National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

AA Portable Power Corp. v. Kevin Li

Claim Number: FA0703000931648

 

PARTIES

Complainant is AA Portable Power Corp. (“Complainant”), represented by Raymond G. Areaux, of Carver, Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux, LLC, 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 2700, New Orleans, LA 70163.  Respondent is Kevin Li (“Respondent”), represented by Harvey I. Jacobs, of DomainStatute.com, 4142 Hayvenhurst Drive, Encino, CA 91436.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <batteryspace.com>, registered with Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. d/b/a Directnic.com.

 

PANEL

The undersigned Panelists certify that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

James Bridgeman, Chairman;

Diane Cabell, Panelist;

Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint under the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”) to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on March 2, 2007; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on March 5, 2007.

 

On March 6, 2007, Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. d/b/a Directnic.com confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <batteryspace.com> domain name is registered with Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. d/b/a Directnic.com and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. d/b/a Directnic.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. d/b/a Directnic.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the Policy.

 

On March 8, 2007, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of March 28, 2007 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@batteryspace.com by e-mail.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on March 28, 2007.

 

Timely Additional Submissions were received from Complainant on April 2, 2007.

 

On April 4, 2007, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed a three-member Panel as follows:

 

James Bridgeman, Chairman;

Diane Cabell, Panelist;

Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson, Panelist.

 

Subsequently timely Additional Submissions were received from Respondent on April 10, 2007.

 

The Panel being unable to agree on an important issue of interpretation of the Policy hereby makes a majority decision and the dissenting Opinion of panelist Diane Cabell is annexed hereto.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name <batteryspace.com> be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

 

In the Complaint, Complainant states that in August of 2002, Complainant hired Respondent as an online marketing manager responsible inter alia for the development of an e-commerce business for Complainant.  On December 6, 2002, Respondent registered the domain name <batteryspace.com> on behalf of Complainant for use in its planned e-commerce business.  Unbeknownst to Complainant and without Complainant’s authorization, however, Respondent listed himself, rather than Complainant, as the registrant of <batteryspace.com>. 

 

In December of 2005 when Respondent left Complainant’s employment, Complainant realized for the first time that Respondent had registered the domain name <batteryspace.com> in his own personal name rather than in Complainant’s name.

 

When Complainant requested Respondent to transfer the registration of the domain name <batteryspace.com> to Complainant, Respondent initially agreed to transfer the registration.  Respondent also demanded payment of an additional bonus for his contribution to set up Complaint’s e-commerce business, which bonus Complainant agreed to pay.  Complainant then requested Respondent to transfer the registration.  At this point, Respondent demanded even more bonus money and, holding the registration hostage, refused to transfer the registration.  Complainant refused to pay the additional money. Respondent has still failed to transfer the registration of <batteryspace.com> to Complainant.

 

Complainant submits that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights. Complainant enjoys extensive common-law trademark rights in the marks BATTERY SPACE, BATTERYSPACE, and BATTERYSPACE.COM by virtue of Complainant’s use of these marks in connection with online retail sales of batteries and electronic devices, including battery chargers, battery analyzers, cases, bags, converters, connectors, wires, DC motors, flashlights, halogen lamps, Universal Power Supply systems, binoculars, and telescopes on Complainant’s website located at <batteryspace.com> since 2002. Complainant displays said trademarks in a prominent manner on the web pages and also in the title bar of the web browser.  In this fashion, Complainant uses said trademarks to identify the source of its online retail services and to distinguish its services from online retail services offered by others, thus creating common-law trademark rights.

 

In addition to the rights acquired by use of said marks in connection with online retail sales, Complainant has further acquired common-law trademark rights to the mark BATTERYSPACE.COM through its use of the domain name <batteryspace.com> for more than four years to display a website offering its batteries and various electronic devices for sale.  Complainant cites Gorstew Limited v. Superman, D2001-1103 (WIPO Nov. 5, 2001) in support of the proposition that “if a domain name has accumulated a great deal of goodwill via a popular website, and is used to sell products or services and identify their source or advertise these products and services, then the domain name would at least have achieved the status of a common law trademark.”

 

Complainant claims to have acquired a substantial goodwill through extensive promotion and advertising of its online retail services under said trademarks.  Said trademarks have become famous and distinctive and are assets of incalculable value to Complainant.

 

In addition, Complainant owns and actively uses the domain name <batteryspace.com> as its primary domain name and claims to be entitled to ownership of the domain name registration.

 

Complainant claims that the <batteryspace.com> domain name is identical to Complainant’s BATTERYSPACE.COM mark and is confusingly similar to Complainant’s BATTERY SPACE and BATTERYSPACE marks.  The slight differences between the <batteryspace.com> domain name and Complainant’s BATTERY SPACE and BATTERYSPACE marks (to-wit: the addition of a generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) and the elimination of the space between the words BATTERY and SPACE) are insufficient to distinguish the disputed domain name from Complainant’s BATTERY SPACE and BATTERYSPACE marks.  It is well settled that the addition of a gTLD extension to a prior mark (as is the case with BATTERY SPACE and BATTERYSPACE) and the elimination of a space between two words (as is the case with BATTERY SPACE) is insufficient to avoid confusing similarity.  In support of these propositions Complainant cites CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. Worldwide Webs, Inc., D2000-0834 (WIPO Sept. 4, 2000) (finding that the elimination of the spaces and addition of a gTLD in <ilovelucy.com> was insufficient to avoid confusing similarity to the complainant’s I LOVE LUCY registered mark); Document Technologies, Inc. v. International Electronic Communications, Inc., D2000-0270 (WIPO June 6, 2000) (finding that the elimination of the spaces and addition of a gTLD in <htmlease.com> was insufficient to avoid confusing similarity to the complainant’s HTML EASE mark); CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. Toeppen, D2000-0400 (WIPO Feb. 28, 2001) (finding that the elimination of the spaces and addition of a gTLD in <twilightzone.com> was insufficient to avoid confusing similarity to the complainant’s THE TWILIGHT ZONE registered mark because “the addition of .net or .com or the absence of a space between the words is not significant in determining similarity”).

 

Complainant submits that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name that is the subject of the Complaint.  Complainant submits that Respondent registered the domain name <batteryspace.com> while he was an employee of Complainant for the sole purpose of developing an e-commerce business for Complainant.  Respondent was not authorized by Complainant to register the domain name <batteryspace.com> in his own name and therefore never possessed any rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name <batteryspace.com>.  Complainant cites the decisions of the panels in Sonic-Crest Cadillac, LLC v. Neil Hayes, FA 212652 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 14, 2004) (“As an employee or agent of Complainant, Respondent knew that it had no right to register the disputed domain names . . . and knew that any use of these domain names would be illegitimate.”); Vinidex Pty. Ltd. v. Auinger, AF-0402 (eResolution Oct. 18, 2000) (finding that the respondent, a former employee of the complainant, lacked any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name because the respondent had constructive knowledge of the complainant’s superior rights).

 

The domain name <batteryspace.com> has been used for more than four years by Complainant – not by Respondent – to display a website offering for sale Complainant’s batteries and various electronic devices.  Accordingly, Respondent neither uses, nor has made demonstrable preparations to use, the <batteryspace.com> domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.  Inasmuch as the website associated with <batteryspace.com> is owned and operated by Complainant and has been so owned and operated for the past four years, it is impossible for Respondent to have used or made preparations to use <batteryspace.com> in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.

 

Furthermore, Complainant asserts that Respondent is not commonly known by the <batteryspace.com> domain name.  Complainant further asserts that on information and belief, Respondent is known only by the name on the WHOIS record for <batteryspace.com> viz.  Kevin Li.

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent’s sole purpose for registering the domain name <batteryspace.com> in his personal name and thereafter refusing to transfer the registration to Complainant was, and continues to be, to use the domain name as leverage against Complainant.  Such use is not legitimate commercial, noncommercial, or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  In support of this argument Complainant cites the decision of the panel in Pristine International Traders v. Pristine Financial Services LLC, FA 882258 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 22, 2007) (finding that Respondent’s “holding the disputed domain name ‘hostage’ in order to lower the amount it owes to Complainant” was not a legitimate use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).

 

Complainant asserts that Complainant has never licensed nor otherwise authorized Respondent to use any of its trademarks or service marks for any purpose whatsoever.

 

Complainant submits that Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith.  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in <batteryspace.com>.  Respondent was employed by Complainant at the time that he registered the domain name at issue and had full knowledge of Complainant’s intention to use the domain name in connection with Complainant’s e-commerce business.  In fact, Respondent was given the specific task of registering <batteryspace.com> on behalf of Complainant, not in his own name. 

 

As a result, Respondent plainly registered the domain name at issue in bad faith.  See Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv); see also Robilant & Associati SRL v. Powerlab SNC, D2006-0991 (WIPO Oct. 5, 2006) (finding that Respondent’s act of registering domain names in its own name, rather than in its client’s name, was evidence of bad faith registration); Champion Innovation, Ltd. v. Udo Dussling, D2005-1094 (WIPO Dec. 16, 2005) (stating that where “Respondent was expected to register the Domain Name in the name of Complainant [his employer]…the Respondent’s refusal to follow his employer’s instruction and his registration of the Domain Name in his own name constitutes bad faith registration.”); Cricket Techs., L.L.C. v. Martin, FA 311353 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 27, 2004) (“Since Respondent registered [the domain name in dispute] within the scope of employment with Complainant, Respondent’s act of registering the domain name in his individual name and providing his personal contact information … is evidence that Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith.”); Sonic-Crest Cadillac, LLC v. Hayes, FA 212652 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 14, 2004) (holding that where Respondent “registered the disputed domain names on behalf of and with instructions from Complainant, but registered them in the name of Respondent’s entity . . . Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain names for any entity other than Complainant is evidence of bad faith.”). 

Further evidence that Respondent has used <batteryspace.com> in bad faith is found in Respondent’s demand for monetary compensation in exchange for the transfer of the domain name to Complainant’s control.  See Robilant, & Associati SRL v. Powerlab SNC, D2006-0991 (WIPO Oct. 5, 2006) (“preparedness to sell the disputed names … to the Complainant … at an excessive price…[is] sufficient to satisfy the circumstances of paragraph 4(b)(i) [of the Policy]); Dynojet Research, Inc. v. Norman, AF-0316 (eResolution Sept. 26, 2000) (finding that respondent demonstrated bad faith when he requested monetary compensation beyond out-of-pocket costs in exchange for the registered domain name); Sonic-Crest, Cadillac, LLC v. Hayes, FA 212652 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 14, 2004).

Complainant argues that the fact that Respondent has not yet used the domain name in a manner adverse to Complainant does not absolve Respondent.  See Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. Norins, FA 97291 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 3, 2001); see also Phat Fashions, LLC v. Kruger, FA 96193 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 29, 2000); Blemain Group v. Frost, D2006-0871 (WIPO Aug. 29, 2006).

In the present case, the “unspoken threat of future misuse” is plain.  With his control of the domain name, Respondent has the ability at any time to, inter alia, change the DNS name server information and disrupt the operation of Complainant’s website.

As in Champion Innovation, Robilant, Sonic-Crest and the other cases cited above, Respondent herein is nothing more than a recalcitrant ex-employee who registered a domain name in his own name without the knowledge, consent, or authorization of his employer.

Complainant submits that for all the reasons discussed above, Respondent’s failure to transfer control of <batteryspace.com> to Complainant is clear proof of Respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the domain name.

 

B. Respondent

 

Respondent’s Preliminary Submissions as to Jurisdiction of Panel

 

In his Response, Respondent submits that this is not a cybersquatting case at all.  Rather, this is a breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty dispute between former partners.  Respondent submits that Complainant’s grounds for relief are beyond the purview of the Policy and should be addressed to a court.  Respondent cites Latent Technology Group v. Fritchie, FA 95285 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 1, 2000).

Respondent claims that the contractual relationship between the Parties is markedly different in nature from those represented in the Complaint.  Respondent is an e-commerce developer and when Complainant sought to expand its business to the online world, the parties entered into an oral agreement, which provided that Respondent would: register in his name, a domain name; develop an e-commerce website; promote it and license the site’s use by the Complainant for the duration of the contract.  Accordingly, the domain name was registered in Respondent’s name, but was configured in a way that the domain has pointed, and still points, to Complainant’s DNS servers.

 

Respondent states that at all times Complainant alone has determined and continues to determine the contents displayed on the website established at the <batteryspace.com> domain name address.

 

Complainant has paid Respondent only a fraction of the amount owed for his work.  Although Respondent, being the registrant, is able to change the domain’s DNS settings, he has not done so despite Complainant’s breach of their contract.  In so doing, Respondent has shown willingness to allow Complainant additional time and opportunities to keep its end of the bargain.  In so doing, Respondent has demonstrated good, not bad, faith.

 

In addition to direct monetary compensation, the parties also agreed that Complainant will issue Respondent options for 10% of its shares.  Complainant, however, did not deliver, and also refused to reduce the oral understandings to writing.  That is another reason why Complainant cannot support any of its claims with written documents shedding light on the scope and content of the parties’ business relations.

 

The only arguable reason that Complainant is seeking relief in this forum is that the property at issue is a domain name citing Thread.com, LLC v. Poploff, D2000-1470 (WIPO Jan. 11, 2001); Discover New England v. Avanti Group, Inc. FA 123886 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 6, 2002) (finding the dispute outside the scope of the Policy because the dispute centered on the interpretation of contractual language and whether or not a breach occurred); Sadoun v. Shoham, FA 206314 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 6, 2004) (finding that the case’s issues “exceed the scope of the […]  Policy.  The parties admit a prior relationship in the business but disagree as to that relationship.  Respondent [Shoham] may have engaged in fraudulent conduct in its dealings with the registrar to the domain name.  Respondent stated an intent to bring suit over the ownership issues.  These issues are breach of contract and breach of fiduciary issues between the parties and they are matters to be determined in a court of law and not by a UDRP Panel”).

 

Even had Respondent been contractually required to transfer the disputed domain name to Complainant (which is not the case), he would still have a right to hold the domain name registration as security until he is paid in full for the services performed.  See Clinomics Biosciences, Inc. v. Simplicity Software, Inc., D2001-0823 (WIPO Aug. 28, 2001) (declining to rule on the merits after finding that the dispute centered on whether Respondent could retain control of a domain name as security for payment for web design work, a subject matter within the law of liens, and outside the scope of the UDRP Policy).  UDRP panels have declined to intervene even in cases where respondents did not contest complainants’ claim of domain name ownership.  See CMM, LLC v. Seckinger FA 340359 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 6, 2004) (“[T]he dispute involves contractual issues.  The dispute is not over who is entitled to the domain name.  Respondent agrees that Complainant is entitled to it.  The only issues are whether Complainant owes Respondent money for registering and holding this domain name for Complainant and whether holding the domain name as security is appropriate.  Both questions are contractual agreement issues”).

Respondents Submissions on Substantive Issues

 

Addressing the tests set out in the Policy, Respondent submits that Complainant has absolutely no trademark rights in any of the three terms mentioned in the Complaint.  Complainant admits its purported mark is not registered anywhere in the world, but contends that it acquired common law rights.

Respondent refers to the WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions and in particular to the consensus view of what is required of a complainant to successfully assert common-law or unregistered trademark rights.  Respondent refers to the consensus view that “complainant must show that the name has become a distinctive identifier associated with the complainant or its goods or services.  Relevant evidence of such ‘secondary meaning’ includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”

 

Respondent submits that Complainant has not provided any evidence of the volume of sales associated with its purported mark or its advertising expenditure.  Complainant did not sell under the term “BatterySpace” on the site’s main page and marketing pages.  The disputed domain name was just one of three mirror sites Complainant used in business: <batteryspace.com>, <bydusa.com> and <powerizer-usa.com>.

 

Complainant no longer uses either <bydusa.com> or <powerizer-usa.com>.  Printouts submitted by Complainant as annexes to the Complaint focus on the site’s forum pages, rather than the marketing pages, because its purported mark can’t be found there.  The “discussions” on the forum pages are by unidentified individuals using pseudonyms, who may or may not be authentic customers or would-be customers.  Complainant offers no evidence of distinctiveness or secondary meaning.

 

The evidence supplied by Complainant is not sufficient to establish Complainant’s claimed common law rights in the marks, citing Prime Connections, LLC v. Covanta Corp., FA 817103 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 18, 2006) and Molecular Nutrition, Inc. v. Network News & Publications, FA 156725 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 24, 2003)

 

Complainant’s failure to demonstrate that an unregistered putative mark has acquired the necessary distinctiveness and secondary meaning is fatal to its case citing Rivkin v. American European Marketing, FA 849015 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 11, 2007).

 

Complainant does not (and cannot) allege any commercial use of the mark which predates Respondent’s registration.  On the contrary, it claimed that it had gained trademark rights as a result of the term being displayed on the website.  But no term could have been displayed on that website until after the registration of the disputed domain name.  And the Complaint does not allege any offline use of the term in commerce, before or after the registration.  Since Complainant’s alleged trademark rights did not commence prior to Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name, the Panel may find that Complainant cannot establish Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) under the holdings of prior decisions under the Policy.  YourTurf, Inc. v. Gowan, FA 462460 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2005).

 

Respondent claims to have rights and legitimate interests in respect of the domain name, specifically, under ¶ 4(c)(i).  Before any notice to Respondent of the dispute, Respondent’s use of the domain name is in connection with a bona fide offering of goods.  Pursuant to the contract between the parties, Respondent has been using the domain name to direct visitors to Complainant’s DNS servers, which Complainant in turn uses to sell its own merchandise.  The goods offered on the site are Complainant’s goods and are offered by Complainant.  As long as the domain name’s DNS settings point to Complainant’s website, Complainant alone is responsible for the content it displays.  This use of the domain began as part of the agreement and the Complaint acknowledges that.  The time to issue a ¶ 4(c)(i) notice is prior to the beginning of use, not after relations between the parties soured.  Mirama Enters. Inc v. Gorman, FA 588486 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2006).

 

Respondent asserts that for there to be a violation of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), a respondent must register and use a domain name in bad faith.  Since Complainant concedes Respondent registered the disputed domain name pursuant to an agreement between the parties it follows that Respondent did not register the domain name in bad faith.

 

Since Complainant’s alleged trademark rights post-date the disputed domain name registration, panels have found that “the trademark must predate the domain name” pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) for the domain name to have been registered and used in bad faith.  See Ode v. Intership Ltd., D2001-0074 (WIPO May 1, 2001); see also Interep Nat'l Radio Sales, Inc. v. Internet Domain Names, Inc., D2000-0174 (WIPO May 26, 2000) (finding no bad faith where Respondent registered the domain prior to Complainant’s use of the mark); see also Open Sys. Computing AS v. degli Alessandri, D2000-1393 (WIPO Dec. 11, 2000) (finding no bad faith where Respondent registered the domain name in question before application and commencement of use of the trademark by Complainant); see also YourTurf, Inc. v. Gowan FA 462460 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2005); see also Creative Paradox LLC v. Talk Am., FA 155175 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 23, 2003) (finding no bad faith registration of the domain name where the Panel found evidence that Respondent was authorized to register the disputed domain name by Complainant).

 

C. Complainant’s Additional Submissions

 

In its Additional Submissions, Complainant submits that this dispute falls within the purview of the Policy.

 

In addition to the above-cited problems with Respondent’s allegations, the decisions cited by Respondent are taken out of context and should be given no weight.  Respondent goes to great lengths to trumpet the number of times Latent Technology Group v. Fritchie, FA 95285 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 1, 2000) and The Thread.com LLC v. Poploff, D2001-1470 (WIPO Jan. 5, 2001) have been cited.  However, neither of these decisions is applicable to the dispute at hand because they did not involve the employer-employee relationship found in the present case.  Complainant made detailed submissions distinguishing the decisions in said cases.  In Latent Technology Group v. Fritchie, FA 95285 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 1, 2000), the respondent owned the domain name <sooiee.com> prior to his employment with the complainant, and respondent had already developed <sooiee.com> into a commercial venture prior to his employment by the complainant; in The Thread.com, the respondent was a co-founder of the complainant and was the President of the complainant at the time the domain name in question was registered; Discover New England v. Avanti Group, Inc., FA 123886 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 6, 2002) involved a licensing agreement between the complainant and the respondent for the trademark at issue, the resolution of which would have been dispositive of the domain name dispute; in Sadoun v. Shoham, FA 206314 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 6, 2004), the parties admitted to a “prior business relationship,” the nature of which was apparently in dispute and which, importantly, involved a question of ownership of the complainant.

 

Complainant submits the cases related to security rights are inapposite as it is well settled that, barring some contractual provisions to the contrary, the actions of an employee inure to the benefit of his employer if performed during the course and scope of his employment.  In the present dispute, Respondent has provided no evidence of any agreement warranting the attachment of security rights to the domain name and is not entitled to hold his former employer’s property ransom as security for the payment of wages.

 

The only relationship that has ever existed between Complainant and Respondent was that of Employer and Employee.  Complainant has submitted copies of Respondent’s W-2 forms from 2002 through 2005; a document evidencing Respondent’s H1B1 non-immigrant professional work visa; an exemplary pay stub showing Complainant withholding taxes from Respondent’s wages; and a copy of the W-4 form filled out by Respondent as evidence of the nature of the relationship.

 

Complainant submits that it is simply beyond belief that Complainant would give Respondent – a temporary non-immigrant employee – the authority to register in Respondent’s name the very domain name upon which Complainant’s business depends, and Respondent has provided no proof supporting this outlandish claim. 

 

Moreover, it should be noted that Respondent has not explicitly disputed Complainant’s description of Respondent as being an employee at the time the domain name was registered.  Rather, Respondent has alluded to a relationship between Complainant and Respondent of a more equal nature than that of employer and employee – i.e., that of vendor and vendee; however, for the reasons just stated, any such allusion is nothing more than a self-serving characterization on the part of Respondent in an attempt to escape the jurisdiction of this panel. 

 

Further evidence that Respondent has never “licensed” the domain name to Complainant is found in the simple fact that Complainant not only paid the registration fee for the Domain Name, but also paid all advertising costs.  Complainant submitted a copy of the record of payment of registration fee and record of promotional costs all paid with Complainant’s credit card as an annex to the Complaint.  It is simply unfathomable that Complainant would enter into this alleged “licensing” scheme to use a domain name that it paid for and promoted. 

 

Complainant has spent over $97,000 on advertising said marks incorporating the words “battery” and “space” on Yahoo and over $202,000 on advertising said marks incorporating the words “battery” and “space” on Google and has submitted evidence of expenditure as an annex to the Additional Submissions.  Moreover, from December of 2002 through the end of 2005, Complainant generated over $6.2 million in revenue via the website associated with <batteryspace.com>.  Complainant submitted a sales report setting out said sales as an annex to the Additional Submission. 

 

Furthermore, Complainant submitted a printout illustrating that a simple search on Google using the terms “rechargeable battery,” returns a result page with a sponsored link for WWW.BATTERYSPACE.COM at the top of the page.  Complainant submits that these simple facts, in combination with the assertions made in Complainant’s original Complaint, are more than sufficient to show that Complainant has developed an extraordinary amount of goodwill, and consequently valuable trademark rights, in said marks incorporating the words “battery” and “space.” 

 

Complainant denies that it has only used the term “Powerizer” on its main page and marketing pages, not only on the home page, but also on many other pages associated with Complainant’s business. The service mark BatterySpace.com is prominently displayed in the title bar of the viewer’s web browser and as Respondent correctly notes, the service mark BATTERYSPACE is also displayed on Complainant’s forum pages

 

Complainant submits that the decision in YourTurf, Inc. v. Your Turf c/o Bill Gowan, FA 462460 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2005) along with other decisions employing similar reasoning, has arguably read requirements into ¶ 4(a)(i) that were never intended to be there.  Specifically, the panel in YourTurf found that a complainant’s trademark rights must exist prior to a respondent’s registration of a disputed domain name to satisfy ¶ 4(a)(i).  However, ¶ 4(a)(i) requires only that a “domain name [be] identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights….” 

 

Nowhere does the Policy state when the complainant’s rights in the mark must attach.  Complainant relies on the reasoning applied by the panel in Consejo de Promocion Turistica de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. Latin America Telecom, Inc., D2004-0242 (WIPO July 19, 2004) and articulated in Cole v. Skipper, D2003-0843 (WIPO Jan. 20, 2004).  ExecuJet Holdings Ltd. v. Air Alpha Am., Inc., D2002-0669 (WIPO Oct. 7, 2002); Travant Solutions, Inc. v. Cole, FA 203177 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 6, 2003).

 

Complainant has provided ample proof that its rights in said marks incorporating the words “battery” and “space” existed at the time the Complaint in this dispute was filed, thereby satisfying ¶ 4(a)(i) of the Policy. 

 

D. Respondent’s Additional Submissions

 

In additional submissions, Respondent inter alia challenged the admissibility of Complainant’s additional submissions as he asserts that Complainant took the opportunity to supplement the Complaint rather than limiting itself to addressing the issues raised in the Response.

 

Furthermore Respondent asserted the principle that Complainant should not succeed because it had no established trademark rights at the time the domain name was registered citing Ode v. Intership, D2001-0074 (WIPO May 1, 2001), where it was held that there are ample authorities supporting the view that a trademark that did not exist at the time the disputed domain name was registered cannot serve as the basis for a claim under the Policy and that Complainant must prove that its rights pre-date Respondent’s registration of the domain name in dispute.

 

FINDINGS

Having considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence adduced, the majority of the Panel finds:

 

That Complainant has established common law trademark rights in the marks BATTERY SPACE, BATTERYSPACE, and BATTERYSPACE.COM through use of said marks in online retail sales of batteries and electronic devices, including battery chargers, battery analyzers, cases, bags, converters, connectors, wires, DC motors, flashlights, halogen lamps, Universal Power Supply systems, binoculars, and telescopes on Complainant’s website located at <batteryspace.com> since 2002;

 

That the domain name in dispute is identical to Complainant’s common law trademarks BATTERY SPACE, BATTERYSPACE, and BATTERYSPACE.COM;

 

That Respondent was engaged by Complainant in a contract of employment to develop its online sales business;

 

That Respondent registered said domain name at the request of Complainant;

 

That it was always the intention of Complainant that it should be the owner of the domain name <batteryspace.com> but Respondent registered said domain name in his own personal name without the knowledge or authority of Complainant;

 

That Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in said domain name and Respondent registered and is using said domain name in bad faith.

 

DISCUSSION

Preliminary Issue relating to Jurisdiction of the Panel

 

Regarding the preliminary issue the Panel rejected Respondent’s submissions that the dispute was outside the jurisdiction of the Panel.  It was accepted that the Policy is not a general domain name dispute resolution process and many disputes relating to domain names are more appropriately dealt with in a court of competent jurisdiction.  The Panel however is of the view that it is not sufficient for a respondent merely to set up a contract issue to oust the jurisdiction of a panel established under the Policy.

 

In casu there is a discrete issue relating to the ownership of the registration of the domain name in dispute that is within the jurisdiction of this Panel.

 

Preliminary Issue relating to Admissibility of Complainant’s Additional Submissions

 

The Panel has considered the submissions made by Respondent that the Panel should not consider the content of the Additional Submissions filed by Complainant, as Complainant should not be entitled to bring additional evidence in Additional Submissions.

 

In the view of the Panel, the Additional Submissions may be admitted and considered as there is no prejudice to Respondent and Respondent subsequently had the last word by filing Additional Submissions that were admitted.

 

Substantive Issues

 

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   The domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights;

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

The Panel failed to agree on the substantive issues and the dissenting Opinion of Panelist Diane Cabell is annexed hereto

 

The majority of the Panel accepts that Complainant had provided sufficient evidence to establish that it has common law rights in the trademarks and service marks relied upon.

 

The majority takes the view that the domain name in dispute is identical to Complainant’s common law trademarks BATTERY SPACE, BATTERYSPACE, and BATTERYSPACE.COM.

 

The majority of the Panel takes the view that the first element of the Policy only requires Complainant to establish that the domain name in issue is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights and it not necessary that such rights should have been acquired at the time of registration of the domain name.

 

This is a view accepted by the majority of panelists according to  1.4 of the WIPO Overview of Panel Decisions referred to by Respondent.

 

In the circumstances the majority of the Panel accepts that Complainant has satisfied the first element of the test in Policy ¶ 4(a).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Respondent claims to have rights or a legitimate interest in the domain name.  In particular he asserts under ¶ 4(c)(i) that before any notice to Respondent of the dispute, Respondent has used the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods.  Respondent claims that pursuant to the contract between the parties, Respondent has been using the domain name to direct visitors to Complainant’s DNS servers, which Complainant in turn uses to sell its own merchandise.  Such use of the domain began pursuant to an agreement between Complainant and Respondent.

 

On the evidence Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.  There is a clear conflict of evidence as to the nature of the relationship that existed between the parties at the time the domain name was registered and subsequently, and as to what was agreed between the parties in relation to payments and remuneration of Respondent.

 

The majority of this Panel takes the view that at all material times Respondent was an employee of Complainant.  This was initially denied by Respondent but Complainant provided compelling evidence of Respondent’s status as an employee in copy documentation annexed to its Additional Submissions viz. copies of Respondent’s W-2 forms from 2002 through 2005; document evidencing Respondent’s H1B1 non-immigrant professional work visa; an exemplary pay stub showing Complainant withholding taxes from Respondent’s wages; and a copy of the W-4 form filled out by Respondent. 

 

The majority of this Panel accepts Complainant’s submissions that it is most unlikely that Complainant would have agreed to have the domain name registered in the name of one of its employees.  Furthermore the majority of this Panel accepts Complainant’s submissions that Respondent could not acquire any rights in the domain name in such circumstances.  Respondent had no reason to use the domain name himself.  He registered the domain name in his own name without the knowledge of his employer and used Complainant’s credit card to pay for the registration.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

The majority of this Panel is satisfied that Respondent registered the domain name in bad faith by registering the domain name in his own name rather than that of his employer.  He was requested to register the domain name by his employer.  He was aware that his employer intended to use the domain name for its Internet business.  He used his employer’s credit card to pay for the registration.  In the view of the majority of this Panel Respondent would have been well aware that Complainant did not intend that such an important registration should be registered in the name of an employee.

 

On the balance of probabilities the majority of the Panel is of the view that Respondent registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to Complainant for valuable consideration in excess of his documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name.

 

The majority of this Panel is satisfied that Respondent’s claim to be entitled to hold onto the registration as security for a debt, in the circumstances outlined above, amounts to a use of the domain name in bad faith.  Respondent is using the domain name in bad faith by his continued refusal to transfer the domain name to Complainant.

 

In the view of the majority of this Panel therefore Complainant has satisfied all elements of the test in the Policy and is entitled to succeed.

 

DECISION

The majority of the Panel concludes that having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <batteryspace.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

James Bridgeman,

Chairman

_________________________

 

Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson, Panelist.

 

 

 

Dissenting Opinion of Diane Cabell

 

This Panelist is of the opinion that trademark rights must pre-exist the domain registration if a mark owner's claim is to be successful.  This domain was registered by an employee in his own name, a fact that the majority holds to be bad faith, but I do not.  In my opinion, bad faith registration only exists when there is some attempt to unfairly trade on a mark, in a fashion that parallels trademark infringement as closely as possible.  As Complainant had no trademark rights at the time of registration, I cannot find that the employee intended to target the employer in any manner suggested by Policy 4(b).

 

 

Diane Cabell, Panelist


Dated: April 23, 2007

 

 

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