Google LLC v. Pro Garden Management / Kurz Randall K
Claim Number: FA2002001882118
Complainant is Google LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Brendan J Hughes of Cooley LLP, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is Pro Garden Management / Kurz Randall K (“Respondent”), Alabama, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <google-apis.info>, registered with NameSilo, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Ho Hyun Nahm, Esq. as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on February 5, 2020; the Forum received payment on February 5, 2020.
On February 6, 2020, NameSilo, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <google-apis.info> domain name is registered with NameSilo, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameSilo, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameSilo, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On February 10, 2020, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of March 2, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@google-apis.info. Also on February 10, 2020, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On March 4, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Ho Hyun Nahm, Esq. as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
i) Complainant, Google LLC, has become one of the most highly recognized and widely used Internet search services in the world. Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE mark based upon the registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502, registered Sep. 14, 2004). The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as Respondent merely adds the generic term “apis” and the “.info” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) to Complainant’s mark.
ii) Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Respondent is not licensed or authorized to use Complainant’s GOOGLE mark and is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. Additionally, Respondent is not using the disputed domain name in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent fails to make an active use of the disputed domain name.
iii) Respondent registered or uses the disputed domain name in bad faith. Respondent attempts to confuse Internet users and to attract them to its own website. Furthermore, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark when it registered the disputed domain name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
1. The disputed domain name was registered on November 26, 2019.
2. Complainant has established rights in the GOOGLE mark based upon the registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502, registered Sep. 14, 2004).
3. The disputed domain name resolves to an inactive webpage.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
Complainant claims rights to the GOOGLE mark based upon registration with the USPTO. Registration with USPTO sufficiently establishes rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Haas Automation, Inc. v. Jim Fraser, FA 1627211 (Forum Aug. 4, 2015) (finding that Complainant’s USPTO registrations for the HAAS mark sufficiently demonstrate its rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). Complainant provides copies of its USPTO registrations for the GOOGLE mark (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502, registered Sep. 14, 2004). Therefore, the Panel finds that Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant next claims that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark as Respondent merely adds a modifier and a gTLD to the mark. Additions of a generic and/or descriptive terms and a gTLD to a complainant’s mark does not negate any confusing similarity between a disputed domain name and mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Microsoft Corporation v. Thong Tran Thanh, FA 1653187 (Forum Jan. 21, 2016) (determining that confusing similarity exist where [a disputed domain name] contains Complainant’s entire mark and differs only by the addition of a generic or descriptive phrase and top-level domain, the differences between the domain name and its contained trademark are insufficient to differentiate one from the other for the purposes of the Policy.); see also Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis). Complainant argues Respondent merely adds the term “apis”, and the “.info” gTLD to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. The Panel agrees with Complainant and finds that the disputed domain name does not contain changes that would sufficiently distinguish it from the GOOGLE mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).
Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Specifically, Complainant argues Respondent is not licensed or authorized to use the GOOGLE mark and is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. Where a response is lacking, WHOIS information can support a finding that a respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark.). Additionally, lack of authorization to use a complainant’s mark may demonstrate the respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. See Navistar International Corporation v. N Rahmany, FA1505001620789 (Forum June 8, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name where the complainant had never authorized the respondent to incorporate its NAVISTAR mark in any domain name registration). The WHOIS information of record identifies Respondent as “Pro Garden Management / Kurz Randall K,” and there is no other evidence to suggest Respondent was authorized to use the GOOGLE mark. The Panel therefore finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Moreover, Complainant argues that Respondent is not using the disputed domain name in connection to a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because Respondent fails to make an active use of the disputed domain name. Failure to make active use of a domain name does constitute as a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See Michelin North America, Inc. v. Energie Media Group, FA 451882 (Forum Aug. 7, 2012). In Michelin North, the panel found that inactive use, or “passive holding,” of the disputed domain name by a respondent “permits the inference that [the respondent] lacks rights and legitimate interests in the domain names.” Here, Complainant provides screenshots of the disputed domain name which resolves to an inactive webpage which currently features a “This site cannot be reached” notice. The Panel agrees with Complainant that this use does not amount to a bona fide offering or good or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).
The Panel finds that Complainant has made out a prima facie case that arises from the considerations above. All of these matters go to make out the prima facie case against Respondent. As Respondent has not filed a Response or attempted by any other means to rebut the prima facie case against it, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
Complainant argues that Respondent has registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith because Respondent is attempting to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s own website by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the content thereon. Bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) can be found where a respondent uses a confusingly similar domain name to falsely indicate an association with a complainant. See AOL LLC v. iTech Ent, LLC, FA 726227 (Forum July 21, 2006) (finding that the respondent took advantage of the confusing similarity between the <theotheraol.com> and <theotheraol.net> domain names and the complainant’s AOL mark, which indicates bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)). Here, Complainant claims Respondent created a likelihood of confusion with Complainant and its trademarks by registering a domain that incorporates—in its entirety—Complainant’s GOOGLE mark, and giving the impression that interested individuals will receive information regarding Complainant. The Panel agrees with Complainant and finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).
Finally, Complainant argues Respondent must have had actual and constructive knowledge of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. While constructive notice of a complainant’s mark is insufficient for a finding of bad faith, actual knowledge is sufficient and may be proven through a totality of circumstances per Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Custom Modular Direct LLC v. Custom Modular Homes Inc., FA 1140580 (Forum Apr. 8, 2008) (“There is no place for constructive notice under the Policy.”); see also Google Inc. v. Ahmed Humood, FA1411001591796 (Forum Jan. 7, 2015) (“This Panel makes that inference; Respondent has actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark at the time of domain name registration based on the fame of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark and Respondent’s use of one of the disputed domain names to detail Internet domain name registration and maintenance services related to an in competition with Complainant.). Complainant claims that due to the fame and unique qualities of the GOOGLE mark, which was adopted by Complainant prior to the registration of the disputed domain name, it is wholly implausible that Respondent created the disputed domain name independently. The Panel infers, due to the notoriety of Complainant's mark that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark, and thus constitutes bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <google-apis.info> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Ho Hyun Nahm, Esq., Panelist
Dated: March 6, 2020
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page