Google LLC v. Artem Polyakov
Claim Number: FA1910001868487
Complainant is Google LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Brendan J Hughes of Cooley LLP, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is Artem Polyakov (“Respondent”), Russian Federation.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <googlecheck.pro>, registered with Danesco Trading Ltd..
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Hon. Karl v. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on October 25, 2019; the Forum received payment on October 25, 2019.
On October 28, 2019, Danesco Trading Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <googlecheck.pro> domain name is registered with Danesco Trading Ltd. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Danesco Trading Ltd. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Danesco Trading Ltd. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On October 29, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of November 18, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@googlecheck.pro. Also, on October 29, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 21, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Hon. Karl V. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is one of the most highly recognized and widely used internet search services in the world. Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registration with the USPTO (e.g. Reg. No. 2,806,075 registered Jan. 20, 2004). Respondent’s <googlecheck.pro> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. Respondent incorporates the mark in its entirety and adds the term “check” along with the “.pro” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <googlecheck.pro> domain name as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. Respondent also fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent attempts to pass itself off as Complainant and redirects internet users to a website that contains malware that is in no way affiliated with Complainant.
Respondent registered and used the <googlecheck.pro> domain name in bad faith Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark prior to registration of the disputed domain name.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
For the reasons set forth below the Panel finds, from Complainant’s uncontested allegations and evidence, that Complainant is entitled to the requested relief of transfer of the <googlecheck.pro> domain name.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
Complainant claims to have rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registration with the USPTO. Registration of a mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish rights in a mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola Emmanuel/tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (“Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”). Complainant has provided the Panel with information pertaining to its USPTO registration for the GOOGLE mark (e.g. Reg. No. 2,806,075 registered Jan. 20, 2004). The Panel finds that Complainant has adequately shown rights in the GOOGLE mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant argues that Respondent’s <googlecheck.pro> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. Registration of a domain name that incorporates a mark in its entirety and adds a generic term along with a gTLD does not distinguish the domain name from the mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Wiluna Holdings, LLC v. Edna Sherman, FA 1652781 (Forum Jan. 22, 2016) (finding the addition of a generic term and gTLD is insufficient in distinguishing a disputed domain name from a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). Complainant argues that Respondent incorporates the mark in its entirety and adds the term “check” along with the “.pro” gTLD. The Panel finds that Respondent’s domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). The Panel finds Complainant has made a prima facie case.
Complainant argues Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interest in the <googlecheck.pro> domain name as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name nor has Respondent been given license or consent to use the GOOGLE mark or register domain names using Complainant’s mark. WHOIS information may be used to determine whether a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. LY Ta, FA 1789106 (Forum June 21, 2018) (concluding a respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name where the complainant asserted it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, and the relevant WHOIS information indicated the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name). Additionally, lack of authorization to use a complainant’s mark may indicate that the respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. See Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“lack of evidence in the record to indicate a respondent is authorized to use [the] complainant’s mark may support a finding that [the] respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)”). The WHOIS information of record for the disputed domain name lists the registrant as “Artem Polyakov” and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent was authorized to use the GOOGLE mark or was commonly known by the disputed domain name. The Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant further argues that Respondent fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent attempts to pass itself off as Complainant in order to redirect Internet users to a website that contains malware that is in no way affiliated with Complainant. Use of a disputed domain name to resolve to webpage that is not affiliated with a complainant and offers malware is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See Spike's Holding, LLC v. Nexperian Holding Limited, FA 1736008 (Forum July 21, 2017) (“Using a confusingly similar domain to display unrelated content can evince a lack of a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use… The Panel therefore finds that Respondent’s unrelated use of the <finishnline.com> domain name evinces a lack of rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”); see also Kmart of Mich., Inc. v. Cone, FA 655014 (Forum Apr. 25, 2006) (The panel found the respondent’s attempt to pass itself of as the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) when the respondent used the disputed domain name to present users with a website that was nearly identical to the complainant’s website); Coachella Music Festival, LLC v. Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, FA 1785199 (Forum June 5, 2018) (“Respondent uses the <coechella.com> domain name to direct internet users to a website which is used to attempt to install malware on visiting devices. Using the domain name in this manner is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶4(c)(i), nor a non-commercial or fair use under Policy ¶4(c)(iii).”). Complainant has provided the Panel with a screenshot of Respondent’s resolving webpage that shows a login screen and also a printout that shows that the domain name tried to download malware onto a user’s device. The Panel finds that Respondent has failed to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii) and Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name.
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant argues that Respondent registered and used the <googlecheck.pro> domain name in bad faith because Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark prior to registration of the disputed domain name. Actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the mark prior to registering the disputed domain name is adequate to find bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Orbitz Worldwide, LLC v. Domain Librarian, FA 1535826 (Forum Feb. 6, 2014) (“The Panel notes that although the UDRP does not recognize ‘constructive notice’ as sufficient grounds for finding Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith, the Panel here finds actual knowledge through the name used for the domain and the use made of it.”). Use of a disputed domain name that contains and well-known a famous mark may be evidence of actual knowledge per Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Coachella Music Festival, LLC v. ALEXANDER DE ALMEIDA LOPES, FA 1705267 (Forum Jan. 9, 2017) (finding the respondent had actual knowledge of the complainant’s COACHELLA mark when it registered and used the <coachellastuff.com> domain name—and thus did so in bad faith—because the complainant presented adequate evidence that its mark was well-known and famous). Complainant has provided evidence, including a list of awards, that shows the fame of the GOOGLE mark. The Panel finds that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark and registered and uses the domain name in bad faith per Policy ¶ (a)(iii).
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the <googlecheck.pro> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Hon. Karl V. Fink (Ret.) Panelist
November 22, 2019
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page