Google LLC v. Gerber Gerber
Claim Number: FA2101001929515
Complainant is Google LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Fabricio Vayra of Perkins Coie LLP, District of Colombia, USA. Respondent is Gerber Gerber (“Respondent”), USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <didigoogle.com>, registered with Dynadot, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Ho Hyun Nahm, Esq. as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on January 25, 2021; the Forum received payment on January 25, 2021.
On January 26, 2021, Dynadot, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <didigoogle.com> domain name is registered with Dynadot, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Dynadot, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Dynadot, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On January 26, 2021, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of February 16, 2021 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@didigoogle.com. Also on January 26, 2021, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On February 18, 2021, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Ho Hyun Nahm, Esq. as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
i) Complainant owns and operates a leading internet search service. Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registration of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502 registered Sep.14, 2004). The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly because it wholly incorporates Complainant’s GOOGLE mark, merely adding the term “didi” and the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
ii) Respondent has no legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names, nor has Complainant authorized or licensed to Respondent any rights in the GOOGLE mark. Additionally, Respondent does not use the disputed domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. The disputed domain name redirects to other sites offering browser extensions and displaying advertising links.
iii) Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith. The disputed domain name resolves to a parked pay-per-click webpage. Additionally, Respondent registered the disputed domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a response in this proceeding.
1. The disputed domain name was registered on September 7, 2019.
2. Complainant has established rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registration of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502 registered Sep.14, 2004).
3. The disputed domain name resolves to a parked pay-per-click webpage. The disputed domain name redirects to other sites offering browser extensions and displaying advertising links.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
Complainant asserts rights in the GOOGLE mark based upon the registration with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502 registered Sep.14, 2004). Registration of a mark with the USPTO is a valid showing of rights in a mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). Since Complainant provides evidence of registration of the GOOGLE mark with the USPTO, the Panel finds that Complainant has rights in the mark under Policy 4(a)(i).
Complainant argues the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark as it contains the GOOGLE mark in its entirety and merely adds the term “didi” and the “.com” gTLD. The addition of a generic or descriptive phrase and gTLD fails to sufficiently distinguish a disputed domain name from a mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Microsoft Corporation v. Thong Tran Thanh, FA 1653187 (Forum Jan. 21, 2016) (determining that confusing similarity exists where [a disputed domain name] contains Complainant’s entire mark and differs only by the addition of a generic or descriptive phrase and top-level domain, the differences between the domain name and its contained trademark are insufficient to differentiate one from the other for the purposes of the Policy). Therefore, the Panel finds the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).
Complainant contends Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name since Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name and Complainant has not authorized or licensed to Respondent any rights in the GOOGLE mark. WHOIS information may be used to determine whether a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. LY Ta, FA 1789106 (Forum June 21, 2018) (concluding a respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name where the complainant asserted it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, and the relevant WHOIS information indicated the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name). Additionally, lack of authorization to use a complainant’s mark may indicate that the respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. See Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“lack of evidence in the record to indicate a respondent is authorized to use [the] complainant’s mark may support a finding that [the] respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)”). The WHOIS information for the disputed domain name lists the registrant as “Gerber Gerber,” and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent was authorized to use the GOOGLE mark. Therefore, the Panel finds Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant argues that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use as the disputed domain name redirects to another site offering competing goods and services. Where the respondent uses a disputed domain name to redirect users to another site offering competing goods and services, the Panel may find the respondent fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See WeddingChannel.com Inc. v. Vasiliev, FA 156716 (Forum June 12, 2003) (finding that the respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to redirect Internet users to websites unrelated to the complainant’s mark, websites where the respondent presumably receives a referral fee for each misdirected Internet user, was not a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by the Policy). Here, Complainant provides screenshots of the sites at the disputed domain, which offer browser extensions and display advertising links. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).
The Panel finds that Complainant has made out a prima facie case that arises from the considerations above. All of these matters go to make out the prima facie case against Respondent. As Respondent has not filed a Response or attempted by any other means to rebut the prima facie case against it, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
Complainant claims that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith because the disputed domain name resolves to a parked pay-per-click webpage. Use of a disputed domain to display commercial hyperlinks may be evidence of bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Plain Green, LLC v. wenqiang tang, FA1505001621656 (Forum July 1, 2015) (finding that the respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to feature generic third-party hyperlinks constituted bad faith according to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)). As previously noted, Complainant provides a screenshot of a parked webpage with pay-per-click links resolving at the disputed domain. Thus, the Panel agrees that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).
Complainant argues that Respondent had knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark at the time of registering the disputed domain name. The Panel observes that actual knowledge can adequately demonstrate bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See AutoZone Parts, Inc. v. Ken Belden, FA 1815011 (Forum Dec. 24, 2018) (“Complainant contends that Respondent’s knowledge can be presumed in light of the substantial fame and notoriety of the AUTOZONE mark, as well as the fact that Complainant is the largest retailer in the field. The Panel here finds that Respondent did have actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark, demonstrating bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”) see also iFinex Inc. v. xu shuaiwei, FA 1760249 (Forum Jan. 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s prior knowledge is evident from the notoriety of Complainant’s BITFINEX trademark as well as from Respondent’s use of its trademark laden domain name to direct internet traffic to a website which is a direct competitor of Complainant”). To support this assertion, Complainant points to the fame and unique qualities of its GOOGLE mark. As such, the Panel infers that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s right in the mark, which supports a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <didigoogle.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Ho Hyun Nahm, Esq., Panelist
Dated: February 22, 2021
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