Board of Trustees of Michigan State University v. Nicholas Fox
Claim Number: FA1907001851354
Complainant is Board of Trustees of Michigan State University (“Complainant”), represented by Connie B. Berg of Michigan State University Office of the General Counsel, Michigan, USA. Respondent is Nicholas Fox (“Respondent”), Michigan, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <msupublishing.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on July 9, 2019; the Forum received payment on July 9, 2019.
On July 10, 2019, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <msupublishing.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On July 15, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of August 5, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@msupublishing.com. Also on July 15, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On August 6, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A, Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a major state university. It has rights in the MSU mark through its registration of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 1,326,001, registered Mar. 19, 1985). Respondent’s Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as it incorporates the MSU mark in its entirety, merely adding the generic term “publishing” and the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name nor has Complainant licensed, authorized, or otherwise permitted Respondent to use Complainant’s mark. Further, Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, as Respondent is attempting to pass of as Complainant and sell counterfeit services represented as those of Complainant.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent is attempting to attract Internet users for commercial gain by passing off as Complainant and selling services represented as those of Complainant. Additionally, Respondent had knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the MSU mark when he registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring the Domain Name:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”) at ¶ 4.3, eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
The MSU mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Registration No. 1,326,001) on March 19, 1985 (Complaint Exhibit A). A complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
Respondent’s <msupublishing.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MSU mark as it incorporates the mark verbatim, merely adding the generic term “publishing” and the “.com” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). MTD Products Inc. v. J Randall Shank, FA 1783050 (Forum June 27, 2018) (“The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as it wholly incorporates the CUB CADET mark before appending the generic terms ‘genuine’ and ‘parts’ as well as the ‘.com’ gTLD.”). In fact, the added generic term “publishing” actually exacerbates the confusion because it suggests the same goods and services offered by Complainant through its MSU Press. Capital One Financial Corp. v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp., FA 1582803 (Forum Nov. 13, 2014) (finding that “the descriptive phrase ‘auto loan’ as included in [the <capitaloneautoloan.org>] domain name enhances the confusing similarity of the domain name.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0 at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name, and this establishes its confusing similarity to Complainant’s mark.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MSU mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to the respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to Respondent of the dispute, Respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) Respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if Respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) Respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Respondent has no relationship, affiliation, connection with or endorsement from Complainant, nor has Complainant authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the Domain Name resolves to web site that impersonates Complainant and offers counterfeit goods and services for sale, representing them as those of Complainant. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “Nicholas Fox.” This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such or similar evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that a registrant name that is materially different from the domain name at issue is competent evidence that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Guardair Corporation v. Pablo Palermo, FA1407001571060 (Forum Aug. 28, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <guardair.com> domain name according to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information lists “Pablo Palermo” as registrant of the disputed domain name), Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Fred Wallace, FA1506001626022 (Forum July 27, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <chevron-europe.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information named “Fred Wallace” as registrant of the disputed domain name). There is no evidence before the Panel to suggest that Respondent has been commonly known by the Domain Name, and the Panel finds that it has not been so known.
Complainant states that Respondent is not affiliated or associated in any way with Complainant, and that Complainant has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complainant Exhibit B contains a screenshot of the web site resolving from the Domain Name. It consists of a single page on which the words “MICHIGAN STATE PUBLISHING HOUSE” appear in the banner, in the green and white colors associated with Complainant. Below that appears a cartoon caricature of a very young child wearing a spartan helmet immediately below the title “Home of Baby Sparty!” “Sparty” is a registered mark of Complainant (USPTO Registration No. 4,662,048 registered December 30, 2014) (Complaint Exhibit A). Also appearing at the top of the page is a seal that is very similar in appearance to that of Complainant’s registered seal (USPTO Registration No. 1,348,875, July 16, 1985) (Complaint Exhibit A). It is clear that the web site is intended to convey the impression that it is in fact that of Complainant’s publishing enterprise. It advertises a series of children’s books “that chronicles the adventures of our favorite mascot.” Although no prices are given for these books it is evident that there is a cost for them. The site is commercial in nature, and appears to offer for sale publications that are represented as being those of Complainant. It is clear that Respondent is using the Domain Name to impersonate and pass off as Complainant or at a minimum as an authorized affiliate, and to sell counterfeit goods or services representing that they are Complainant’s. Passing off as a complainant does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding the respondent did not use the domain name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services per Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) where the website resolving from the disputed domain name featured the complainant’s mark and various photographs related to the complainant’s business), Dell Inc. v. Devesh Tyagi, FA 1785301 (Forum June 2, 2018) (“Respondent replicates Complainant’s website and displays Complainant’s products. The Panel finds that this use is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”), Crow v. LOVEARTH.net, FA 203208 (Forum Nov. 28, 2003) (“It is neither a bona fide offerings [sic] of goods or services, nor an example of a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii) when the holder of a domain name, confusingly similar to a registered mark, attempts to profit by passing itself off as Complainant . . . .”).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
(i) circumstances indicating that the Respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the Respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the Respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the Respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of Respondent’s web site or location or of a product or service on Respondent’s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name set forth above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith use and registration of that domain, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is clearly using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site. This fits squarely within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is clear evidence of bad faith registration and use. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum Dec. 27, 2017) (finding bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) where “Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant’s own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant, or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.”).
Second, Respondent is using the Domain Name to pass off as Complainant and offer products that are advertised as Complainant’s, in competition with Complainant’s publishing enterprise, MSU Press. This diverts business from Complainant and disrupts Complainant’s business. It thus fits also within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) and is evidence of bad faith registration and use. Capital One Financial Corp. v. Michael Bock, FA1718603 (Forum Mar. 28, 2017) (finding bad faith registration because “…the disputed domain name and resolving website were designed to pass off as a product of Complainant for the purpose of business competition.”), Dell Inc. v. Prashant Chhibber, FA 1785651 (Forum June 1, 2018) (“Respondent offers support services related to Complainant’s products that are in direct competition with the services Complainant offers. The Panel finds that Respondent registered and used the domain names in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).”).
Finally, it is evident from the notoriety of Complainant’s MSU mark, from Respondent’s copying that mark verbatim into the Domain Name, and from Respondent’s web site impersonating Complainant and selling products that are advertised as those of Complainant that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in May 2018 (information furnished to the Forum by the registrar shows registration date). Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <msupublishing.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
August 8, 2019
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