Center for Financial Training Atlantic & Central States, Inc. v. Zsolt Bikadi
Claim Number: FA23070 02051938
Complainant is Center for Financial Training Atlantic & Central States, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by David Ewen of Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, Connecticut, USA. Respondent is Zsolt Bikadi (“Respondent”), Hungary.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <cftuny.com>, registered with DropCatch.com 908 LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on July 5, 2023; Forum received payment on July 5, 2023.
On July 5, 2023, DropCatch.com 908 LLC confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <cftuny.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with DropCatch.com 908 LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. DropCatch.com 908 LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the DropCatch.com 908 LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On July 6, 2023, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of July 26, 2023 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@cftuny.com. Also on July 6, 2023, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On August 1, 2023, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant provides continuing professional education programs and seminars primarily in the banking and finance field. It has rights in the CFT and CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING marks based upon its registration of the CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark with the states of Connecticut and New Jersey, its application for registration of the CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and by common law based upon its use of the marks in commerce since as early as 2020. Respondent’s <cftuny.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark as it uses the “CFT” and merely adds the geographic word “uny” (which is an acronym for Upstate New York) and the “.com” generic top-level-domain name ("gTLD").
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. He is not commonly known by the Domain Name and is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services but instead is using it to host sponsored links that compete with Complainant or to divert users seeking Complainant.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. His website consists only of sponsored search links for websites that compete with Complainant and generate revenue for him.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING ATLANTIC AND CENTRALSTATES mark was registered to Complainant with the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey on August 25, 2021 and with the Secretary of State of the State of Connecticut on August 24, 2021 (certificates issued by New Jersey State Treasurer and Secretary of State of the State of Connecticut included in Complaint Annex C). These registrations, however appear to be in the nature of mere filings for a trade name, or a “d/b/a” (“doing business as”) registration. There is no indication from either certificate that the relevant state performs any kind of examination or review of an application for a trademark. The New Jersey certificate was issued the same day it was applied for and does not indicate any fee associated with it. The Connecticut certificate was issued seven days after it was applied for, for a fee of $50.00. UDRP panels have been reluctant to find rights in a mark based upon unexamined U.S. state registrations. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.2, Navigo Energy Inc. v. Meier, FA 206312 (Forum Dec. 6, 2003) (“The Policy was intended solely to protect registered and unregistered trademarks and not trade names because trade names are not universally protected as are trademarks.”), Elan, LLC v. Al Perkins, FA 1731999 (Forum June 26, 2017) (“[R]egistration of a trade name with a State is insufficient to establish trademark rights.”), The Panel notes also that the mark identified in both of these certificates is not the same as either of the marks asserted by Complainant in this proceeding, in that the words “Atlantic and Central States” included in those marks are not present in the two marks asserted here. The two state registrations submitted in this matter do not in and of themselves demonstrate Complainant’s rights in the marks for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant submitted evidence of its application to register its CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark with the USPTO, filed August 18, 2021. (TESS printout included in Complaint Annex C). While the application date for a registered trademark establishes the priority date for that registration, the mere filing of an application for USPTO registration does not guarantee that a registration will ultimately issue and does not constitute competent evidence of rights in a mark. Complainant’s application for a USPTO registration of its CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark is not sufficient in and of itself to establish its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). PRGRS, Inc. v. Pak, WIPO Case No.D2002-0077 (“Contrary to what the Complainant is proposing, the Panel finds the broad consensus under the Policy is that a trademark application alone is not sufficient evidence of mark rights in a disputed domain name.”), Jireh Industries Ltd. v. DVLPMNT MARKETING, INC. / Domain Administrator, FA 1719671 (Forum Apr. 14, 2017) (“Pending trademark applications do not confer rights under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”), ValueVapor LLC v. Vicki Oxman, FA 1542157 (Forum Mar. 20, 2014) (denying Complainant’s rights under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) as “[t]here is no evidence of a registered trademark and it has long been held that a pending application for registration is not sufficient to prove trademark rights.”)..
It is also well-settled, however, that a complainant need not show registration of its mark to establish rights in a mark in order to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). If proven, common law rights are sufficient to establish rights for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Oculus VR, LLC v. Ivan Smirnov, FA 1625898 (Forum July 27, 2015) (“A complainant does not need to hold registered trademark rights in order to have rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) and it is well established that a Complainant may rely on common law or unregistered trademarks that it can make out”.), Artistic Pursuit LLC v. calcuttawebdevelopers.com, FA 894477 (Forum Mar. 8, 2007) (finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) does not require a trademark registration if a complainant can establish common law rights in its mark).
Common law rights in a trademark can be established by evidence of secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since “[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant’s rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will… Complainant has published under the KAREN KOEHLER name extensively, and Complainant’s legal skills have been recognized by various organizations and groups with extensive positive media coverage. Complainant also operates an online blog associated with the KAREN KOEHLER mark.”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”) ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”
Complaint Annex D is a Declaration of Complainant’s CEO in which she states that Complainant has used both of the marks asserted here since 2020 and that Complainant provides its services to customers in all 50 states of the U. S., generating about 10,000 enrollments per year. She states that Complainant has registered a number of domain names, including <cftnow.com>, <cftnow.org>, <cftse.org>, <cftglobal.org>, <cftusa.org>, <cftacs.com>, and <cftacs.org> in connection with its business operations. Complaint Annex F contains screenshots of Complainant’s website at <cftnow.com> as of August 13, 2020. Complaint Annex E contains representative samples of Complainant’s social media posts on Twitter, Facebook and Linkedin at various times time between December 2021 and December 2022. All of these prominently feature the CFT mark stylized in a blue circle and the CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark printed immediately next to it. Finally, while Complaint’s trademark application with the USPTO and state registrations are not sufficient in and of themselves to confer rights in the marks, they are additional evidence that Complainant has been using the mark in its business operations and support Complainant’s contentions of common law rights in the mark. On this evidence the Panel finds that Complainant has sufficiently demonstrated common law rights in those marks for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Respondent’s <cftuny.com> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s CFT and CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING marks as it fully incorporates the CFT mark and the dominant CFT element of the CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING mark, merely adding the letters “uny” and the “.com” gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s marks for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Nexperian Holding Limited, FA 1782013 (Forum June 4, 2018) (“Where a relevant trademark is recognisable within a disputed domain name, the addition of other terms (whether descriptive, geographical, pejorative, meaningless, or otherwise) does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity under the first element.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s CFT mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the CFT and CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING marks, in which Complainant has rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) he is not commonly known by the Domain Name and (ii) he is not using Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services but instead is using it to host sponsored links that compete with Complainant or to divert users seeking Complainant. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to Forum by the registrar lists “Zsolt Bikadi” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the Domain Name or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complaint Annex H is a screenshot of the website resolving from the Domain Name. It consists entirely of a list of three links: “Center for Financial Training,” “Cfttraining,” and “Cft Course.” Respondent’s site is obviously commercial in nature, offering click-through links to vendors, which may include Complainant. Some pay-per-click sites are set up and operated by the registrar of the domain name. In such cases the registrant of the domain name is not always aware of this arrangement and may not share in the revenues generated. This site, however, shows no evidence of that. It consists only of the links, which are closely related to Complainant’s business, and displays no advertising or other references to the registrar, DropCatch.com 908 LLC. As this site appears to be sponsored and operated by Respondent, he is using the confusingly similar Domain Name to attract Internet traffic to his own commercial pay-per-click site. This is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Bank of Am. Corp. v. Nw. Free Cmty. Access, FA 180704 (Forum Sept. 30, 2003) (“Respondent's demonstrated intent to divert Internet users seeking complainant's website to a website of Respondent and for Respondent's benefit is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The concept of bad faith as illustrated in the four subparagraphs above necessarily involves a subjective intent on the part of a respondent knowingly to trade upon the goodwill of the complainant. Such subjective intent would in turn require that the respondent actually knew of the complainant and its rights in the relevant mark when the domain name was registered. In attempting to discern actual knowledge and a subjective bad faith intent, panels have looked at many different types of evidence, including but not limited to use of a domain name in direct competition with a trademark owner, simple impersonation of some sort, the parties operating in the same market segment, the parties being physically located in the same general geographic area, a pattern of bad faith conduct, actual prior association between or among the parties, the fanciful nature of a trademark suggesting that any similarity is not happenstance, or the famous nature of the trademark, again suggesting that any similarity is not happenstance. Importantly, allegations about a respondent’s subjective intention are not evidence in this regard.
It is not easy to determine whether Respondent registered and has been using the Domain Name with actual knowledge of Complainant or its rights in the CFT or CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING marks. The Complaint does not address this issue at all but as discussed above a finding of actual knowledge is necessary to support a finding of bad faith registration and use. Turning to the indicia of actual knowledge discussed above, neither Complainant nor its marks can be considered as famous for the purposes of a UDRP analysis. Under 15 USC §1125, a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties, (ii) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark, and (iii) the extent of actual recognition of the mark. According to the Declaration of its CEO, Complainant has been in business only since 2020, it presently has an enrollment of 10,000 students per year, and the evidence of its advertising of the marks consists primarily of appearing at trade shows and a presence on the Internet and social media. There is no evidence of its volume of sales offered under the marks or of the extent of actual recognition of the marks by the consuming public. Complainant cannot be said generally to be famous or even well-known as compared with many other firms.
The CFT mark itself consists of a three-letter string, which could reasonably stand for many different things and is not in and of itself uniquely associated with Complainant. Nor is “uny,” the other three-letter string in the Domain Name uniquely associated with Complainant. Complainant argues that it stands for Upstate New York, but “uny” could also stand for many other things, as is illustrated in the Acronym Finder included in Complaint Annex G, which confirms that “uny” stands for Upstate New York but also shows that it can stand for other things such as United Nations Youth, United Nations of Yoga, and the like. Also, according to the WHOIS printout furnished to Forum by the registrar, the Respondent is a resident of Budapest, Hungary, and according to the Declaration of Complainant’s CEO, Complainant’s business operations are limited to the United States. If Respondent’s WHOIS information is correct it is not likely that a resident of Budapest would be familiar with Complainant or its business operations, or an abbreviation for Upstate New York.
All of these factors tend to suggest that Respondent was not aware of Complainant or its rights in the CFT or CFT CENTER FOR FINANCIAL TRAINING marks when he registered the Domain Name. The text of the links appearing on his pay-per-click website, however, are persuasive evidence that he was. The “Center for Financial Training” link states Complainant’s name exactly as it appears on Complaint’s social media posts and its website located at <cftnow.com> (Complaint Annexes E and F). The “Cfttraining,” and “Cft Course,” links evoke the manner in which Complainant uses the CFT mark in its other CFT-formative domain names, e.g., <cftacs.com>,<cftse.org>, <cftglobal.org>, <cftusa.org>, and <cftacs.org>, and “@cftacs” appears as Complainant’s user name on its Twitter posts, shown on Complaint Annex E. Their appearance on Respondent’s pay-per-click site cannot be coincidental, and they cannot be ignored. The only plausible explanation for their being there is that Respondent was aware of Complaint and its marks and had actual knowledge of them when he registered the Domain Name. Proving actual knowledge and targeting a specific complainant in cases involving a domain name based upon a three-letter mark is very difficult, and orders transferring such domain names are rare, but the evidence in this case demonstrates that Respondent did have such knowledge and that he did target this Complainant. This does not fit precisely within any of the scenarios listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955. The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
Further, as discussed above, Respondent is using the confusingly similar Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain).
For the reasons above set forth, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <cftuny.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
Dated: August 4, 2023
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