DECISION

 

Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. IT Company / Core Cut / Faria abid / AAden Sha / Design Marvel / Publishing Domains / Alex / OctaLogo / Salman Saad / Salman Sabir / Junaid Mansoor / Pennielynn stiansen / Ali Abbas Sipra / Divine Technologies Limited / Zeph Bruno

Claim Number: FA2307002053540

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Amazon Technologies, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by James F. Struthers of Richard Law Group, Inc., Texas, USA.  Respondent is IT Company / Core Cut / Faria abid / AAden Sha / Design Marvel / Publishing Domains / Alex / OctaLogo / Salman Saad / Salman Sabir / Junaid Mansoor / Pennielynn stiansen / Ali Abbas Sipra / Divine Technologies Limited / Zeph Bruno (“Respondent”), Multiple Locations.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES

The domain names at issue are <amazonaudiobookpublishing.com>, <amazonbookpublication.co>, <amazonbookpublication.org>, <amazonbookpublisher.org>, amazondirectspublishers.com>, <amazonkindledirectpublishers.com>, <directamzpublishing.com>, <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com>, <amazonpublishinghub.net>, <amazonpublishinghub.org>, <amazonpublishingzone.com>, <amazonselfpublication.com>, <amazonselfpublishingpros.com>,  <amzbookpublication.com>, <amzpublishingpros.com> and <kindlewritingacademy.com>, each registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC; Name.com, Inc.; PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com; NameCheap, Inc.; or Porkbun LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially, and, to the best of his knowledge, has no conflict of interests in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Terry F. Peppard as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on July 18, 2023; Forum received payment on July 18, 2023.

 

On July 18, 2023, July 19, 2023, and July 20, 2023, GoDaddy.com, LLC; Name.com, Inc.; PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com; NameCheap, Inc.; Porkbun LLC separately confirmed by e-mail message to Forum that the <amazonaudiobookpublishing.com>, <amazonbookpublication.co>, <amazonbookpublication.org>, <amazonbookpublisher.org>, <amazondirectspublishers.com>, <amazonkindledirectpublishers.com>, <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com>, <amazonpublishinghub.net>, <amazonpublishinghub.org>, <amazonpublishingzone.com>, <amazonselfpublication.com>, <amazonselfpublishingpros.com>,  <amzbookpublication.com>, <amzpublishingpros.com>, <directamzpublishing.com> and <kindlewritingacademy.com> domain names are registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC; Name.com, Inc.; PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com; NameCheap, Inc.; Porkbun LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the names.  GoDaddy.com, LLC; Name.com, Inc.; PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com; NameCheap, Inc.; Porkbun LLC have verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC; Name.com, Inc.; NameCheap, Inc.; PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com; and Porkbun LLC registration agreements and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On July 24, 2023, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of August 14, 2023, by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to the attention of the following:

 

postmaster@amazonaudiobookpublishing.com, postmaster@amazonbookpublication.co, postmaster@amazonbookpublication.org, postmaster@amazonbookpublisher.org, postmaster@amazondirectspublishers.com, postmaster@amazonkindledirectpublishers.com, postmaster@amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com, postmaster@amazonpublishinghub.net,

postmaster@amazonpublishinghub.org, postmaster@amazonpublishingzone.com, postmaster@amazonselfpublication.com, postmaster@amazonselfpublishingpros.com, postmaster@amzbookpublication.com,

postmaster@amzpublishingpros.com,

postmaster@directamzpublishing.com, and

postmaster@kindlewritingacademy.com. 

 

Also on July 24, 2023, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

A timely Response was received from Respondent Ali Abbas Sipra and determined to be complete on August 2, 2023.

 

A timely Additional Submission was received from Complainant and determined to be complete on August 3, 2023.

 

On August 4, 2023, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Terry F. Peppard as sole Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

Preliminary Issue: Multiple Respondents

In the instant proceeding, Complainant alleges that the entities controlling the sixteen domain names at issue are themselves controlled by a single person or entity which is operating under several aliases.  Apropos of this assertion, paragraph 3(c) of the Rules recites that:

 

[t]he complaint may relate to more than one domain name, provided that the domain names are registered by the same domain name holder.

 

So, to bring a proceeding against multiple domain names is permissible so long as there is but one Respondent.  In the case before us, a question arises under this rule because one of the named Respondents, Ali Abbas Sipra, has answered the Complaint by offering the transfer to Complainant of one of the domain names, <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com>, which that Respondent insists is the only domain name identified by Complainant with which he has any connection.  The implication of this offer is that it now appears that, as of the date of filing of the Complaint, there were two Respondents to be considered.  None of the other identified Respondents has answered the Complaint or otherwise entered an appearance in this proceeding. 

 

We consider the material facts to be these:

 

1.   there is no indication in the record or the surrounding circumstances suggesting that Complainant filed its Complaint in a knowing effort to avoid compliance with Rule 3(c);

 

2.   once the domain name <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com> has been removed from the case by order of the Panel in reliance upon the agreement of the affected parties, there is no evidence suggesting other than that the remaining Respondents are, as alleged in the Complaint, a single Respondent masquerading as many;

 

3.   the remaining Respondent, having been given due notice of the institution of this proceeding and afforded an opportunity to appear and defend against the allegations of the Complaint, is in default;

 

4.   the posture of the case has thus changed materially between the date of filing of the Complaint and the date of appointment of this Panel;

 

5.   that change occurred through the voluntary behavior of the two affected parties;  and

 

6.   we are aware of no disadvantage, let alone prejudice, which might be visited upon the remaining Respondent by terminating this proceeding as to Respondent Ali Abbas Sipra via an order for the transfer of the <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com> domain name to Complainant and permitting the balance of the case to proceed promptly to a decision.

 

Before entering the contemplated order, we should explain the rationale for this aspect of our decision. 

 

To begin with, the alternative to the approach we take here would, presumably, be to dismiss the Complaint on grounds that it was filed in contravention of Rule 3(c), an accusation which no one connected with the case has advanced.  The consequences to Complainant, who, it bears repeating, does not stand accused of acting in bad faith in filing its case against the captioned group of Respondents as it did, would be that it must employ legal counsel to file a new Complaint, pay a new filing fee and suffer further delay in obtaining justice from both the single Respondent who has agreed to a transfer of one domain name and the other Respondent who has already defaulted as to all of the other domain names.

 

The path to a rational and just result runs through Rule 10(c), which provides:

 

The Panel shall ensure that the administrative proceeding takes place with due expedition.  It may, at the request of a Party or on its own motion, extend, in exceptional cases, a period of time fixed by these Rules or by the Panel.

 

One immediately notices in addressing this rule that it uses the mandatory word “shall” to underscore a panel’s obligation to proceed in all cases “with due expedition.”  In the context of the arbitral process, expedition has two branches.  The first is speed, the second efficiency.  Consider the alternative path available to us.  Would it be timely?  Would it be efficient, including efficiency in the expenditure of resources?

 

The second thing one notices in reviewing the rule is that panels are empowered by it to relax the UDRP Rules on the point of time.  That power gives voice to the fundamental mandate of all commercial arbitration regimes, the twin ideals of fairness and equality.  This is well described in the companion to Rule 10(c), that found in Rule 10(b), to wit:           

 

In all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with equality and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case.

 

The question before us thus reduces to this:  Would it be fair to reject the Complaint of an evidently innocent Complainant and require a costly and time-consuming extension of the UDRP process in circumstances in which that Complainant has been surprised by the emergence of a single outlier in a field of eight apparently related domain name registrants? 

 

The choice we face then is one between a reading of Rule 3(c) which would apply the mandate of the rule solely at the point of filing of a complaint, on the one hand, or, instead, a construction of the rule which, in the occasional case in which the circumstances justify it, applies its mandate at the later point of decision.  Putting it another way, we elect to construe the rule as permitting the affected parties to correct an imperfect complaint by themselves carving out the offending outlier party via a consensual transfer of the affected domain name, thus allowing the surviving balance of the case to proceed “with due expedition.”

 

This approach has been employed in another recent UDRP proceeding, denominated Wilson’s Gun Shop v Hieu Nguyen, FA 2044813 (Forum July 6, 2023).  The case for a rigid approach to Rule 3(c) in that decision is ably set out in the dissenting opinion of our co-panelist, Steven M. Levy.  Days following the release of that decision, commentators writing in the Internet Commerce Association’s UDRP Digest seconded Mr. Levy’s view.  See ICA UDRP Digest, July 18, 2023, vol. 3.29.  In their commentary, the ICA reviewers declared that they disagreed with the majority’s construction of Rule 3(c) because “this approach deprived the Forum of its fees for a second case.”  We would, with respect, remind the commentators that it is not now, and has never been, the obligation of arbitrators (panelists) to so frame their decisions as to enrich the coffers of any sponsoring organization.  Were there to be such a duty, it would be a deadly cancer in the system which could only bring down upon everyone involved a richly deserved opprobrium.       

 

The same commentators go on to say, in support of their agreement with panelist Levy’s dissent, that:

 

If a Panel could override the express requirements of the Policy under its general powers, then it could override any provision of the Policy that it likes,….

 

There are several problems here.  The first is that the commentators conflate two distinct documents, the UDRP Policy, on the one hand, and its companion procedural rules, on the other.  They are not the same instrument, and they exist separately for the very good reason that, while the Policy is fixed, the accompanying procedural rules are tailored to be flexible in order to meet the particular needs of each case.  The Policy is, in effect, the architect’s plan, and the procedural rules are but the toolbox by which panelists realize on that plan, choosing, as circumstances require, the right tool for each facet of the cases presented to them.  

 

The second problem with the commentators’ analysis is that they appear to seek to analogize UDRP procedural rules with, for example, the loosely parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in the federal courts of the United States.  This cannot work because civil litigation and commercial arbitration are not the same animal.  Indeed, it may be said that the very reason why commercial arbitration has thrived in the modern era is that disputants have felt a need for a simpler and more adaptive system to resolve their disputes than does civil litigation, including those disputes involving domain name controversies in the fast-moving global economy.  Arbitrators (panelists) have always had, as one of their tools, the authority to construe and apply procedural rules with an eye to flexible problem-solving in the interests of fair and balanced decision-making. 

 

Another difficulty with the commentators’ remarks is the forensic device of hyperbole.  They evidently wish readers to imagine that arbitrator (panelist) discretion with respect to the occasional application of a single procedural rule is the road to perdition.  It is not.  Recall that the tool of construction employed here is sought to be used only in circumstances in which the parties themselves have set the parameters of construction as to Rule 3(c) by their voluntary acts.  Moreover, no party is disadvantaged in any way by the path we have chosen.  And, importantly, no party opposes our construction of the rule, nor would they have reason to do so in the circumstances before us.  If any did object, we would of course proceed differently.

Finally, and this may be the most important of the considerations we must take into account, rigid date-of-filing application of Rule 3(c) facilitates an enterprising Respondent’s execution of what might be called a “sacrificial lamb defense” in cases involving multiple domain names controlled by a single entity.  The ploy appears to work in this way:  when a respondent is found out and the aggrieved complainant files its complaint against all of the respondent’s offending domain names (here the number is sixteen), the respondent selects one of them to offer up for voluntary transfer, thus prompting an unsuspecting panel to dismiss the entire case on grounds of Rule 3(c) non-compliance.  In a case such as the one before us, the gambit could be employed several times before the hapless complainant surrenders and files a pile of separate cases.  We decline to play the part of enabler in such situations.  And, we submit, date-of-decision application of Rule 3(c) is a proper remedy to cure this ailment.  

 

In any event, the ultimate point of this discussion is simply that, although there may well be a principled disagreement on the use of the analytical method we propose here, the existence of such disagreement does not delegitimize it.  There is room in UDRP jurisprudence for both approaches to the interpretation and application of Rule 3(c), so that panels might employ the date-of-filing path for the great majority of cases, those in which the fundamental circumstances of the case have not changed materially from the date of filing of a complaint through the time of appointment of the presiding panel, but still have at their disposal the second (date-of-decision) path for the rarer instances when they have so changed.  

 

Accordingly:           

 

 Order as to the domain name <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com>

 

In light of the tacit agreement made between Complainant and Respondent 

Ali Abbas Sipra that the domain name <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com> may be transferred to Complainant without the need for further proceedings as to that domain name, it is therefore Ordered that the same domain name be transferred forthwith from the named Respondent to Complainant.  Thereupon, this proceeding is terminated as to Respondent Ali Abbas Sipra and the indicated domain name.  The balance of the case may proceed to a decision on its merits. 

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

In its Complaint and Additional Submission, Complainant alleges, among other things, that:

 

Complainant, doing business under the marks AMAZON, AMAZON.COM and KINDLE, is among the world’s largest and most prominent online retailers.

 

Complainant does business under the name Amazon Publishing, through which it has, since 2009, published fiction, nonfiction and children’s books in digital, print and audio formats.

 

Complainant also does business under the name Kindle Direct Publishing, known familiarly as KDP, through which it allows authors to self-publish e-books and paperback books.

 

Complainant holds a registration for the AMAZON service mark, on file with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as Registry No. 2,078,496, registered July 15, 1997, and renewed as of January 24, 2018.

 

Complainant holds a registration for the service mark AMAZON.COM, on file with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as Registry No. 2,837,138, registered April 27, 2004, and renewed as of April 21, 2014.

 

Complainant also holds a registration for the KINDLE service mark, on file with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as Registry No. 4,289,293, registered February 12, 2013, renewed as of September 15, 2022.

 

Respondent registered the fifteen domain names shown below on the date(s) indicated for each:

 

<amazonaudiobookpublishing.com>

July 1, 2022

<amazonbookpublication.co>

June 1, 2023

<amazonbookpublication.org>

June 1, 2023

<amazonbookpublisher.org>

May 20, 2023

<amazondirectspublishers.com>

June 5, 2023

<amazonkindledirectpublishers.com>

May 10, 2023

<amazonpublishinghub.net>

June 1, 2023

<amazonpublishinghub.org>

June 1, 2023

<amazonpublishingzone.com>

February 3, 2023

<amazonselfpublication.com>

November 16, 2022

<amazonselfpublishingpros.com> 

January 18, 2023

<amzbookpublication.com>

January 23, 2023

<amzpublishingpros.com>

January 5, 2023

<directamzpublishing.com> 

May 16, 2023

<kindlewritingacademy.com>

February 24, 2023

 

AMZ is a publicly recognized abbreviation for Complainant’s AMAZON mark.

 

KDP is a publicly recognized abbreviation for Complainant’s line of products and services marketed under the business name Kindle Direct Publishing. 

 

All of Respondent’s domain names are confusingly similar to one or more of Complainant’s registered marks.

 

Respondent is not affiliated with Complainant in any way.

 

Respondent is not licensed by Complainant to use any of its marks.

 

Respondent is not an authorized vendor, supplier or distributor of Complainant’s goods or services.

 

Respondent has not been commonly known by any of the domain names.

 

Respondent is not making either a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of any of the domain names.

 

Instead, Respondent employs the domain names to pass itself off online as Complainant while purporting to offer to Internet users ghostwriting or publishing services for authors in competition with the business of Complainant.

 

Respondent seeks to profit commercially from this use of the domain names.

 

Respondent has neither any rights to nor any legitimate interests in any of the domain names.

 

Respondent displays derivatives of Complainant’s AMAZON logos at many of the landing pages resolving from the domain names.

 

Respondent knew of Complainant and its rights in the marks AMAZON, AMAZON.COM and KINDLE when it registered the domain names.

 

Respondent both registered and now uses the domain names in bad faith.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to file a Response to the Complaint and is in default.

 

FINDINGS

(1)  the domain names registered by Respondent are identical or confusingly similar to a service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in respect of any of the domain names; and

(3)  the domain names were registered and are being used by Respondent in bad faith.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

i.     the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

ii.   Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

iii.  the domain name has been registered and is being used by Respondent in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

By virtue of its registration of the AMAZON, AMAZON.COM and KINDLE service marks with a national trademark authority, the USPTO, Complainant has shown that it has rights in those marks sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) that it demonstrate standing to pursue its claim against Respondent in this proceeding.  See, for example, Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017):

 

Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.

 

As to three of the disputed domain names, <directamzpublishing.com>,    

<amazondirectspublishers.com> and <amazonselfpublishingpros.com>,

this principle holds without regard to whether Complainant’s rights in its mark arise from registration of the mark in a jurisdiction (here the United States) other than that in which Respondent resides or does business (here Iceland).  See, for example, W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. Above.com Domain Privacy, FA 1334458 (Forum Aug. 24, 2010):

 

[T]he Panel finds that USPTO registration is sufficient to establish these [Policy¶4(a)(i)] rights even when Respondent lives or operates in a different country.

 

Turning to the central question posed by Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), we conclude from a review of the record that all of Respondent’s contested domain names are confusingly similar to one or another of Complainant’s registered service marks.  Twelve of the domain names incorporate either the AMAZON mark or the AMAZON.COM mark in their entirety, adding only, where necessary, a generic Top Level Domain (“gTLD”), (whether “.co,” “.org” or “.net”), and a generic term or phrase (whether “audio book publishing,” “book publication,” “book publisher,” “publishing hub,” “publishing zone,” “directs publishers,” “self publishers” or “self publishing pros,” all of those expressions being plainly calculated to link the domain name to Complainant’s book publishing business.  Three of the domain names follow this pattern but substitute the abbreviation AMZ for AMAZON, while one inserts Complainant’s KINDLE mark alongside AMAZON, and the final one, <kindlewritingacademy.com>, targets the KINDLE mark with the expression “writing academy,” thus hewing to the pattern of linking a domain name to Complainant’s book business.

 

These alterations of Complainant’s marks, made in forming the several domain names, do not save them from the realm of confusing similarity under the standards of the Policy.  See, for example, Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. L.P. v. Surya Tech., FA 1059665 (Forum Oct. 2, 2007):

 

[The] addition of a term that relates to the business in which Complainant engages and the addition of the gTLD are not sufficient to differentiate a domain name from a known mark.

 

See also Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. L.P. v. Kaiser, FA 1299317 (Forum Feb. 10, 2010):

 

[T]he combination of Complainant’s two marks [in a single domain name] creates confusing similarity between the … domain name and the marks.

    

Further see Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assoc. v. Shi Lei, FA 1784643 (Forum June 18, 2018):

 

A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy¶4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLD[’]s. 

 

Finally, see Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Oksana, FA 1780758 (Forum May 9, 2018), finding the domain name <amz.broker> to be confusingly similar to the AMAZON mark because AMZ “is a recognizable abbreviation of Complainant’s mark….”

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must make out a prima facie showing that Respondent has neither rights to nor legitimate interests in the contested domain names, whereupon the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have such rights or interests.  See, for example, Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum, Aug. 18, 2006) (finding that a UDRP complainant must make out a prima facie case that a respondent lacks rights to or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name under UDRP¶4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to that respondent to show that it does have such rights or interests).  See also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Forum Sept. 25, 2006):

 

Complainant must … make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, … the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.

 

Complainant has made a sufficient prima facie showing under this head of the Policy.  Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint therefore permits us to infer that Respondent does not have rights to or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names.  See, for example, Desotec N.V. v. Jacobi Carbons AB, D2000-1398 (WIPO December 21, 2000) (finding that a respondent’s failure to respond to a UDRP complaint allows a presumption that a complainant’s allegations are true unless they are clearly contradicted by the evidence).  Nonetheless, we will examine the record before us, in light of the several considerations set out in Policy 4(c)(i)-(iii), to determine whether there is in it any basis for concluding that Respondent has rights to or legitimate interests in the contested domain name that are cognizable under the Policy.

 

We begin by noting that Complainant contends, and Respondent does not deny, that Respondent has not been commonly known by any of the challenged domain names, and that Complainant has not licensed Respondent to use any of its marks.  Moreover, the pertinent WHOIS information identifies the registrants of the several domain names by various appellations, none of which resembles any of the domain names.  On this record, we conclude that Respondent has not been commonly known by any of the disputed domain names so as to have acquired rights to or legitimate interests in any of them within the ambit of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See, for example, Google LLC v. Bhawana Chandel / Admission Virus, FA 1799694 (Forum Sept. 4, 2018) (concluding that a respondent was not commonly known by a disputed domain name incorporating the GOOGLE mark where the relevant WHOIS record identified that respondent as “Bhawana Chandel,” and nothing in the record showed that that respondent was authorized to use a UDRP Complainant’s mark in any manner). 

                                                           

We next observe that Complainant asserts, without objection from Respondent, that Respondent uses the subject domain names to pass itself off online as Complainant while purporting to offer to Internet users ghostwriting or publishing services for authors in competition with the business of Complainant, from which use Respondent seeks to profit commercially.  This employment is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services by means of the domain names under Policy 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of them under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) such as would confirm in Respondent rights to or legitimate interests in the domain names as provided in those subsections of the Policy.  See, for example, Amazon Tech., Inc. v. Lin, FA 1480702 (Forum Feb. 26, 2013):

 

Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to offer competing goods or services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

The Panel therefore finds that Complainant has satisfied the proof requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

We are persuaded by the evidence that Respondent employs all of the disputed domain names, each of which we have found to be confusingly similar to one or another of Complainant’s registered service marks, to profit from the confusion thus caused among Internet users as to the possibility of Complainant’s affiliation with the domain names.  Under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), this stands as proof of Respondent’s bad faith in registering and using the domain names.  See, for example, Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Little, FA 0301728 (Forum Sept. 2, 2004):

 

Respondent’s practice of diversion, motivated by commercial gain, constitutes bad faith registration and use [of a contested domain name] pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).

 

See also Microsoft Corp. v. Lafont, FA1349611 (Forum Nov. 9, 2009):

 

[I]ntentional appropriation of Complainant’s mark to mislead Internet users and subsequently profit from them reveals bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).

 

In addition, the fact that, as alleged in the Complaint, Respondent displays derivatives of Complainant’s AMAZON logos at many of the landing pages resolving from the domain names, makes it clear that Respondent knew of Complainant and its rights in the AMAZON, AMAZON.COM and KINDLE marks when it registered the offending domain names.  This further demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith in registering them.  See, for example, IMDB.COM, INC. v. armin n.s. / Netafraz Hosting, FA 1582698 (Forum Nov. 13, 2014):

 

Given the use of Complainant’s own marks and logos in the content of the websites, the Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights. As such Respondent has registered and uses all of the domain names in Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith. 

 

The Panel thus finds that Complainant has met its burden of proof under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required to be proven under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that the relief requested must be, and it is hereby, GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that each and all of the domain names <amazonaudiobookpublishing.com>, <amazonbookpublication.co>, <amazonbookpublication.org>, <amazonbookpublisher.org>, <amazondirectspublishers.com>, <amazonkindledirectpublishers.com>, <amazonpublishinghub.net>, <amazonpublishinghub.org>, <amazonpublishingzone.com>, <amazonselfpublication.com>, <amazonselfpublishingpros.com>,  <amzbookpublication.com>, <amzpublishingpros.com>, <directamzpublishing.com> and <kindlewritingacademy.com> be TRANSFERRED forthwith from Respondent to Complainant.

 

Recall that the Panel ordered in the conclusion to the Preliminary Issue section above that the domain name <amazonkdpdirectpublishing.com> be TRANSFERRED from Respondent Ali Abbas Sipra to Complainant without the need for further proceedings as to that domain name.

 

Terry F. Peppard, Panelist

Dated:  August 19, 2023

 

 

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