National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

Caribbean Publishing Company, Ltd. v. Rummi`s

Claim Number: FA0702000921674

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Caribbean Publishing Company, Ltd. (“Complainant”), represented by Paul D. McGrady, Jr., of Greenberg Traurig, 77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2500, Chicago, IL 60601.  Respondent is Rummi`s (“Respondent”), represented by Andre Brvenik, of The Law Office of Andre Brvenik, 8019 North Himes Avenue, Suite 202, Tampa, FL 33614.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME 

The domain name at issue is <caribbean-yellowpages.com> (the “Domain Name”), registered by Respondent on January 2, 2002 with Wild West Domains, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Christopher Gibson as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) electronically on February 21, 2007; NAF received a hard copy of the Complaint on February 22, 2007.

 

On February 22, 2007, Wild West Domains, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to NAF that the <caribbean-yellowpages.com> domain name is registered with Wild West Domains, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Wild West Domains, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Wild West Domains, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On February 22, 2007, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of March 14, 2007 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@caribbean-yellowpages.com by e-mail.

 

NAF confirmed that a timely Response was received and determined to be complete on March 12, 2007.

 

On March 19, 2007, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel (to which Respondent also agreed), the NAF appointed Christopher Gibson as Panelist.

 

NAF confirmed that the following Additional Submissions were received from the parties in a timely manner, in accordance with NAF Supplemental Rule No. 7: Complainant’s Additional Submission of March 19, 2007, and a letter dated March 22, 2007 from Respondent.

 

On March 27, 2007, NAF transmitted a communication from Respondent’s representative, Andre Brvenik, indicating that he would no longer be acting as attorney for Respondent. 

 

A second Additional Submission was submitted by Respondent on April 6, 2007, Respondent’s Response to Complainant’s Additional Submissions.  This second Additional Submission was accompanied by a Notice of Appearance indicating that Brandon Kolb was now acting as legal representative for Respondent.  The second Additional Submission was determined to be deficient by NAF because it was received after the deadline for submissions and in violation of NAF Supplemental Rule No. 7(e), which permits only one Additional Submission or response (to an Additional Submission) per party.

 

On April 13, 2007, Complainant submitted its Objection to Respondent’s Second Additional Submission.  Complainant requested that Respondent’s second Additional Submission be disallowed, but in the alternative raised additional arguments as Complainant’s second Additional Submission.  NAF indicated that this second Additional Submission of Complainant was deficient because it, too, was received after the deadline for submissions and in violation of NAF Supplemental Rule No. 7(e).  Finally, to complete the cycle of late submissions, Respondent on April 23, 2007 filed its Rebuttal to Complainant’s Objection to Respondent’s Additional Submission.  The NAF considered this last filing of Respondent to be deficient for the same reasons stated above.

 

The Panelist must decide whether to consider both parties’ second Additional Submissions, as well as Respondent’s rebuttal.  The Panel has chosen to consider these submissions from both parties, even though they were submitted late and in violation of Rule 7(e).  The Panelist observes that Respondent substituted attorneys, with the apparent consequence that the new representative considered it important to file the second Additional Submission.  Complainant objected to this submission, but also submitted additional responsive arguments.  In the interest of giving a full hearing to the parties’ contentions, the Panel will consider all of the submissions, including both parties’ second Additional Submissions and Respondent’s rebuttal.

 

Complainant also brought a request to consolidate this case with Case No. FA 914922.  This request was opposed by Respondent.  The Panelist, by order dated April 17, 2007, denied the request to consolidate these cases.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant contends that it is the owner of the trademark CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC (& design); that the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark; that Respondent has no legitimate interests in the Domain Name; and that Respondent has registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith.  Complainant’s arguments are reviewed below.

 

Rights in a trademark: Complainant is a company that provides telephone directories focusing on Caribbean businesses and community information.  Complainant’s online directory currently enables Internet users to find pertinent information including phone numbers, addresses, maps, links to websites, and e-mail addresses. 

 

Complainant is the owner of the U.S. trademark CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC (& design), Reg. no. 1,663,390, covering “classified directories.”  Complainant claims that it first began to use its trademark in 1980.  Complainant has submitted evidence that it filed for its U.S. trademark in July 1989, and received its trademark registration in November 1991.  The trademark registration contains the following disclaimer: “No claim is made to the exclusive right to use ‘yellow pages’ apart from the mark as shown.”

 

Complainant’s principal website is located at <caribbeanyellowpages.com>.  Complainant states that it expanded use of its mark onto the Internet in 1997, and has submitted evidence that its website has been available and in use since at least November 1998.  Complainant therefore claims that it has also established common law rights to the mark, CARIBBEANYELLOWPAGES.COM.

 

The Domain Name was registered by Respondent on January 2, 2002.  Complainant contends that this registration occurred well after Complainant had established trademark rights in its mark.

 

Confusingly similar:  Complainant contends that the Domain Name <caribbean-yellowpages.com> is confusingly similar to its trademark because the Domain Name incorporates the dominant part of Complainant’s mark, CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES, adding only a hyphen between words. 

 

No legitimate interests:  Complainant contends that Respondent has no trademark or other intellectual property rights in the Domain Name, and that Respondent’s use of Complainant’s mark is unauthorized, having received no license or permission from Complainant.  Complainant states that Respondent is predominantly known as “Island Yellow Pages,” and has also been known as “Island Super Pages” or “Rummi’s.”  Complainant has also submitted a WHOIS look-up record for the Domain Name, indicating that the registrant is listed as “Rummi’s.”

 

Complainant contends that Respondent has never operated any bona fide or legitimate business under the Domain Name, nor made non-commercial or fair use of it.  Instead, Respondent is using the Domain Name to offer directly competing services.

 

Registered and using the Domain Name in bad faith:  Complainant contends that Respondent registered the Domain Name in bad faith and is using it in bad faith.  With respect to registration in bad faith, Complainant contends that Respondent offers competing services and had actual or constructive knowledge of Complainant’s mark and rights.  Complainant contends that even if Respondent were able to claim lack of knowledge, U.S. trademark principles of constructive notice should apply.

 

Complainant further contends that Respondent has used the Domain Name in bad faith by redirecting traffic to Respondent’s websites, which offer competing services.  Complainant argues that Respondent’s conduct is squarely within the illustrations of bad faith in the UDRP Policy, paragraph 4(b), which sets forth two applicable examples of bad faith:

 

(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

 

(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.

 

Complainant contends that Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract Complainant’s customers by creating a likelihood of confusion, and that Respondent is using the Domain Name to create a false impression to consumers that they have reached Complainant’s site.  Respondent’s use is therefore disrupting Complainant’s business.

 

Finally, Complainant contends that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct, alleging that the Domain Name lists the same administrative contact name and email as the respondent in the pending NAF Case No. FA 914922, in which Complainant here has submitted a complaint concerning the following domain names: <carribbeanyellowpages.com>, <carribeanyellowpages.com> and <caribyp.com>.

 

B. Respondent

In its Response, Respondent contends that Complainant has no legally protected rights to the terms “Caribbean Yellow Pages;” that Respondent has legitimate interests in the Domain Name; and that Respondent has not registered or used the Domain Name in bad faith.  Respondent’s arguments are reviewed below.

 

Respondent contends that Complainant’s trademark rights are limited only to the mark CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC in conjunction with the design, but do not extend to exclusive rights for the terms “Yellow Pages” or “Caribbean.”  Respondent highlights that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) requires a disclaimer of any exclusive right to use the term “yellow pages.”  Further, the phrase “Caribbean Yellow Pages” is generic and therefore incapable of trademark protection.  In addition, Respondent contends that geographical terms cannot be trademarked unless one can show distinctiveness, and the terms “Caribbean” and/or “yellow pages” in “CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES” have no distinctiveness.

 

With respect to legitimate rights, Respondent contends that it was operating a business website for at least one year prior to Complainant’s website being published.  Respondent therefore argues that it did not disturb or redirect any traffic away from Complainant’s website, since this site did not yet exist at the time Respondent first established its own site.  Additionally, Respondent contends that it has been known as Caribbean Yellow Pages since 2003 and has operated under this name since that time.  Respondent also alleges that Complainant has practiced cybersquatting because it did not use its own registered domain name <caribbeanyellowpages.com> for at least seven years. 

 

Respondent contends that, even though Complainant and Respondent engage in the same area of commerce, they do so using different and distinct methodologies.  Complainant specializes in business to business directory services, while Respondent offers directory services geared more towards individuals. 

 

Respondent denies that it registered or has used the Domain Name in bad faith, or that it has used it to redirect traffic to its own websites.  Respondent states that it registered the domain names <carribbeanyellowpages.com>, <carribeanyellowpages.com> and <caribyp.com> in order to prevent typosquatters from registering these names.  Respondent also refers to domain names registered by other third parties, such as <caribbeanonlineyellowpages.com>, which are “similar” but against which Complainant has yet to file any claim.  Finally, Respondent states that it has never used Complainant’s trademark on its website or claimed to be the same company, but instead has used the tag line “a division of Island Super Pages.”

 

C. Additional Submissions

Complainant:  Complainant’s first Additional Submission highlights that Respondent fails to deny several assertions made by Complainant, including that (i) the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark; (ii) Complainant owns the U.S. mark, CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC; (iii) Respondent used the Domain Name to attract web traffic to its website; and (iv) Respondent had actual or constructive knowledge of Complainant’s trademark rights when it registered the Domain Name.

 

Complainant takes issues with several of Respondent’s arguments.  In response to Respondent’s contention that Complainant does not have exclusive rights because Complainant’s mark is limited to CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC in conjunction with the design, Complainant asserts that the text element of a mark may be protected under the Policy, and that the mere removal of “CPC” while still using the dominant part of Complainant’s mark does not decrease the confusing similarity between the Domain Name and Complainant’s mark.

 

Complainant emphasizes that not only has its trademark achieved incontestable status under U.S. trademark law, but that the commercial impression of a trademark, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, must be derived from the whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail.  Thus, Complainant argues that the relevant issue is whether the textual elements of Complainant’s mark, CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC, taken as a whole, are confusingly similar to the Domain Name.  As to Respondent’s contention that geographical terms cannot be trademarked unless the mark holder can show distinctiveness, Complainant contends that U.S. registered trademarks are presumed by law to be inherently distinctive and to have acquired secondary meaning.

 

Complainant contests Respondent’s assertion that it had rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name because Respondent was using it to direct Internet users to a website that pre-existed the establishment of Complainant’s own site.  Complainant first offers evidence to make clear that it registered its own domain name <caribbeanyellowpages.com> and commenced operating that site in 1998, well before Respondent registered the Domain Name in 2002.  Complainant argues that, to the extent Respondent is asserting it offered services online before Complainant (albeit using a domain name different from the Domain Name), this is not the proper framing of the issue.  The question to be considered under the Policy is not when Complainant first operated its own website, but whether Complainant had rights in its trademark before Respondent registered the Domain Name.  As to this question, Complainant states that it had registered and used its trademark in commerce for more than a decade before Respondent registered the Domain Name.

 

Among the other arguments made by Complainant, it asserts that Respondent’s own statements describing its offering of slightly different services actually emphasize the fact that Respondent is a direct competitor of Complainant.  Complainant argues that whether or not it has taken action against other potentially infringing domain names is irrelevant to this case.  Finally, Complainant contends that the small disclaimer on Respondent’s website does nothing to minimize any confusion and in fact increases the likelihood of confusion.

 

Respondent’s First Additional Submission:  Respondent submitted a letter dated March 22, 2007, from David Phillips as President of Rummi.com.  Mr. Phillips indicates that he is the owner of the Domain Name but clarifies that he is not an attorney.  He states that he registered the Domain Name in 2001, indicating that he did so because he saw the need for an online directory for all of the Caribbean islands, to help people of the islands by opening more trade between them.  Mr. Phillips states that his company has many happy customers.  Rather than redirecting traffic from Complainant’s business, he asserts that Respondent has its own online traffic, which he has worked hard to build.

 

Mr. Phillips views Complainant’s UDRP Complaint as an attempt to take away his online traffic.  He explains that:

 

While I understand that Caribbean Publishing was printing a directory for several years, it is my understanding they were only printing approximately 70,000 copies of this for ALL the Caribbean Islands.  They WERE NOT offering an online directory when I started my business.  Their circulation was very sparse to say the least.  I saw a need to start an online directory that would make the phone numbers accessible to everyone.

 

When I began this venture in June of 2000, while living in the Virgin Islands, no one was doing this or offering this online service.  While Caribbean Publishing claims to have their domain since 1998, they did not have any type of directory online or any promise of such.  I could only presume that they had bought the domain with the intent to sell it.

 

Mr. Phillips argues that he has spent thousands of dollars to establish his business over seven years of his life, and that his business should not be given over to a competitor whose only reason for filing this case is to take away his Internet traffic and attempt to convert his clients into advertising with them.

 

Respondent’s Second Additional Submission:  Respondent, through its new substituted counsel, submitted a Response to Complainant’s Additional Submissions.  Respondent emphasized that the question to be considered is not whether Complainant has a registered trademark – Respondent does not deny that Complainant holds the trademark CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC and design, and acknowledges that the UDRP does not provide the proper venue, in any event, for a challenge to Complainant’s trademark registration.  Instead, the question is whether, because of the trademark CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC, Complainant can monopolize the phrase “yellow pages” and its derivatives.  Respondent also denies that the Domain Name creates confusion with Complainant’s mark, in particular, because Respondent is only relying on the generic and descriptive terms “Caribbean Yellow Pages,” which do not qualify for trademark protection.  Respondent submits that the text “CPC,” as part of Complainant’s mark, distinguishes the specific product as being a telephone directory produced by Caribbean Publishing Company.  In addition, if the Internet user were to log onto Complainant’s site when intending to reach Respondent’s site, there would be no confusion because Internet users are familiar with the Internet and arriving at incorrect sites bearing similar domain names, and they can easily correct their mistakes.  Each of the parties’ sites contain the relevant tradename affiliation on the opening page, and each site provides distinguishable services, tailored to separate market segments.   

 

Respondent further emphasizes that there is no intent to attract Internet users who were looking for Complainant.  In this regard, Respondent refers to the previous submission of Mr. Phillips on this point, and stresses that there is no reference to Complainant’s product, services, trade name or trademark anywhere on Respondent’s website.

 

Finally, Respondent again contends that it has rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name, stemming from its consistent use of the Domain Name to direct traffic to its website over several years.  “The Respondent’s interest in the use of the name has been established and continues to accrue as a result of several years of uninterrupted use and a substantial amount of development.”  Respondent emphasizes that substantial Internet traffic arrives at the Domain Name, and Respondent’s site has achieved larger market recognition than Complainant’s site.  Respondent alleges that Complainant registered a single domain name describing its trademarked product and “sat dormant for nearly seven years while a company it claims to consider a competitor developed another, similar name….”  Respondent argues that deciding in favor of Complainant under these circumstances would amount to unjust enrichment.

 

Complainant’s Second Additional Submission:  Respondent’s second Additional Submission triggered a response from Complainant.  Complainant’s Second Additional Submission argues that Respondent is attempting “to confuse the straight forward issues in this dispute.”  Among the points raised, Complainant again emphasizes that trademarks should be considered in their entirety and not “dissected” – Respondent improperly dissects Complainant’s mark by separating out the “CPC” and “yellow pages” elements.  Second, Complainant rejects Respondent’s contention that there is no confusion, asserting that the mere addition of a dash or hyphen in the domain name does not diminish or obviate confusion.  Complainant also takes issue with Respondent’s attempt to contend it is not a competitor.  The letter of Mr. Phillips, CEO of Respondent, refers to Complainant as a “competitor.”  Finally, Complainant emphasizes that Respondent cannot develop legitimate interests by being a “successful infringer” of Complainant’s trademark.

 

Respondents Rebuttal:  Respondent’s final submission briefly lists several final points, most of which were previously covered.  Among them Respondent contends that the parties appear to agree that the only issue is whether the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark; that considering Complainant’s trademark in its entirety must include all of the elements (including CPC and graphic, and not just “yellow pages” or “Caribbean yellow pages”); that the ultimate issue is whether Respondent’s long use of the Domain Name infringes on the protections of Complainant’s trademark; and finally that Complainant has not rebutted any duty it had to have acted sooner to protect its rights.

 

FINDINGS

The Panel finds that Complainant is the owner of the U.S. trademark CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC (& design) (Reg. No. 1,663,390), covering “classified directories.”  Complainant filed for its U.S. trademark in July 1989, and received its trademark registration in November 1991.  The trademark registration contains the disclaimer: “No claim is made to the exclusive right to use ‘yellow pages’ apart from the mark as shown.”  Complainant’s principal website is located at <caribbeanyellowpages.com>.  Complainant’s website has been available and in use since at least November 1998.  The Domain Name was registered by Respondent on January 2, 2002.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights;

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has clearly established rights in its CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC (and design) mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  The trademark has achieved incontestable status under U.S. trademark law and this has not been disputed by Respondent.

 

Instead, the focus of both parties’ arguments has been on the issue of whether or not the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark.  In particular, Complainant has asserted that the Domain Name <caribbean-yellowpages.com> is confusingly similar to its trademark because it contains the dominant part of Complainant’s mark in its entirety and merely inserts a hyphen between the terms “caribbean” and “yellow pages.”  Complainant has referred to previous UDRP cases in which the addition of punctuation marks, such as a hyphen, is considered irrelevant in the determination of confusing similarity under the Policy.  See Health Devices Corp. v. Aspen S T C, FA 158254 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 1, 2003) (“[T]he addition of punctuation marks such as hyphens is irrelevant in the determination of confusing similarity pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).

 

While the Panelist would agree that the introduction of a hyphen, alone, would normally not be sufficient to avoid confusion between a domain name and a trademark, this is not the key point on which Respondent hinges its arguments.  Respondent contends that there is no confusing similarity because the Domain Name consists only of the terms “caribbean” and “yellow pages,” which are generic, descriptive and incapable of being within the scope of Complainant’s trademark rights.  Thus, the question of confusing similarity turns on whether the terms which comprise the Domain Name fall within the scope of Complainant’s protectable rights.

 

Both parties have made reference to legal authorities under U.S. law.  The Panelist is extremely reluctant, in the context of this domain name dispute, to accept arguments by Respondent that would amount to a significant challenge to the distinctiveness and secondary meaning of Complainant’s incontestable trademark, which under U.S. law is presumed to be inherently distinctive and to have acquired secondary meaning.  See Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. v. Wick, FA 117861 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16, 2002) (“Under U.S. trademark law, registered marks hold a presumption that they are inherently distinctive [or] have acquired secondary meaning.”).  Complainant has referred to Diners Club v. MForce Communications, FA 708908 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 27, 2006), which the Panelist finds to be instructive because the three-member panel in that case carefully considered similar issues.  There, the respondent essentially contended that the trademark in question had become generic.  In this case, Respondent argues that the elements of Complainant’s trademark which have been incorporated into the Domain Name are generic.  The three-member panel in Diners Club reasoned in relevant part that:

 

This is of course a domain name dispute and the standards and tests that are used when trademarks are said to collide do not necessarily apply to the same degree.  However it is worth noting that the Supreme Court of the United States held, in a court case to enjoin infringement of a registered and uncontestable trademark, that such an action may not be defended by the adverse party on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive.  See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).  That reasoning suggests that in domain name disputes, such as this one, where the Complainant has a registered and incontestable mark, a Respondent should not be permitted to defend the domain name dispute on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive or generic as to the issue of rights and legitimate interests.  As the Supreme Court stated, an incontestable mark that becomes generic may be cancelled at any time pursuant to the Lanham Act.  That cause of action places the burden of proof on the party seeking cancellation.  That is the proper method for resolving such a controversy.

 

Here, Complainant’s trademark had been registered and used by Complainant, albeit primarily in the off-line context, for more than 10 years prior to the date on which Respondent registered the Domain Name.  While Respondent attempts to attack Complainant’s online activity as being limited – an attack to which Complainant has submitted reasonable evidence in response – Respondent has failed to address the prior off-line commercial activities of Complainant, which would have contributed to distinctiveness and secondary meaning for Complainant’s mark.  In fact, Respondent’s president, Mr. Phillips, appears to acknowledge that he was aware that Complainant was “printing a directory for several years” and “printing approximately 70,000 copies” of its directory for the Caribbean Islands at or about the time when Respondent first chose to register the Domain Name and to establish its own online activities.  These references do nothing to detract from the presumptions of distinctiveness and secondary meaning that accompany Complainant’s registered mark.  The present case is not one where the comparison is between two domain names, but between the Domain Name and an incontestable trademark registration that has been used by Complainant both off-line and online.  Respondent has failed to provide sufficient evidence in this case to overcome the high threshold of showing that Complainant’s registered mark, even when comprised of certain terms that alone may not be distinctive, has not attained secondary meaning or distinctiveness.  Moreover, even as Respondent has recognized, such a challenge would be better placed in different forum.

 

The final piece of the confusing similarity analysis relates to a direct comparison of the Domain Name with Complainant’s mark.  Complainant contends that the relevant issue is whether the textual elements of Complainant’s mark, CARIBBEAN YELLOW PAGES CPC, taken as a whole, are confusingly similar to the Domain Name.  Complainant further argues that Respondent’s position would improperly dissect Complainant’s mark by separating out the “CPC” and “yellow pages” elements.  Both parties have cited Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commisioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538 (1920), in which the Supreme Court ruled that “the commercial impression of a trademark is derived from it as a whole.” Respondent, however, emphasizes that Complainant’s entire mark must be taken to include the “CPC” text (and the design element), which is the element that really serves to distinguish Complainant’s mark. 

 

The Panelist disagrees with Respondent’s position.  The overall impression when comparing the “Caribbean Yellow Pages CPC” mark with “Caribbean-yellow pages.com” is one that easily yields a finding of confusing similarity.  See Gen. Steel Domestic Sales LLC v. Malinuskii, FA 140653 (Nat. Arb. Forum, March 4, 2004) (finding <generalsteel.com> to be confusingly similar to GENERAL STEEL CORPORATION mark).   

 

In conclusion, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

As noted above, Complainant contends that Respondent has no trademark or other intellectual property rights in the Domain Name, that Respondent’s use of Complainant’s mark is unauthorized, and that Respondent is predominantly known as “Island Yellow Pages,” and has also been known as “Island Super Pages” or “Rummi’s.”  Complainant submitted a copy of the web page corresponding to the Domain Name, where the business name that appears is “Island Yellow Pages.”  Complainant also asserted that Respondent has never operated any bona fide or legitimate business under the Domain Name.

 

Respondent rejected these contentions, indicating that it has rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name based on its consistent and uninterrupted use of the Domain Name over several years and with a substantial amount of development.  Respondent also contended that it was operating a business website for at least one year prior to Complainant’s website being published, and therefore argues that it did not disturb or redirect any traffic away from Complainant’s website.  Respondent asserts that it has been known as Caribbean Yellow Pages since 2003 and has operated under this name since that time.  Respondent argues that Complainant has “sat dormant” and took no measures to protect its rights, while Respondent was developing its online business.

 

The Panel finds that Respondent cannot establish rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.  First, as discussed above, Respondent’s arguments focus only on online activities and do not weigh Complainant’s off-line commercial activities and use of its trademark, which were established well before Respondent chose to register the Domain Name.  Second, Complainant submitted evidence to show that its own website was available from at least 1998, more than three years before Respondent registered the Domain Name in dispute.  Respondent claims it was operating its business website more than one year prior to Complainant’s website being published, which would mean approximately 1997, yet Mr. Phillips as CEO of Respondent indicates in his letter of March 22, 2007 that he began his business venture in June 2000.  Thus, we have a chronology in which Complainant obtained its registered trademark in 1991, then registered its own domain name <caribbeanyellowpages.com> in 1997 and published and maintained its website under that name since November 1998 at the latest.  It was more than three years later, in January 2002, that Respondent registered the Domain Name, in the face of what appears to be Mr. Phillips’ knowledge of Complainant’s and its business at that time.  It is no excuse that Respondent was dissatisfied with Complainant’s business offerings in terms of meeting the needs of the Caribbean community.  Respondent could have chosen a different domain name that did not give rise to the issues which are now before this Panel.  It is important to recall that each time a domain name is registered, the registrant represents in the registration agreement that to the best of the registrant’s knowledge and belief, neither the registration of the domain name nor the manner in which it is directly or indirectly used infringes the legal rights of any third party.

 

Respondent has also provided no evidence in support of its statement that it has been known as the Caribbean Yellow Pages since 2003.  Instead, the documentation before the Panel indicates that Respondent has been known as “Island Yellow Pages,” “Island Super Pages” or “Rummi’s.”  The current website refers to Island Yellow Pages and “CBT.cc,” while Respondent indicates that the website previously had the tag line “a division of Island Super Pages.”  By contrast, Complainant submitted a copy in its amended exhibits of a letter from its legal representative to Respondent dated March 2004, in which it demanded that Respondent cease and desist from using Complainant’s trademark and to transfer the Domain Name to Complainant.  See Am. Online, Inc. v. World Photo Video & Imaging Corp., FA 109031 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 13, 2002) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by <aolcamera.com> or <aolcameras.com> because the respondent was doing business as “Sunset Camera” and “World Photo Video & Imaging Corp.”).

 

All of these circumstances together suggest that, even in the face of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name for its own business, such use has not established rights or legitimate interests for Respondent.  See Or. State Bar v. A Special Day, Inc., FA 99657 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 4, 2001) (“Respondent's advertising of legal services and sale of law-related books under Complainant's name is not a bona fide offering of goods and services because Respondent is using a mark confusingly similar to Complainant's to sell competing goods.”)

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Complainant contends that Respondent registered the Domain Name in bad faith and is using it in bad faith, that Respondent had actual or constructive knowledge of Complainant’s mark, and offered competing services.  Complainant argues that Respondent’s conduct is also squarely within the illustrations of bad faith in the Policy, paragraph 4(b), which sets forth two examples of bad faith:

 

(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

 

(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.

 

Complainant contends that Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract Complainant’s customers by creating a likelihood of confusion, and that Respondent is using the Domain Name to create a false impression to consumers that they have reached Complainant’s site.  Finally, Complainant contends that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct, registering other infringing domain names.

 

Respondent denies that it registered or has used the Domain Name in bad faith, or that it has used the Domain Name to redirect traffic to its own websites.  Respondent contends that, even though Complainant and Respondent engage in the same area of commerce, they do so using different and distinct methodologies.  Respondent also argues, as noted above, that its website was established before Complainant’s site, and therefore no traffic was “redirected” to Respondent’s site.  Respondent also referred to domain names registered by other third parties which are “similar” but against which Complainant has filed no claims.  Respondent contends that it has never used Complainant’s trademark on its website or claimed to be the same company, but instead used the tag line “a division of Island Super Pages.”  Finally, Respondent states that it registered the domain names <carribbeanyellowpages.com>, <carribeanyellowpages.com> and <caribyp.com> in order to prevent typosquatters from registering them.

 

Weighing the parties’ arguments and the evidence, the Panelist determines that Respondent registered the Domain Name in bad faith and has used it in bad faith.  First, the evidence supports the view that Respondent was aware of Complainant at the time when Respondent registered the Domain Name.  Mr. Phillips acknowledges this much in his letter of March 22, 2007, where he described his motivation for starting his online directory service and registering the Domain Name:

 

While I understood that Caribbean Publishing was printing a directory for several years, it was my understanding they were only printing approximately 70,000 copies of this for ALL the Caribbean Islands.  They WERE NOT offering an online directory when I started my business….

 

Clearly Mr. Phillips was aware of Complainant and its business activities at the time when he was commencing his operations – he states very clearly that he knew “[t]hey WERE NOT offering an online directory” at that time.  Complainant, however, had registered its trademarks and commenced operations at least 10 years before this time.  Even if Mr. Phillips, as CEO of Respondent, was not specifically aware of Complainant’s federally registered mark, this is no excuse under these circumstances.  Here, imputing to Respondent constructive knowledge of Complainant’s trademarks – that is, the trademarks of a company operating in the same area of commerce (although offering slightly different products and services) and targeting the same geographic region – is not going too far.  Bad faith registration can be found when a domain name registrant uses the mark of another with knowledge of the mark holder’s rights.  See Samsonite Corp. v. Colony Holding, FA 94313 (Nat. Arb. Forum, April 17, 2000) (finding evidence of bad faith includes actual or constructive knowledge of a mark at the time of registration); see also Digi Int’l v. DDI Sys., FA 124506 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 24, 2002 (“There is a legal presumption of bad faith, when Respondent reasonably should have been aware of Complainant’s trademarks, actually or constructively.”); see also Nintendo of America Inc. v. Pokemon, D2000-1230 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2000) (finding that respondent, at the time of registration, had notice of complainant’s trademarks and thus registered the domain name in bad faith). 

 

Respondent has made the same mistake that many other domain name registrants have made when registering a name: Respondent ignored what Complainant had been doing everywhere except on the Internet, as if this other activity had no relevance to his choice of a domain name, and no legal relevance even now as Respondent seeks to justify registration of the Domain Name.  If the Panelist were to accept this approach, it would significantly undermine the legal rights and protections that arise through trademark registrations and conduct which takes place elsewhere than on the Internet.  In the opinion of the Panel, Respondent exercised, at best, poor judgment and, at worst, calculation in its approach on these issues.

 

The Panel also finds that Respondent has used the Domain Name to attract Internet users to its website offering services in close competition with Complainant.  Because of the confusing similarity between Complainant’s mark and the Domain Name, Internet users may mistakenly believe that Respondent’s website is sponsored by or affiliated with Complainant.  There is at least initial interest confusion, which cannot be completely remedied by statements on the website itself.  Although Respondent contends that its website existed first in time, Complainant has offered evidence to call this assertion into question.  Furthermore, even if a website of Respondent might have existed earlier, it was a site published under a different domain name, not the Domain Name in dispute.  The “likelihood of confusion” that is the concern of paragraph (4)(b)(iv) of the Policy is with respect to Complainant’s trademark, not simply who first established a website.  Finally, it is of no relevance to this case that Complainant has not filed claims against every third party whom might have registered a confusingly similar domain name. 

 

The Panel finds that Respondent has engaged in bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ (4)(b)(iv).  See Identigene, Inc. v. Genetest Labs., D2000-1100 (WIPO Nov. 30, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent's use of the domain name at issue to resolve to a website where similar services are offered to Internet users is likely to confuse the user into believing that the complainant is the source of or is sponsoring the services offered at the site); see also MathForum.com, LLC v. Weiguang Huang, D2000-0743 (WIPO Aug. 17, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) where the respondent registered a domain name confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark and the domain name was used to host a commercial website that offered similar services offered by the complainant under its mark).

 

The Panel concludes that, in the totality of the circumstances, Respondent’s registration and use of the Domain Names is indicative of bad faith under the Policy.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <caribbean-yellowpages.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Christopher Gibson, Panelist
Dated: May 9, 2007

 

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