DECISION

 

Steelcase Inc. v. Remy Dorinville

Claim Number: FA1801001769798

PARTIES

Complainant is Steelcase Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Lisa R. Harris of Steelcase Inc., Michigan, USA.  Respondent is Remy Dorinville (“Respondent”), Florida, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <steelcsae.com>, registered with 1&1 Internet SE.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on January 31, 2018; the Forum received payment on January 31, 2018.

 

On February 7, 2018, 1&1 Internet SE confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <steelcsae.com> domain name is registered with 1&1 Internet SE and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  1&1 Internet SE has verified that Respondent is bound by the 1&1 Internet SE registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On February 8, 2018, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of February 28, 2018 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@steelcsae.com.  Also on February 8, 2018, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On March 2, 2018, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

     Complainant made the following contentions.

Complainant registered the STEELCASE mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g. Reg. No. 534,526, registered Dec. 12, 1950). See Compl. Ex. 2. Respondent’s <steelcsae.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s STEELCASE mark as it wholly incorporates the mark, transposes the final “s” and the “a” to create a misspelling, and appends the “.com” generic top-level-domain (“gTLD”).

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <steelcsae.com> domain name. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name, nor has Complainant authorized, licensed, or otherwise permitted Respondent to use the mark. Respondent also does not use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Rather, Respondent uses the disputed domain name to pass off as Complainant via email while the resolving website contains third-party hyperlinks.

 

Respondent registered and uses the <steelcsae.com> domain name in bad faith. Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business via its passing off behavior. Respondent had constructive knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the STEELCASE mark the time Respondent registered the disputed domain name.

 

 

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

 

1.    Complainant is a United States company which is a global leader in the office furniture and related industries.

 

2. Complainant registered the STEELCASE mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g. Reg. No. 534,526, registered Dec. 12, 1950).

 

3.  Respondent registered the <steelcsae.com> domain name on January 22, 2018.

 

4. Respondent uses the disputed domain name to pass itself off as Complainant via email while the resolving website contains third-party hyperlinks.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The first question that arises is whether Complainant has rights in a trademark or service mark on which it may rely. Complainant submits that it has rights in the STEELCASE mark based upon registration with the USPTO. Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently confers a complainant’s rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Humor Rainbow, Inc. v. James Lee, FA 1626154 (Forum Aug. 11, 2015) (stating, “There exists an overwhelming consensus amongst UDRP panels that USPTO registrations are sufficient in demonstrating a complainant’s rights under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) and its vested interests in a mark. . . . Due to Complainant’s attached USPTO registration on the principal register at Exhibit 1, the Panel agrees that it has sufficiently demonstrated its rights per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). Complainant provides copies of the USPTO registrations for the STEELCASE marks (e.g. Reg. No. 534,526, registered Dec. 12, 1950). See Compl. Ex. 2. Accordingly, the Panel finds that Complainant has established rights in the STEELCASE mark.

 

The next question that arises is whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s STEELCASE mark. Complainant argues that Respondent’s <steelcsae.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as it wholly incorporates the mark, transposes the final “s” and the “a” to create a misspelling, and appends the “.com” gTLD. Similar changes in a registered mark have failed to sufficiently distinguish a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶4(a)(i). See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. domain admin / private registrations aktien gesellschaft, FA 1626253 (Forum Jul. 29, 2015) (finding that “Respondent has simply transposed the letters ‘u’ and ‘r’ in the term ‘furniture’ to complete the [<ashleyfurnitrue.com>] domain name.  The addition of a descriptive term, such as ‘furniture’, even if misspelled, does not negate a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Dell Inc. v. Protection of Private Person / Privacy Protection, FA 1681432 (Forum Aug. 1, 2016) (“A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs.  Likewise, the absence of spaces must be disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax prohibits them.”). The Panel therefore finds that the <steelcsae.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the STEELCASE mark under Policy ¶4(a)(i).

 

Complainant has thus made out the first of the three elements that it must establish.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

It is now well established that Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has made out a prima facie case that arises from the following considerations:

(a)Respondent has chosen to take Complainant’s STEELCASE mark and has used it in its entirety in its domain name, making a slight misspelling;

(b) Respondent registered the disputed domain name on January 22, 2018;

(c) Respondent has used the domain name to pass itself off as Complainant via email while the resolving website contains third-party hyperlinks;

(d) Respondent has engaged in these activities without the consent or approval of Complainant;

(e) Complainant contends that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <steelcsae.com> domain name.  Where a response is lacking, relevant information includes the WHOIS and any other assertions by a complainant regarding the nature of its relationship with a respondent. See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same). The WHOIS identifies “Remy Dorinville” as the registrant.  See Compl. Ex. 1. Complainant submits that no evidence exists to show that Respondent has ever been legitimately known by the STEELCASE mark. Panels use these facts as evidence of a respondent lacking rights or legitimate interests in a domain name. See Navistar International Corporation v. N Rahmany, FA1505001620789 (Forum Jun. 8, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name where the complainant had never authorized the respondent to incorporate its NAVISTAR mark in any domain name registration). Complainant submits that Respondent has never been legitimately affiliated with Complainant, has never been known by the disputed domain name prior to its registration, and Complainant has not given Respondent permission to use the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the Panel agrees that Respondent is not commonly known by the <steelcsae.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii);

(f) Complainant argues that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain for any bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use as it attempts to phish for information from consumers via email. Complainants may use phishing attempts to evince a lack of any bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. See Blackstone TM L.L.C. v. Mita Irelant Ltd., FA 1314998 (Forum Apr. 30, 2010) (“The Panel finds that Respondent’s attempt to “phish” for users’ personal information is neither a bona fide offering of goods and services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”). Complainant submits that, on January 22, 2018, Complainant’s business associate received an email from someone representing an employee of Complainant, Dan Brondyk, with an email address utilizing the <steelcsae.com> domain name. See Compl. Ex. 4. The Panel therefore finds that Respondent has failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii);

(g)  Complainant argues that Respondent has failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name as the domain name resolves in a website that contains links wholly unrelated to Complainant or its services, presumably to benefit commercially from pay-per-click fees. Using a domain name to offer links to services unrelated to a complainant does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. See Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”). Complainant submits Respondent’s <steelcsae.com> domain name resolves to a page containing pay-per-click links for Respondent’s presumed commercial gain. See Compl. Ex. 3. As such, the Panel finds that Respondent has failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

All of these matters go to make out the prima facie case against Respondent. As Respondent has not filed a Response or attempted by any other means to rebut the prima facie case against it, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

 

Complainant has thus made out the second of the three elements that it must establish.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

It is clear that to establish bad faith for the purposes of the Policy, Complainant must show that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith and has been used in bad faith. It is also clear that the criteria set out in Policy ¶ 4(b) for establishing bad faith are not exclusive, but that Complainants in UDRP proceedings may also rely on conduct that is bad faith within the generally accepted meaning of that expression.

 

Having regard to those principles, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name was registered and used in bad faith. That is so for the following reasons.

 

First, Complainant submits that Respondent commercially benefits by offering advertisements on the resolving webpage for the <steelcsae.com> domain name. Commercially benefitting by offering advertisements can evince bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Google Inc. v. James Lucas / FireStudio / Jameschee / FIRESTUDIO / SEONG YONG, FA1502001605757 (Forum Apr. 7, 2015) (“This Panel agrees that Respondent’s inclusion of advertisements to likely reap click-through fees is an example of bad faith pursuant Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”). Complainant asserts Respondent uses the disputed domain name to transmit email falsely purporting to originate from Complainant’s employee and requesting a redirect of funds to a Hong Kong wire account. See Compl. Ex. 5. The Panel agrees with Complainant’s contentions and finds that Respondent acted in bad faith when registering and using the disputed domain name.

 

Secondly, Complainant contends Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the STEELCASE mark at the time of registration. UDRP decisions generally decline to find bad faith based on constructive knowledge. See The Way Int'l, Inc. v. Diamond Peters, D2003-0264 (WIPO May 29, 2003) ("As to constructive knowledge, the Panel takes the view that there is no place for such a concept under the Policy."). The Panel agrees with Complainant that, based on Respondent choice of disputed domain name, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant's rights in the mark prior to registering the disputed domain name—bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Orbitz Worldwide, LLC v. Domain Librarian, FA 1535826 (Forum Feb. 6, 2014) (“The Panel notes that although the UDRP does not recognize ‘constructive notice’ as sufficient grounds for finding Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith, the Panel here finds actual knowledge through the name used for the domain and the use made of it.”). Complainant contends that Respondent must have had actual knowledge of the Complainant’s rights in the STEELCASE mark at the time Respondent registered the disputed domain name based upon Respondent’s registration of a nearly identical domain name. The Panel agrees with Complainant and finds that Respondent did have actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark, demonstrating bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

Finally, in addition and having regard to the totality of the evidence, the Panel finds that, in view of Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name using the STEELCASE mark and in view of the conduct that Respondent engaged in when using it, Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith within the generally accepted meaning of that expression.

 

Complainant has thus made out the third of the three elements that it must establish.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <steelcsae.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC

Panelist

Dated:  March 5, 2018

 

 

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