Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Don Wrinkles
Claim Number: FA2301002027014
Complainant is Gilead Sciences, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Cynthia Smuzynska of Gilead Sciences, Inc., US. Respondent is Don Wrinkles (“Respondent”), US.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <gileadscience.us>, registered with Sav.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on January 10, 2023; Forum received payment on January 10, 2023.
On January 11, 2023, Sav.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <gileadscience.us> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Sav.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Sav.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Sav.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On January 11, 2023, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of January 31, 2023 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@gileadscience.us. Also on January 11, 2023, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On February 3, 2023, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules to the usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules”). Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the usTLD Policy, usTLD Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a well-known manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. It has rights in the GILEAD SCIENCES mark through its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <gileadscience.us> Domain Name is virtually identical and confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it incorporates the GILEAD SCIENCES mark in its entirety, merely omitting the letter “s” and adding the “.us” country code top-level domain (“ccTLD”).
Respondent has no legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Respondent is not associated or affiliated with Complainant, Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent any rights in the GILEAD SCIENCES mark, and Respondent is offering the Domain Name for sale.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent registered it omitting the “s,” from the “sciences” element, with intent to divert Internet users, and is offering the Domain Name for sale. Respondent registered the Domain Name with constructive knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the GILEAD SCIENCES mark.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.
Given the similarity between the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) and the usTLD Policy, the Panel will draw upon UDRP precedent as applicable in rendering its decision.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The GILEAD SCIENCES mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 1,611,838) on September 4, 1990 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit 10). Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrates its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
Respondent’s <gileadscience.us> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s GILEAD SCIENCES mark. It incorporates the mark substantially in its entirety, merely omitting the space and the letter “s” from the SCIENCES term and adding the “.us” ccTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Bond & Co. Jewelers, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 937650 (Forum Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that the elimination of spaces between terms and the addition of a gTLD do not establish distinctiveness from the complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)), .”), Farouk Systems, Inc. v. Jack King / SLB, FA 1618704 (Forum June 19, 2015) (finding, “The ccTLD “.us” designation is inconsequential to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis.”), Wells Fargo & Company v. Xiangsheng Zhou, FA 1576852 (Forum Oct. 17, 2014) (finding that the removal of the letter “s” in the <wellfargo.net> domain name failed to differentiate it from the complainant’s WELLS FARGO trademark, thus resulting in a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the GILEAD SCIENCES mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) The respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the domain name;
(ii) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(iii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iv) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant states that Respondent has no legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not associated or affiliated with Complainant, (ii) Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent any rights in the GILEAD SCIENCES mark, and (iii) Respondent is offering the Domain Name for sale. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant did not address or offer any evidence bearing specifically upon the Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) factor, concerning whether the Respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the Domain Name. Complainants in usTLD cases can search one or more governmental trademark authorities and report negative results to establish a prima facie case as to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). Complainant here offered no such evidence. Nevertheless, while Complainant should have offered evidence bearing specifically upon this element, the evidence that is available is sufficient to establish that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name. The USPTO registration certificate for the GILEAD SCIENCES mark submitted in Complaint Exhibit 10 evidences Complainant’s rights in that mark dating from at least as early as the 1988 first use date shown on that certificate. Inasmuch as the USPTO is fully aware of Complainant’s claim of rights in the GILEAD SCIENCES mark, it is extremely unlikely that it or any other governmental trademark authority would register a trademark identical to <gileadscience.us> or any other mark identical or similar to the Domain Name in the name of any person other than Complainant or one of its affiliates, or that Respondent could be the owner or beneficiary of a valid common law trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name. On this evidence, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Panel finds that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a valid trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name.
Complainant states that Respondent has no connection or affiliation with it and that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complainant did not specifically address the Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) factor, concerning whether the Respondent has been commonly known by the Domain Name, but the WHOIS printout it submitted as Complaint Exhibit 2 and the information furnished to the Forum by the registrar list “Don Wrinkles” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).
Complaint Exhibit 3 is a screenshot of the <dan.com> website to which the Domain Name resolves. It advertises the Domain Name for sale at a price of $1,450.00. It is clear that Respondent is affirmatively advertising and offering the Domain Name for sale to the general public. A general offer of sale is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv), and is thus evidence of a lack of rights or legitimate interests. Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Huang Jia Lin, FA1504001614086 (Forum May 25, 2015) (“Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent’s general attempt to sell the disputed domain name is further evidence of Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”), Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Diego Ossa, FA1501001602016 (Forum Feb. 26, 2015) (“The Resolving parked page advertises the sale of the domain name with the message ‘Would you like to buy this domain?’ The Panel accepts this offer as demonstrative of Respondent’s willingness to sell the disputed domain name, and finds that such behavior provides additional evidence that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.”).
By registering the Domain Name with subtle a misspelling of Complainant’s mark, i.e., omitting the “s” at the end of “Sciences,” Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Engaging in typosquatting is inconsistent with rights or legitimate interests in a domain name. Macy’s Inc. and its subsidiary Macy’s West Stores, Inc. v. chen wenjie c/o Dynadot Privacy, FA1404001552918 (Forum May 21, 2014) (“Respondent’s disputed domain names are typosquatted versions of Complainant’s registered mark. Typosquatting shows a lack of rights or legitimate interests.”), Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum April 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark. Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP and usDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is affirmatively advertising and offering the Domain Name for sale to the general public at a price of $1,450.00, which is substantially in excess of normal out-of-pocket costs directly related to a domain name, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). A general offer of sale of a confusingly similar domain name is evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). Diners Club Int’l Ltd. v. Domain Admin******It's all in the name******, FA 156839 (Forum June 23, 2003) (finding that when the domain name itself notes that it is “available for lease or sale,” evidence that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i) can be inferred from the fact that “the sole value of the [<wwwdinersclub.com] domain name is dictated by its relation to the complainant’s registered DINERS CLUB mark).
Complainant asserts that Respondent had constructive knowledge of Complainant and its GILEAD SCIENCES mark when it registered the Domain Name in February 2022 (WHOIS printout submitted in Complaint Exhibit 2 shows creation date). Arguments of bad faith based on constructive notice are generally rejected, and Panels have most frequently declined to find bad faith based upon constructive knowledge. The Way Int'l, Inc. v. Diamond Peters, D2003-0264 (WIPO May 29, 2003) ("As to constructive knowledge, the Panel takes the view that there is no place for such a concept under the Policy."). Nevertheless, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name. Complainant’s GILEAD SCIENCES mark was registered in 1990 and had been used in commerce at least since the 1988 first use date shown in the USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit 2. Complainant’s presence in the pharmaceutical industry is significant and well-known throughout the U.S. (exemplar articles printed in the New York Times and other publications submitted in Complaint Exhibit 8). There is no question that Respondent knew of Complainant and its GILEAD SCIENCES mark when it registered the Domain Name. This may not fit within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
Finally, although not argued in so many words by Complainant, as discussed above, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. This also does not fit precisely within any of the circumstances listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but given the non-exclusive nature of that paragraph, registering a confusingly similar typosquatted domain name has been held to be bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein), Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball League, Inc. v. Zuccarini, D2002-1011 (WIPO Jan. 21, 2003) (“Typosquatting … is the intentional misspelling of words with [the] intent to intercept and siphon off traffic from its intended destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of itself evidence of bad faith.”).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Names in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <gileadscience.us> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
February 6, 2023
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