DECISION

 

Google LLC v. Shengyuan Qiu

Claim Number: FA2201001980957

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Google LLC (“Complainant”), represented by James R. Davis, II of Perkins Coie LLP, District of Columbia, USA.  Respondent is Shengyuan Qiu (“Respondent”), Taiwan.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <xn--oogle-j1a.com>, registered with NameCheap, Inc..

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Ho-Hyun Nahm, Esq. as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on January 18, 2022; the Forum received payment on January 18, 2022.

 

On January 19, 2022, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <xn--oogle-j1a.com> domain name is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On January 20, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of February 9, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@xn--oogle-j1a.com.  Also on January 20, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On February 14, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Ho-Hyun Nahm, Esq. as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PRELIMINARY ISSUE: ENCODED DOMAIN NAME

The <xn--oogle-j1a.com> domain name includes certain characters that rely on information exchange coding systems such as PUNYCODE for electronic communications, such that computers translate the domain name as <ğoogle.com>, PUNYCODE is an ASCII-compatible encoding standard designed for use with internationalized domain names (IDNs) containing non-Latin (and non-ASCII) characters. For Complainant to display the <xn--oogle-j1a.com> domain name as <ğoogle.com>, it first had to decode it.

 

Previous panels have found IDNs and their PUNYCODE translations to be equivalent.  See Damien Persohn v. Lim, FA 874447 (Forum Feb. 19, 2007) (finding an internationalized domain name, <têtu.com>, and its PUNYCODE translation, <xn--ttu-fma.com>, to be one and the same under the Policy); see also Württembergische Versicherung AG v. Emir Ulu, D2006-0278 (WIPO May 4, 2006) (finding that the <xn--wrttembergische-versicherung-16c.com> should be considered as equivalent to the <württembergische-versicherung.com> domain name, based on previous panel decisions recognizing the relevance of I-nav software for translating German letters such as “ä” or “ü” into codes such as <xn--[name]-16c> and similar); see also Fujitsu Ltd. v. tete and Lianqiu Li, D2006-0885 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2006) (finding the <xn--zqsv0e014e.com> domain name to be an exact reproduction of the complainant’s Chinese trademark in a domain name). 

 

The Panel finds that the domain name <xn--oogle-j1a.com> is the same as its PUNYCODE translation, <ğoogle.com>, for the purposes of this proceeding.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

i) Complainant is one of the most highly recognized Internet search services in the world. Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registration of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502, registered September 14, 2004). The disputed domain name <ğoogle.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. Respondent incorporates the GOOGLE mark in its entirety, replacing the “G” with a “ğ” and adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).

 

ii) Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the <ğoogle.com> domain name as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name nor did Complainant authorize Respondent to use the GOOGLE mark in any way. Respondent fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate non-commercial or fair use. Instead, the disputed domain name resolves to a webpage that displays pay-per-click links that make use of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.

 

iii) Respondent registered and used the <ğoogle.com> domain name in bad faith as the disputed domain name resolves to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links that make use of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. Respondent has offered to sell the disputed domain name. Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark due to the longstanding use and fame of the mark in commerce.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

1. The <ğoogle.com> domain name was registered on October 26, 2014.

 

2. Complainant has established rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registration of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502, registered September 14, 2004).

 

3. The disputed domain name resolves to a webpage that displays pay-per-click links that make use of Complainants GOOGLE mark.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant claims to have rights in the GOOGLE mark through its registrations with the USPTO. Registration of a mark with the USPTO is sufficient to demonstrate rights in a mark per policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See BGK Trademark Holdings, LLC & Beyoncé Giselle Knowles-Carter v. Chanphut / Beyonce Shop, FA 1626334 (Forum Aug. 3, 2015) (asserting that Complainant’s registration with the USPTO (or any other governmental authority) adequately proves its rights under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). Here, Complainant has provided this Panel with copies of its USPTO registrations for the GOOGLE mark (e.g., Reg. No. 2,884,502, registered September 14, 2004). Therefore, the Panel finds Complainant has rights in the mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Complainant argues that the disputed domain name <ğoogle.com> is confusingly similar to Complainants GOOGLE mark. Complainant contends that the disputed domain name incorporates the GOOGLE mark in its entirety, replacing the G with a ğ and adding the “.com” gTLD.  Registration of a domain name that incorporates a complainant’s mark in its entirety and adds unicode letter along with a gTLD does not distinguish the domain name from the mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See NIKE, Inc. and Nike Innovate, C.V. v. michal restl  c/o Dynadot, FA1703001723952 (Forum May 11, 2017) (finding <nıke.com> [xn--nke-jua.com] confusingly similar to NIKE and noting, “Panels have determined that exchanging a letter in a mark for a Unicode character fails to distinguish a domain name for the purposes of a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis of confusing similarity”). Therefore, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).

 

Complainant argues Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interest in the <ğoogle.com> domain name as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name nor has Respondent been given license or consent to use the GOOGLE mark or register domain names using Complainant’s mark. Where a response is lacking, WHOIS information may be used to determine whether a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. LY Ta, FA 1789106 (Forum June 21, 2018) (concluding a respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name where the complainant asserted it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, and the relevant WHOIS information indicated the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name). Additionally, lack of authorization to use a complainant’s mark may indicate that the respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. See Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“lack of evidence in the record to indicate a respondent is authorized to use [the] complainant’s mark may support a finding that [the] respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)”). The WHOIS information for the disputed domain name lists the registrant as “Shengyuan Qiu” and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent was authorized to use the  GOOGLE mark or was commonly known by the disputed domain name. Therefore, the Panel finds Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate non-commercial or fair use. Instead, the disputed domain name resolves to a webpage that displays pay-per-click links that make use of Complainants GOOGLE mark. Use of a disputed domain name to resolve to a domain name that makes use of a complainant’s mark by providing pay-per-click links is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate non-commercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See Danbyg Ejendomme A/S v. lb Hansen / guerciotti, FA1504001613867 (Forum June 2, 2015) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name where the disputed domain name resolved to a website that offered both competing hyperlinks and hyperlinks unrelated to the complainant’s business). Complainant has provided the Panel with screenshots of the disputed domain name’s resolving website that provides links to services related or unrelated to Complainant’s business. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent has failed to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate non-commercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has made out a prima facie case that arises from the considerations above. All of these matters go to make out the prima facie case against Respondent. As Respondent has not filed a Response or attempted by any other means to rebut the prima facie case against it, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant argues that Respondent registered and used the <ğoogle.com> domain name in bad faith as the disputed domain name resolves to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links that make use of Complainants GOOGLE mark. Use of a disputed domain name to resolve to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links may be evidence of bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Staples, Inc. and Staples the Office Superstores, LLC v. HANNA EL HIN / DTAPLES.COM, FA1404001557007 (Forum June 6, 2014) (“Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the <dtaples.com> domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the Respondent is using the disputed domain name to host third-party links to Complainant’s competitors from which Respondent is presumed to obtain some commercial benefit.”). The Panel recalls that the disputed domain name’s resolving website provides links to services related or unrelated to Complainants business. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent had knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE mark at the time of registering the <ğoogle.com> domain name. To support this assertion, Complainant points to its trademark registrations along with the fact that Respondent impersonates Complainant to further a fraudulent scam. The Panel infers, due to the manner of use of the disputed domain name and the notoriety of Complainant’s mark that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s right in its mark at the time of registering the disputed domain name, which supports a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <xn--oogle-j1a.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Ho-Hyun Nahm, Esq., Panelist

Dated:  February 22, 2022

 

 

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