DECISION

United States Postal Service v Reflex Publishing, Inc.

Claim Number: FA0102000096761

PARTIES

The Complainant is United States Postal Service, Washington, DC, USA ("Complainant") represented by David M Kelly, of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrrett & Dunner LLP. The Respondent is Reflex Publishing, Brandon, FL, USA ("Respondent") represented by Marcus D. Dunn.

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <post-office.com>, registered with Tucows, Inc.

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as a panelist in this proceeding.

R. Glen Ayers, Honorable Carolyn Marks Johnson and Paul M. DeCicco, served as Panelists.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum ("the Forum") electronically on February 23, 2001; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on February 23, 2001.

On February 26, 2001, Tucows, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <post-office.com> is registered with Tucows, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Tucows, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Tucows, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

On February 28, 2001, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of March 20, 2001 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@post-office.com by e-mail.

A timely response was received and determined to be complete on March 20, 2001.

A timely additional submission from Complainant was received and determined to be complete on March 27, 2001.

A timely additional submission from Respondent was received on March 27, 2001. The fee was not received on time.

On March 30, 2001, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a three member Panel, the Forum appointed R. Glen Ayers, Honorable Carolyn Marks Johnson and Paul M. DeCicco served as Panelists.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

The Complainant, United States Postal Service ("USPS") asserts, since the Articles of Confederation in 1781, only the central government (now the USPS) had the right or power to establish and regulate "post offices". USPS also asserts that the establishment of any other, Non-USPS "post office" is illegal under Title 18, at 18 U.S.C. §1729. That statute makes it illegal to set up a "office or place of business bearing the same name or title of post office...."

USPS owns the following trademark registrations: POST OFFICE, UNITED STATES POST OFFICE AND EAGLE LOGO, UNITED STATES POST OFFICE EXPRESS, and UNITED STATES POST OFFICE EXPRESS AND EAGLE LOGO. It also owns domain names which forward Internet users to the main web site. The main web site is "usps.com." The domain names include one word "postoffice.org", "post-office.net", "post-office.org", "mypostoffice.com", "mypostoffice.net", and "mypostoffice.org."

USPS Office asserts that the domain name "post-office.com"is identical to a common law trademark held by the U.S. Postal Service, "post office." In the alternative, it asserts that the name is confusingly similar. Of course, USPS objects to Respondent’s domain registration, "post-office.com."

USPS also alleges that Respondent has no rights in the name and that the domain names was registered in bad faith.

First, USPS says the name was registered in bad faith because Respondent knew or should have known of Complainant’s trademark at the time of registration and that this is evidence of bad faith. Then, USPS says that Respondent acted in bad faith because the Respondent profits from use of the domain name in the following way: When a person using the Internet types in post-office.com, that event take the Internet user to Respondent’s web site where Respondent post banner ads and access links. In particular, USPS asserts, although it offers no evidence, that an Internet user winding up at Respondent’s domain site would then use one of the links to one of the major search engines. Respondent would receive a fee from that usage.

B. Respondent

The Respondent’s response emphasizes its considered belief that the term "post office", with or without a hyphen, is so generic that it cannot be considered to be a trademark in common law.

Respondent also asserts that it has legitimate rights to use the name post office, just as it would have the right to register any given term.

Respondent goes on to deny that had any intent to register the name "post-office.com" in violation of any of the rights of the United States Postal Service and denies emphatically that it has behaved in any way in bad faith.

Respondent stresses that he has not attempted to sell the name to the USPS and that it has made to attempt to pass itself off as the USPS.

C. Additional Submissions

Complainant filed an additional submission in reply, and once again asserted that it has protected rights of the term "Post Office." USPS argues that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has informally rejected other "Post Office formative marks due to concerns over confusion with and/or false association with the postal service." The USPS also argues that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has continued to register marks on behalf of USPS containing the term "Post Office,"

that the Patent and Trademark office has not made USPS disclaim "post office", and argues that this means that the Patent and Trademark Office does not find the term "Post Office" to be generic.

Contravening the Respondent’s argument as to its rights in generic words, USPS argues - - at least in the United States - - that the term "post office" has one meaning - - a meaning controlled by the USPS. In the alternative, USPS’ response argues that the name is confusing and that Respondent has not offered any evidence of rights in the name.

As to the bad faith registration, the USPS goes back through the argument that Respondent’s registration enables it to make a profit by receiving fees for the use of links to Internet search services. The links, of course, are posted at Respondent’s web page.

Respondent timely filed a supplemental statement. However, Respondent did not attach the fee required. Respondent did subsequently pay the fee. The panel has determined to consider the Respondent’s supplemental statement, considering the violation of the rules to be minor.

In the supplemental statement, Respondent asserts that its business plan was intended to be a vanity e-mail service. Respondent goes on to assert that it has not gone far with the business plan because it does not, at the present time, have the employees to do so.

Finally, in the supplemental response, Respondent denies that it intends to offer any of the services normally offered by the USPS at its web site or anywhere else.

FINDINGS

The Panel has argued the issues extensively. Each has reviewed the two prior determinations involving the USPS. First, United States Postal Service v. Consumer Information Organization, FA 95757 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 27, 2000) held that the USPS had common law trademark rights to the term "post office" and went on to hold that "post-office.net" and "post-office.org" were either identical to that common law mark or were at lest identical and/or confusingly similar to those marks.

In the second USPS opinion, United States Postal Service v. Postoffice.com, Inc., FA 96313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 19, 2001), the panel also held that "postoffice" even when used as one word, was identical to the common law mark, "post office" held by USPS.

Two of the Panelists, R. Glen Ayers and Carolyn Marks Johnson, agree with earlier decisions and find that the USPS has a common law mark in the two words, "post office." Therefore, those two panelist find that the Complainant has made its initial burden of proof in showing that it holds a common law trademark in that the domain name "post-office.com" is confusingly similar to or identical to the common law mark.

Of course, common law marks receive the same protection under the Rules for Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution as do registered trademarks. See MatchNet TLC. v. MAC Trading, D2000-0205 (WIPO May 11, 2000).

Mr. DeCicco disagrees with this finding. Mr. DeCicco does not see that the USPS has presented sufficient evidence of common law rights in the mark "Post Office", which may on its face seems to be generic, or that such rights would extend world-wide.

As to rights and legitimate interest, Judge Johnson would point out the obvious: Because the term "post office" is widely understood to refer to USPS and its operations, it is very difficult to understand how Respondent could claim any legitimate right or interest in the use of the name. For example, Respondent is not generally known by the term "post office", and has made no use, commercial or otherwise, of the domain name. See e.g. Broadcom Corp. v. Intellifone Corp, FA 96356 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 5, 2001). Further, Respondents have submitted no evidence of a legitimate business plan or use for the domain name, even in their supplemental response. In other words, to Judge Johnson, Respondents have submitted no "plausible explanation" for its claim of a right to use the domain name. See IG Index PLC v Index Trade, D2000-1124 (WIPO Oct. 16, 2000).

Registration and use "in bad faith" requires some reference to the definition of "bad faith"

as that term is used at paragraph 4 (a) (iii) of the Policy. Paragraph 4(b) gives a non-exclusive list of examples of "bad faith", which include:

As to registration and use in bad faith, Mr. DeCicco would argue that Respondent could not have acted in bad faith because Respondent certainly shares his view that "post office" is generic or that there is no common law mark held by the USPS. This belief that the words are generic leads to a conclusion that Respondent could not have acted in bad faith in registering the words. Further, Mr. DeCicco asserts that: (1) There is no evidence of any attempt to sell or otherwise market the name; and (2) the alleged commercialization, that is the providing of links to search engines which in turn would enable a user of the Internet to go from Respondent’s web site to a search engine and from the search engine ultimately to USPS is not the sort of commercial use in bad faith that is typically found in such cases.

Mr. Ayers also has difficulty seeing the bad faith element in this case. There is little or no evidence offered of any bad faith use. Even if the use described by USPS is occurring, there is no evidence of that use.

To summarize the findings, Mr. Ayers and Judge Johnson find that the USPS holds a common law trademark, "post office", and that the domain name "post-office.com" is identical to or certainly confusingly similar to the common law mark. Although Mr. DeCicco agrees that the at-issue mark and the domain name sound identical and appear identical, does not believe that the USPS has presented sufficient evidence of the existence of a common law trademark, "post office", and thus he does not see that the issue of confusing similarity is ever reached.

The panelists believe that the Complainant has shown that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in the name. Respondent’s use of the name has been so limited and its business plan has been so truncated that it is very difficult to find for Respondent on this ground. Respondents’ pleadings give very little assistance in this regard.

Finally, while Judge Johnson, consistent with her earlier dissent in United States Postal Service v. Postoffice.com, Inc. would find that there is evidence of bad faith simply in the registration. Mr. Ayers and Mr. DeCicco cannot find adequate evidence of bad faith.

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

    1. the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
    2. the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
    3. the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The Complainant has proved the evidence is common law mark rights in the term "post office" to the satisfaction of Judge Johnson and Mr. Ayers. The UDRP does not discriminate between registered and unregistered marks and the domain name registered by Respondent is identical to or confusingly similar to the mark. See United States Postal Service v. Postoffice.com, Inc., FA 96313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 19, 2001).

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Although Respondent claims to have rights to use a generic name, the simple fact is, that even given Respondent's pleadings to the contrary, Respondent is not generally known by the term "post office" and has made no or very little commercial or non-commercial use of the domain name.

In Respondent's pleadings, Respondent has asserted that it has some intent to set up "vanity" e-mail addresses. However, at the present time. Respondent's domain name is little more than a jump station for persons unsuccessfully seeking the services of the USPS. All of the panelists agrees that Complainant has met its burden of proof and Respondent has failed to rebut as to this element.

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Mr. DeCicco, of course, believes that the USPS’s rights in the descriptive/generic term "post office" are dubious and as such the simple act of registering the term as a domain name cannot be evidence of bad faith. Judge Johnson takes the opposite approach, and believes that the act of registration is in and of itself an act of bad faith. Mr. Ayers, on this point, must agree in part with Mr. DeCicco. Although Mr. Ayers believes that the term "post office" is subject to the rights of a common law mark holder, the USPS, it is difficult to see how Respondent could be said to be acting in bad faith when two reasonable, experienced persons, Judge Johnson and Mr. DeCicco, disagree on this very point. Therefore, Mr. Ayers does not believe that the registration, in and of itself, was an act of bad faith.

As to the other "bad faith" allegations made by USPS, none of the Panelists find that the conduct of Respondent is sufficient to be said to have been in bad faith.

DECISION

Because two of the Panelists have found that the conduct of Respondent was not in "bad faith" as that term is used as ICANN Policy §4(a)(3) the relief requested is denied and the domain name will not be transferred.

 

R. Glen Ayers, Jr., Esq.

Paul Michael DeCicco, Esq.

Dated: April 30, 2001

 

Judge Carolyn Marks Johnson dissents, having determined that USPS holds a valid common law mark and that Respondent's conduct was in bad faith.

DISSENT

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Decision in this case. The domain name at issue is <post-office.com>. It is my opinion that the Claimant met the burden required and that Complainant United States Postal Service should prevail and that the domain name registered by Respondent Reflex Publishing should be transferred to the Complainant for the following reasons:

FINDINGS

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Complainant met all three prongs of this burden.

Identical to or Confusingly Similar

Complainant established its rights under federal law to use the mark United States Postal Service under 18 U.S.C. 1729. Further Complainant has been commonly known since the beginning of its service to the country more than two centuries ago as the POST OFFICE.

Complainant contends that the domain name in question is identical to its common law trademark POST OFFICE. I agree. See United States Postal Service v. Consumer Info. Org., FA 95757 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 27, 2000) (finding Complainant has common law rights in the term POST OFFICE). See also Chernow Communications Inc. v. Kimball, D2000-0119 (WIPO May 18, 2000) (holding "that the use or absence of punctuation marks, such as hyphens, does not alter the fact that a name is identical to a mark"); Nintendo Of America Inc. v. This Domain Is For Sale, D2000-1197 (WIPO Nov. 1, 2000) (finding <game-boy.com> identical and confusingly similar the Complainant’s GAME BOY mark, even though the domain name is a combination of two descriptive words).

Complainant also contends that Respondent’s domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered trademark UNITED STATES POST OFFICE. I also agree to this point. See also Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Tseu & Assoc., FA 94416 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 9, 2000) (finding common law rights in the mark BIBBERO as the Complainant, Bibbero Systems, Inc (Complainant owns a trademark for its full company name) had developed brand name recognition with the BIBBERO term by which the Complainant is commonly known); see also Hammond Suddards Edge v. Westwood Guardian Ltd., D2000-1235 (WIPO Nov. 6, 2000) (finding that the domain name, "hammondsuddards.net," is essentially identical to the Complainant's mark, Hammond Suddards Edge, where the name "Hammond Suddards" identifies the Complainant independently of the word "Edge").

Complainant also urges that Respondent’s domain name is so confusingly similar a reasonable Internet user would assume that the domain name is somehow affiliated with Complainant’s well-established mark. I agree with this as well. See Surface Protection Indus., Inc. v. The Webposters, D2000-1613 (WIPO Feb. 5, 2001) (finding the domain name confusingly similar "so as to likely confuse Internet users who may believe they are doing business with Complainant or with an entity whose services are endorsed by, sponsored by, or affiliated with Complainant; hence, satisfying the confusing similarity requirement").

Although it is urged that Interactive Television Corp. v. Noname.com, D2000-0358 (WIPO June 26, 2000) supports the Respondent’s position, the Panel in that case held that "serious questions as to whether Complainant has any proprietary rights require us to reject Complainant’s claim. The ultimate decision as to whether Complainant does or does not have proprietary rights is better left to a court or trademark office tribunal.". One purpose of arbitrating these disputes is to protect the parties from prolonged litigation where possible and bring an orderly system of resolution to domain name disputes using ICANN policies and procedures to which the parties have agreed to be bound. That case also is distinguishable because the case did not involve the United States Postal Service, its common law mark Post Office, and a domain name that presents itself as being different because it adds a hyphen between post and office.

Respondent also claimed that the terms contained in the domain name are generic. There is support in the Decisions for this position. See Rollerblade, Inc. v. CBNO, D2000-0427 (WIPO Aug. 24, 2000) (finding that "genericness, if established, will defeat a claim of trademark rights, even in a mark which is the subject of an incontestable registration"); see also SportSoft Golf, Inc. v. Sites to Behold Ltd., FA 94976 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 27, 2000) (finding that the disputed domain name, golfsociety.com, is neither identical to nor confusingly similar to complainant’s trademark because the trademark links together two generic words – golf and society -- with a geographic entity, the United States). What is generic about post and office is the general way in which the population views them when they are separated. When the two words are juxtaposed, however, it is clear that post office, with or without the hyphen, has a meaning that the general public commonly associates with the delivery of mail in this country and abroad.

Complainant has shown and I would find that Respondent’s domain name is identical to and confusingly similar to Complainant’s well-know common law mark. Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

Rights to and Legitimate Interests

Complainant established its rights to use the United States Postal Service name and the common law mark, Post Office. Complainant contends that Respondent has no legitimate interest in the domain name and that because Respondent’s web site diverts consumers searching for Complainant’s sites, Respondent is not making a bona fide use of the disputed domain name. See Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev, D2000-1571 (WIPO Jan. 15, 2001) (finding no rights and legitimate interests where the Respondent diverted Complainant’s customers to his web sites).

Complainant also urges that Respondent is not generally known by the term "post-office," has made no commercial or noncommercial use of the domain name, and therefore, has no rights in the domain name that contains Complainant’s common law mark. Broadcom Corp. v Intellifone Corp., FA 96356 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 5, 2001) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in a Respondent not commonly known by the disputed domain name and not using the domain name in connection with a legitimate or fair use).

Complainant further contends that Respondent has no rights in the mark contained within the domain name because Respondent offered no evidence of having a legitimate business plan or use for the domain name. See AT&T Corp. v. Domains by Brian Evans, D2000-0790 (WIPO Sept. 27, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where Respondent does not provide any documentation on the existence of this company that might show what the company’s business was, or how the company’s years of existence, if it ever existed, might mesh with Complainant’s trademark claims); see also Woolworths PLC. v. Anderson, D2000-1113 (Oct. 10, 2000) (finding that absent any evidence of preparation to use the domain name for any legitimate purpose, the burden of proof lies with the Respondent to demonstrate that he has rights or legitimate interests).

Respondent countered that Complainant has a burden of showing Respondent’s intent to mislead Internet users by diverting those who seek to access the United States Postal Service to Respondent’s web site in order to gain commercially or in order to tarnish the Complainant’s mark. In fact, Respondent’s intent may be presumed where Respondent knows that the domain name Respondent filed contains the mark of another and that it causes confusion among users of the Internet or creates confusion about the source or sponsorship of the domain name. Policy 4(a)(iii). Respondent’s knowledge may also be presumed in this case because Respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge that the United States Postal Service has been commonly known as the Post Office since shortly after the origin of the country more than two hundred years ago. Further, if Respondent’s business plan, using a well-known mark, is in harmony with ICANN Rules, then those who seek to preserve trademarks throughout the world should be on the alert. The ICANN Decisions are replete with the unfounded dreams of planners who have registered domain names for business plans that contain the well-known marks of folks such as McDonalds, Hewlett Packard and Julia Roberts. The case of IG Index PLC v Index Trade, D2000-1124 (WIPO Oct. 16, 2000) requires the Panelists to give weight to a Respondent’s "plausible explanation" as to use or anticipated use, it does not invite Panelists to legitimize pipe-dreams using the well-known mark of another and I would think that this applies with extra emphasis where the planned enterprise seeks to confuse users of governmental services. Even Shirmax Retail Ltd. v. CES Marketing, Inc., AF-0104 (eResolution Mar. 20, 2000) recognized that a first issue is that the name used be genuinely generic. While a post is a post and while to post may be an athletic term, a domain name that invites users to the post office suggests an identifiable and distinguishable designation. And the Shirmax Panel noted that the enterprise must not "mislead consumers" or "tarnish a trademark".

Respondent contended that Complainant does not have exclusive rights to the term "post office." Respondent’s own domain name defeats this argument. Had Respondent not known that Respondent was invading the rights of the United States Postal Service, Respondent probably would not have seen fit to add the hyphen to the domain name in issue that contains Complainant’s common law mark.

Complainant established rights to and legitimate interests in the Post Office mark. I would find that Respondent’s Post-Office.com domain name infringes on Complainant’s mark. I would further find that Respondent has shown no legitimate right to or interest in the Post Office mark contained within the disputed domain name. Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Given the more than two centuries in which the United States Postal Service has operated the country’s post office, Respondent knew or should have known of Complainant’s rights in the POST OFFICE mark. See Nintendo of America Inc v. Pokemon, D2000-1230 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2000) (finding that Respondent, at the time of registration, had notice of Complainant’s famous POKÉMON and PIKACHU trademarks given their extreme popularity). Complainant contends that Respondent’s use of the domain name for a revenue producing web site evidences opportunistic bad faith and I agree. See ESPN, Inc. v. Ballerini, FA 95410 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 15, 2000) (finding bad faith where the Respondent linked the domain name to another website <iwin.com>, presumably, the Respondent received a portion of the advertising revenue from site by directing Internet traffic to the site, thus using a domain name to attract Internet users, for commercial gain).

Respondent claims to have registered the domain name in good faith and also claims to be using the domain name in good faith by not competing with Complainant or offering to sell the domain name. See Lumena s-ka zo.o. v. Express Ventures LTD, FA 94375 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 11, 2000) (finding no bad faith where the domain name involves a generic term and there is no direct evidence that Respondent registered the domain name with the intent of capitalizing on Complainant’s trademark interest).

A confusing dual line of cases may be emerging in this area, especially in those instances in which the United States Postal Service seeks to protect the rights that Congress has given it. See United States Postal Service v. Postoffice.com, Inc., FA 96313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 19, 2001) (finding no bad faith where the domain name was not registered with the intent to confuse, does not currently cause confusion with Complainant’s marks, services, or domain names, and where Respondent did not register the domain name with the intent to sell). It may be up to a federal court or Congress to provide the bright line rule for these disputes. However, Complainant met its requirements under ICANN Rules and there is no justification for putting the United States Postal Service to the extra burden of filing a lawsuit for trademark infringement or to require the taxpayers to support the purchase of this domain name. Complainant presented evidence sufficient to support bad faith in two areas: Respondent’s domain name creates confusion among Internet users who access the domain name expecting to access the United States Postal Service and Respondent’s domain name creates confusion as to the origin, source or sponsorship of the service. Either is sufficient to show bad faith. Complainant is entitled to prevail in this domain name dispute. Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

I would order the domain transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

Honorable Carolyn Marks Johnson

Retired Judge

Arbitrator

Dated: April 23, 2001.

 

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