The RCS Network v. Zhichao Yang
Claim Number: FA2205001996199
Complainant is The RCS Network (“Complainant”), represented by Jonathan Loeb of Rich May, P.C., Massachusetts, USA. Respondent is Zhichao Yang (“Respondent”), China.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <masssae.com>, registered with Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd. d/b/a HiChina (www.net.cn).
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on May 13, 2022; the Forum received payment on May 13, 2022. The Complaint was received in both Chinese and English.
On May 17, 2022, Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd. d/b/a HiChina (www.net.cn) confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <masssae.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd. d/b/a HiChina (www.net.cn) and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd. d/b/a HiChina (www.net.cn) has verified that Respondent is bound by the Alibaba Cloud Computing Ltd. d/b/a HiChina (www.net.cn) registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On May 19, 2022, the Forum served the Chinese and English language Complaint and all Annexes, including a Chinese language Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of June 8, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@masssae.com. Also on May 19, 2022, the Chinese and English language Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On June 15, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: LANGUAGE OF PROCEEDING
According to the Registrar, the registration agreement for the Domain Name is written in the Chinese language. Rule 11(a) provides that the language of the proceedings is the language of the registration agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Complainant filed its Complaint in both English and Chinese and states no preference as to whether these proceedings be conducted in English or Chinese. Nevertheless, the Panel is not proficient in the Chinese language and deems it appropriate to conduct these proceedings in English. Factors which previous panels have seen as important include evidence showing that the respondent can understand the language of the complaint, the language of the domain name, the content on any web pages resolving from the domain name, prior correspondence between the parties, and potential unfairness or unwarranted delay in ordering translation of the pleadings and the Decision. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.5.1, The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language), Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, “It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case.”).
As stated above, Complainant filed its Complaint in English and Chinese, and the Written Notice of the Complaint, written in both Chinese and English, was served upon Respondent in accordance with Rules 1 and 2. The web pages to which the Domain Name resolves are written exclusively in English (screenshots submitted as Amended Complaint Annex C). It thus appears that Respondent is conversant and proficient in the English language. Inasmuch as the Panel is not proficient in Chinese, proceeding in that language would involve substantial additional expense and delay for translation. Further, Respondent has not submitted a Response or any indication that it desires to participate in this proceeding, in the Chinese language or otherwise. Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the additional time and expense of proceeding in Chinese would be unwarranted inasmuch as the only party who might benefit from that has declined to participate. For this reason, the Panel determines that this proceeding will be conducted in English.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a collaborative association of Massachusetts utility companies and energy efficiency services providers. It has rights in the MASS SAVE mark through its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <masssae.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as it fully incorporates the mark, merely omitting the space between the two words and one letter from the word “SAVE”, and adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. The Domain Name is a typosquatted version of Complainant’s mark. Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead uses it for a pay-per-click website. Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark in any way.
Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent uses the Domain Name for a website that hosts hyperlinks to websites in competition with Complainant, attracting for commercial gain Internet users to its website by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its site by Complainant and disrupting Complainant’s business.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Respondent’s <masssae.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s MASS SAVE mark. It fully incorporates Complainant’s mark, merely omitting the space between the two words and a letter from the “SAVE” element of the mark and adds the “.com” gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purses of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Bond & Co. Jewelers, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 937650 (Forum Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that the elimination of spaces between terms and the addition of a gTLD do not establish distinctiveness from the complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)), Morgan Stanley v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp., FA 1783121 (Forum June 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s <morganstanle.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark as it wholly incorporates the mark, but for the omission of the letter ‘y’ and spacing within the mark, and appends the ‘.com’ gTLD.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MASS SAVE mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it is a typosquatted version of Complainant’s mark, (ii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead uses it for a pay-per-click website, and (iii) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and (iv) Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark in any way. These allegations are addressed as follows:
By registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant’s mark, omitting the letter “V” from the word “SAVE,” Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Engaging in typosquatting is inconsistent with rights or legitimate interests in a domain name. Macy’s Inc. and its subsidiary Macy’s West Stores, Inc. v. chen wenjie c/o Dynadot Privacy, FA1404001552918 (Forum May 21, 2014) (“Respondent’s disputed domain names are typosquatted versions of Complainant’s registered mark. Typosquatting shows a lack of rights or legitimate interests.”).
Amended Complaint Annex C is a screenshot of the website resolving from the Domain Name. The site features the links “Mass Save Rebates,” “Mass Save Program,” and “Energy Conservation.” It is a typical pay-per-click site. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links to goods and services, whether related or unrelated to a complainant’s business, is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). McGuireWoods LLP v. Mykhailo Loginov / Loginov Enterprises d.o.o, FA1412001594837 (Forum Jan. 22, 2015) (“The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to feature parked hyperlinks containing links in competition with Complainant’s legal services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees), Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”).
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Zhichao Yang” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent here obtains commercial gain from his use of the Domain Name and the resolving web site to generate pay-per-click revenues. Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because the sponsors of the various web sites forwarded from Respondent’s web site benefit from the subsequent interest and purchases of those who visit the sites. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO,2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).
Next, as discussed above, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. This does not fit precisely within any of the circumstances listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The list of circumstances set forth in Policy ¶ 4(b) is non-exclusive, allowing for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to be bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Finally, although not argued by Complainant, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name. Complainant’s mark is unique and somewhat whimsical and is not a name a business entity, particularly one in China, would select unless it was targeting Complainant’s mark for commercial gain. Respondent copied that mark into the Domain Name, albeit with a subtle misspelling, and structured the links on its web site to relate in many cases to energy-saving concerns, the same area of endeavor in which Complainant operates. In light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy, ¶ 4(b) registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in the incorporated mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons first set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <masssae.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
June 17, 2022
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