Lockheed Martin Corporation v. Zhichao / Zhichao Yang
Claim Number: FA2011001919933
Complainant is Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Complainant”), represented by Jonathan Uffelman of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is Zhichao / Zhichao Yang (“Respondent”), China.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <lockheedmartinsavingsempower-retirement.com>, <lockheedmartingsaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsavingss.com>, <lockheedmartinssavings.com>, <lockheedmartinavings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaveings.com>, <lockheedmartinsavigs.com>, <lockheedmartinsavimgs.com>, <lockheedmartinssaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsvings.com>, <lokheedmartinsavings.com>, and <mylockheedmartinsavings.com>, registered with Dynadot, Llc and Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on November 9, 2020; the Forum received payment on November 9, 2020.
On November 9, 2020; November 13, 2020, Dynadot, Llc and Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <lockheedmartinsavingsempower-retirement.com>, <lockheedmartingsaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsavingss.com>, <lockheedmartinssavings.com>, <lockheedmartinavings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaveings.com>, <lockheedmartinsavigs.com>, <lockheedmartinsavimgs.com>, <lockheedmartinssaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsvings.com>, <lokheedmartinsavings.com>, and <mylockheedmartinsavings.com> domain names (the Domain Names) are registered with Dynadot, Llc and Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the names. Dynadot, Llc and Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd. have verified that Respondent is bound by the Dynadot, Llc and Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd. registration agreements and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On November 16, 2020, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint written in English and Chinese setting a deadline of December 7, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@lockheedmartinsavingsempower-retirement.com, postmaster@lockheedmartingsaving.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinsavingss.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinssavings.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinavings.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinsaings.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinsaveings.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinsavigs.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinsavimgs.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinssaving.com, postmaster@lockheedmartinsvings.com, postmaster@lokheedmartinsavings.com, postmaster@mylockheedmartinsavings.com. Also on November 16, 2020, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On December 9, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES:
Multiple Domain Names
Complainant alleges that all of the Domain Names are effectively controlled by the same person. Paragraph 3(c) of the Rules provides that a “complaint may relate to more than one domain name, provided that the domain names are registered by the same domain name holder.” The Domain Names resolve to web pages which are for all intents and purposes identical to each other (Revised Complaint Exhibit 11). The names and addresses of the registrants of all 13 Domain names as shown in the information furnished to the Forum by the two registrars are the same, 12 of the thirteen Domain Names are registered with the same registrar, all of the Domain Names save one were registered within ten days of each other in June 2020 (Complaint Exhibit 2), and all of the Domain Names save one have similar misspellings of the words “savings” and the names “Lockheed” and “Martin.” On these facts the Panel finds that all 13 Domain Names are registered to the same person or entity and will proceed as to all of them.
Language of the Proceedings
The registration agreement for 12 of the 13 the Domain Names is written in Chinese. Rule 11(a) provides that the language of the proceedings is the language of the registration agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Complainant filed its Complaint in English and requests that this proceeding be conducted in English. Factors which previous panels have seen as important include evidence showing that the respondent can understand the language of the complaint, the language of the domain name, the content on any web pages resolving from the domain name, prior correspondence between the parties, and potential unfairness or unwarranted delay in ordering the translation of the pleadings and the Decision. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.5.1, The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language), Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, “It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case.”).
As stated above, Complainant filed its Complaint in English, but the Written Notice of the Complaint, written in both Chinese and English, was served upon Respondent in accordance with Rules 1 and 2. The web pages to which the Domain Names resolve are written exclusively in English (Revised Complaint Exhibit 11), and the Domain Names are composed of the name of the U.S.-based Complainant and the English words “savings,” “my,” and “empower-retirement.” It thus appears that Respondent is conversant and proficient in the English language. Inasmuch as neither Complainant nor the Panel is proficient in Chinese, proceeding in that language would involve substantial additional expense and time for translation. Further, Respondent has not submitted a Response or any indication that he desires to participate in this proceeding, in the Chinese language or otherwise. Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the additional time and expense of proceeding in Chinese would be unwarranted inasmuch as the only party who might benefit from that has declined to participate. For this reason, the Panel determines that this proceeding will be conducted in English.
A. Complainant
Complainant is the world’s largest defense contractor and a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 100,000 people worldwide. It has rights in the LOCKHEED MARTIN mark through its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s Domain Names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s LOCKHEED MARTIN mark in that they incorporate the mark in its entirety, merely adding the generic terms “empower,” “retirement,” “my,” and “savings” (albeit in many cases with misspellings) and the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Names. He is not using any of them in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the resolving web pages host pay-per-click links. He is not commonly known by the Domain Names, nor did Complainant authorize him to use the LOCKHEED MARTIN mark in any way. Finally, Respondent has engaged in typosquatting.
Respondent registered and is using the Domain names in bad faith. He attempts to attract internet users to his web sites for commercial gain. Respondent registered multiple domain names that use Complainant’s LOCKHEED MARTIN mark when he has no connection with Complainant and has been subject to previous UDRP proceedings, which shows a pattern of bad faith registration. Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the LOCKHEED MARTIN mark.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The LOCKHEED MARTIN mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 2,022,037) on December 10, 1996 (Complaint Exhibit 10). Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (“Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”).
Respondent’s <lockheedmartinsavingsempower-retirement.com>, <lockheedmartingsaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsavingss.com>, <lockheedmartinssavings.com>, <lockheedmartinavings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaveings.com>, <lockheedmartinsavigs.com>, <lockheedmartinsavimgs.com>, <lockheedmartinssaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsvings.com>, <lokheedmartinsavings.com>, and <mylockheedmartinsavings.com> Domain Names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s LOCKHEED MARTIN mark. They all contain the mark in its entirety, merely adding generic words and a gTLD. All but one of them contain the word “savings,” in some cases misspelled, one contains the word “my” and another two misspell the name “Lockheed.” One of them adds the words “savings empower-retirement” to the mark. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Names from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Wiluna Holdings, LLC v. Edna Sherman, FA 1652781 (Forum Jan. 22, 2016) (finding the addition of a generic term and gTLD is insufficient in distinguishing a disputed domain name from a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s marks are clearly recognizable within the Domain Names.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Names are identical or confusingly similar to the LOCKHEED MARTIN mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) The respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the domain name;
(ii) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(iii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iv) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not using the Domain Names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the web sites resolving from them are pay-per-click sites, (ii) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Names, (iii) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use the LOCKHEED MARTIN mark, and (iv) the Domain Names are typo-squatted. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrars lists “Zhichao” as the registrant of the Domain Name <lockheedmartinsavingsempower-retirement.com> and “Zhichao Yang” as the registrant of the other Domain Names. These names bear no resemblance to any of the Domain Names. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Names for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Revised Complaint Exhibit 11 consists of screenshots of the web sites resolving from the Domain Names. They feature links such as “Lockheed Martin Savings,” “529 College Savings Plan,” “401k Retirement Plan,” “Raytheon Technologies Careers” and the like. They appear to be typical pay-per-click sites. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links to goods and services, related and unrelated to a complainant’s business, is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). McGuireWoods LLP v. Mykhailo Loginov / Loginov Enterprises d.o.o, FA1412001594837 (Forum Jan. 22, 2015) (“The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to feature parked hyperlinks containing links in competition with Complainant’s legal services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees), Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”
Finally, by registering all but one of the Domain Names with subtle misspellings of words, e.g., “lokheed” for “lockheed,” “marting” for “martin,” Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to evidence a lack of rights and legitimate interests in the domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark. Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Names.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is using the Domain Names to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web sites by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web sites, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent here obtains commercial gain from his use of the Domain Names and the resolving web sites to generate pay-per-click revenues. Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because the sponsors of the various web sites forwarded from Respondent’s web site benefit from the subsequent interest and purchases of those who visit the sites. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO, 2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).
Second, Respondent registered and is using the Domain Names, which incorporate the well-known LOCKHEED MARTIN mark. As discussed above, however, Respondent has no connection with that mark or its owner, the Complainant. This may not fit precisely within any of the circumstances set forth in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). Given the nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark with which the respondent has no connection has frequently been held to be evidence of opportunistic bad faith. Kraft Foods (Norway) v. Wide, D2000-0911 (WIPO Sept. 23, 2000) (“[T]he fact that Respondent chosen [sic] to register a well-known mark to which [it] has no connections or rights indicates that [it] was in bad faith when registering the domain name at issue.”), Google LLC v. Noboru Maruyama / Personal, FA 2001001879162 (Forum Mar. 3, 2020) (“the registration and use of domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark with which the respondent has no connection has frequently been held to be evidence of bad faith.”).
Next, as discussed above, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), typosquatting has, in and of itself, been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use. Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its marks when he registered the Domain Names in March and June 2020 (Complaint Exhibit 2 shows the creation dates). Complainant has been using the LOCKHEED MARTIN mark since 1995, long before Respondent registered the Domain Names and is well-known throughout the world. Respondent copied that mark into the Domain Names, albeit with subtle misspellings. While Complainant’s primary business relates to defense contracting and aerospace technology, it also offers its employees a variety of savings plans through its <lockheedmartinsavings.com> domain name, which Respondent copied with misspellings in many of the Domain Names at issue in this proceeding, and his web sites offer links to services related to savings and retirement plans. In light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy, ¶ 4(b) registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in the incorporated mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons first set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Names in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <lockheedmartinsavingsempower-retirement.com>, <lockheedmartingsaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsavingss.com>, <lockheedmartinssavings.com>, <lockheedmartinavings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaings.com>, <lockheedmartinsaveings.com>, <lockheedmartinsavigs.com>, <lockheedmartinsavimgs.com>, <lockheedmartinssaving.com>, <lockheedmartinsvings.com>, <lokheedmartinsavings.com>, and <mylockheedmartinsavings.com> Domain Names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
December 14, 2020
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