Brooks Sports, Inc. v. Shao Wei Wang
Claim Number: FA1907001851767
Complainant is Brooks Sports, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Mayura I. Noordyke of Cozen O’Connor, Minnesota, USA. Respondent is Shao Wei Wang (“Respondent”), China.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <brookshoes.club>, registered with Chengdu West Dimension Digital Technology Co., Ltd..
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Hon. Karl v. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on July 12, 2019; the Forum received payment on July 12, 2019.
On July 17, 2019, Chengdu West Dimension Digital Technology Co., Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <brookshoes.club> domain name is registered with Chengdu West Dimension Digital Technology Co., Ltd. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Chengdu West Dimension Digital Technology Co., Ltd. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Chengdu West Dimension Digital Technology Co., Ltd. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On July 22, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of August 12, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@brookshoes.club. Also on July 22, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On August 14, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Hon. Karl V. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is known as a world-leader in athletic clothing and footwear, including high-performance running shoes. Complainant has rights in the BROOKS mark through its trademark registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 1,161,034, registered Jul. 14, 1981). Respondent’s <brookshoes.club> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s BROOKS mark as Respondent incorporates the mark in its entirety, along with the generic term “shoes,” deletion of the letter “s,” and a “.club” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <brookshoes.club> domain name. Respondent is not authorized or licensed to use Complainant’s BROOKS mark nor commonly known by the disputed domain name. Additionally, Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Rather, Respondent uses the disputed domain name to pass off as Complainant in furtherance of a phishing scheme.
Respondent registered and uses the <brookshoes.club> domain name in bad faith. Respondent uses the disputed domain name to divert users for commercial gain. Furthermore, Respondent had actual and constructive knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the BROOKS mark prior to registering and subsequently using the disputed domain name.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
For the reasons set forth below, the Panel finds Complainant is entitled to the requested relief of transfer of the <brookshoes.club> domain name.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: LANGUAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Complainant requests that the language of this administrative proceeding proceed in the English language pursuant to UDRP Rule 11(a). Complainant makes this request in light of the Chinese language Registration Agreement. It is established practice to take UDRP Rules 10(b) and (c) into consideration for the purpose of determining the language of the proceeding to ensure fairness and justice to both parties. Factors which previous panels have seen as particularly compelling are: WHOIS information which establishes Respondent in a country which would demonstrate familiarity with the English language, filing of a trademark registration with an entity which shows an understanding of the English language, and any evidence (or lack thereof) exhibiting Respondent’s understanding of the Chinese language included in the Registration Agreement. See The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language). Further, the Panel may weigh the relative time and expense in enforcing the Chinese language agreement, which would result in prejudice toward either party. See Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, “It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case.”).
Pursuant to UDRP Rule 11(a), the Panel finds that persuasive evidence has been adduced by Complainant to establish that the Respondent is conversant and proficient in the English language. After considering the circumstance of the present case, the Panel decides that the proceeding should be in English.
Complainant claims rights in the BROOKS mark based upon registration of the mark with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 1,161,034, registered Jul. 14, 1981). See Compl. Ex. A. Registration of a mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish rights in that mark. See Home Depot Product Authority, LLC v. Samy Yosef / Express Transporting, FA 1738124 (Forum July 28, 2017) (finding that registration with the USPTO was sufficient to establish the complainant’s rights in the HOME DEPOT mark). The Panel finds that Complainant’s registration of the BROOKS mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant next argues Respondent’s <brookshoes.club> domain name is confusingly similar to the BROOKS mark, as the name incorporates the mark in its entirety, along with the generic term “shoes,” deletion of the letter “s,” and a “.club” gTLD. Such changes are not sufficient to distinguish a domain name from an incorporated mark in a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis. See Dell Inc. v. pushpender chauhan, FA 1784548 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“Respondent merely adds the term ‘supports’ and a ‘.org’ gTLD to the DELL mark. Thus, the Panel finds Respondent’s disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s DELL mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Lockheed Martin Corporation v. toyosei maruyama, FA 1620489 (Forum July 7, 2015) (“Simply removing the letter ‘s’ from a mark in the creation of a domain name still creates a confusingly similar domain name.”). The Panel finds that <brookshoes.club> domain name is confusingly similar to the BROOKS mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). The Panel finds that Complainant has made a prima facie case.
Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <brookshoes.club> domain name, as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name, nor has Complainant authorized Respondent to use the BROOKS can support a finding that the respondent is not commonly known by a disputed domain name. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Usama Ramzan, FA 1737750 (Forum July 26, 2017) (“We begin by noting that Complainant contends, and Respondent does not deny, that Respondent has not been commonly known by the <marlborocoupon.us> domain name, and that Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use the MARLBORO mark in any way. Moreover, the pertinent WHOIS information identifies the registrant of the domain name only as “Usama Ramzan,” which does not resemble the domain name. On this record, we conclude that Respondent has not been commonly known by the challenged domain name so as to have acquired rights to or legitimate interests in it within the purview of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).”). The WHOIS information of record identifies the registrant of the at-issue domain name as “Shao Wei Wang,” and no information on the record indicates Respondent was authorized to register a domain name incorporating Complainant’s mark. The Panel finds under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) that Respondent has not been commonly known by the <brookshoes.club> domain name.
Complainant further argues Respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests in the <brookshoes.club> domain name is demonstrated by its failure to use the name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Complainant contends Respondent’s disputed domain name resolves to a website that is nearly identical and has a similar color scheme to Complainant’s official website. Complainant also claims that Respondent’s website purports to offer similar products at a discount. Use of a disputed domain name to pass off as a complainant does not amount to a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See Dell Inc. v. Devesh Tyagi, FA 1785301 (Forum June 2, 2018) (“Respondent replicates Complainant’s website and displays Complainant’s products. The Panel finds that this use is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”). Complainant provides a screenshot of the disputed domain name’s resolving website and a copy of its own official website in support of these contentions.
Complainant also contends that Respondent uses the <brookshoes.club> domain name to acquire users’ personal information. Use of a disputed domain name in furtherance of a phishing scheme is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See DaVita Inc. v. Cynthia Rochelo, FA 1738034 (Forum July 20, 2017) (”Passing off in furtherance of a phishing scheme is not considered a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”); see also United States Postal Service v. Kehinde Okunola / Genuine ICT Centre, FA 1785420 (Forum June 6, 2018) (“Respondent uses the <uspscouriers.com> domain name both to sell services competing with the business of Complainant and to phish for personal identification information from Internet users. Neither of these uses of the domain name constitutes a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) such as would confirm in Respondent rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name as provided in those subsections of the Policy.”). Complainant provides a copy of consumer complaints in which users claim the disputed domain name is a scam website.
The Panel finds that Respondent does not use the disputed domain name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii) and Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name.
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant contends Respondent registered and uses the <brookshoes.club> domain name in bad faith. Specifically, Complainant argues Respondent’s disputed domain name displays content nearly identical to portions of Complainant’s legitimate website and this causes consumer confusion. Complainant further argues Respondent commercially benefits from this confusion by promoting unauthorized versions of Complainant’s goods. Use of a disputed domain name to create a false affiliation with a complainant for commercial gain may support a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Allianz of Am. Corp. v. Bond, FA 680624 (Forum June 2, 2006) (finding bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) where the respondent was diverting Internet users searching for the complainant to its own website and likely profiting); see also Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum December 27, 2017) (finding bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) where “Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant’s own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant, or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.”). Complainant provides a screenshot of the disputed domain name’s resolving website and a copy of its own official website in support of these contentions.
Complainant also contends that in light of the fame and notoriety of Complainant's BROOKS mark, it is inconceivable that Respondent could have registered the <brookshoes.club> domain name without actual and constructive knowledge of Complainant's rights in the mark. Any arguments of bad faith based on constructive notice are irrelevant because UDRP case precedent declines to find bad faith as a result of constructive knowledge. See The Way Int'l, Inc. v. Diamond Peters, D2003-0264 (WIPO May 29, 2003) ("As to constructive knowledge, the Panel takes the view that there is no place for such a concept under the Policy."). However, the Panel agrees with Complainant that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant's rights in the mark prior to registering the disputed domain name and finds that actual knowledge is adequate evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Orbitz Worldwide, LLC v. Domain Librarian, FA 1535826 (Forum Feb. 6, 2014) (“The Panel notes that although the UDRP does not recognize ‘constructive notice’ as sufficient grounds for finding Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith, the Panel here finds actual knowledge through the name used for the domain and the use made of it.”). Complainant further asserts that Respondent’s use of the domain name to offer unauthorized versions of Complainant’s goods indicates it had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights. The Panel agrees and finds Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the mark and registered and uses the name in bad faith.
Complainant has proved this element.
DECISION
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the <brookshoes.club> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Hon. Karl V. Fink (Ret.) Panelist
Dated: August 19, 2019
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