DECISION

 

My Pet Cab, LLC v. Peter Calls / starwoodpettravels

Claim Number: FA2309002061576

PARTIES

Complainant is My Pet Cab, LLC ("Complainant"), represented by Staci R. DeRegnaucourt of Varnum LLP, Michigan, USA. Respondent is Peter Calls / starwoodpettravels ("Respondent"), USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <starwoodpettravels.com>, registered with Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on September 13, 2023; Forum received payment on September 13, 2023.

 

On September 20, 2023, Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <starwoodpettravels.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu has verified that Respondent is bound by the Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On September 21, 2023, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of October 11, 2023 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@starwoodpettravels.com. Also on September 21, 2023, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On October 12, 2023, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

The STARWOOD PET TRAVEL mark is used and registered by Complainant in connection with its pet shipping business. Complainant has rights in that mark based upon its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). The <starwoodpettravels.com Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant's mark as it wholly incorporates Complainant's mark, merely adding an "s" at the end of TRAVEL and the generic top level domain ("gTLD") ".com."

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name, it is not a licensee of Complainant and Complainant has not authorized it to use its mark, and it is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for any legitimate or fair use but instead uses it to pass off as Complainant and purport to offer Complainant's services.

 

Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. It is using the Domain name to attract Internet users to its website where it purports to sell Complainant's services, and it registered the Domain Name with actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2)       the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true).  Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) ("Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint"), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 ("In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent's default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.").

 

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

The STARWOOD PET TRAVEL mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 7,052,542) on May 16, 2023 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit 2). Complainant's registration of its mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy 4(a)(i). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) ("Complainant's ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).").

 

Respondent's <starwoodpettravels.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant's STARWOOD PET TRAVEL mark. It incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely omitting spaces, adding an "s" at the end of the mark and the ".com" gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant's mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Dell Inc. v. Protection of Private Person / Privacy Protection, FA 1681432 (Forum Aug. 1, 2016) ("A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs."), Dell Inc. v. Protection of Private Person / Privacy Protection, FA 1681432 (Forum Aug. 1, 2016) ("A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs. Likewise, the absence of spaces must be disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax prohibits them."), Microsoft Corp. v. Harrington, FA1305319 (Forum Mar. 16, 2010) ("The Panel finds that exchanging one letter for another in the disputed domain name fails to prevent confusing similarity according to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), especially when the disputed domain name remains visually similar to Complainant's mark").  The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity "typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name."  Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant's mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name, and the Domain Name is likely to cause confusion.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the STARWOOD PET TRAVEL mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) ("Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests"). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.

 

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i)                            Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent's use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;

(ii)                            The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii)                      The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) it not a licensee of Complainant and Complainant has not authorized it to use its mark, and (iii) it is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for any legitimate or fair use but instead uses it to pass off as Complainant and purport to offer Complainant's services.  These allegations are addressed as follows:

 

Complainant states that Respondent is not a licensee of Complainant and that Complainant has not authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant's mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant's mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) ("Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant's trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.").

 

The WHOIS information provided to the Forum by the registrar lists the registrant of the Domain Name as "Peter Calls / starwoodpettravels."  The first of these names bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the Domain Name or respondent's use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent Peter Call has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).

 

The second name in which the Doman Name is registered, starwoodpettravels, is virtually identical to the Domain Name and might suggest that the Respondent has been commonly known by that name. This is not conclusive, however, because as discussed above Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant's mark, and there is no evidence before the Panel indicating that Respondent used this name for any purpose other than to register the Domain Name and operate the resolving website, or that an entity named starwoodpettravels even exists. Registering a domain name in a name that is similar or identical to the domain name is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the respondent "has been commonly known by" it for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). There must be some evidence, independent of the registration and resolving website, that the respondent used the name in a business or some other legitimate undertaking, or that persons have by other means come to associate the respondent with that name. If a person could acquire rights or legitimate interests in a domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) by the simple expedient of registering it in the name of an entity whose name is similar or identical to the domain name at issue, Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) would be completely nullified. Augusta National, Inc. v. Ryan Carey, FA1758547 (Forum Dec. 21, 2017) ("If a respondent could acquire rights and legitimate interests in a domain name through Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) by the simple expedient of incorporating the complainant's mark into the name of his business entity, the intent and purpose of the Policy would be completely frustrated."), Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding that, although the respondent listed itself as "Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund" in the WHOIS contact information, it did not provide any affirmative evidence to support this identity; combined with the fact that the complainant claimed it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name). The Panel is satisfied that Catagent BIOSERVICES has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

Complaint Exhibit 4 contains screenshots of the website resolving from the Domain Name. It displays Complainant's name and advertises pet shipping services under the name "Starwood."  These pages do not copy or mimic the appearance and general layout of the pages on Complainant's website, screenshots of which are displayed in Complaint Exhibit 3, but they are similar in content to the pages on Complainant's website and purport to offer exactly the same services as Complainant, under Complainant's Starwood brand. Respondent's website is designed and intended to convey the impression that it is Complainant's website. Passing off as a complainant and purporting to sell the complainant's services does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) ("The usage of Complainant's NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material  is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name."), Ripple Labs Inc. v. NGYEN NGOC PHUONG THAO, FA 1741737 (Forum Aug. 21, 2017) ("Respondent uses the [disputed] domain name to divert Internet users to Respondent's website… confusing them into believing that some sort of affiliation exists between it and Complainant… [which] is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:

 

(i)                      circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)         by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent 's web site or location.

 

The evidence of Respondent's conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, by passing off as Complainant and purporting to sell Complainant's services, Respondent is clearly using the confusingly similar Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website. The evidence does not disclose whether Respondent is actually providing the services advertised on its website or fraudulently representing that it does, collecting money from the customer and then not delivering the services. Regardless of which scenario is present here, Respondent's conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) ("The Panel agrees that Respondent's use of the website to display products similar to Complainant's, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).").

 

As discussed above, Respondent is using the Domain Name to pass off as Complainant, which it is not. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum December 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.").

 

Although Complainant does not assert the argument, by registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant's mark, i.e., adding an "s" at the end of the TRAVEL element of Complainant's mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), typosquatting has also, in and of itself, been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use. Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant's mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).

 

Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name on May 29, 2023 (WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit 1 show the creation date). Complainant or its predecessor in interest began using the STARWOOD mark in connection with its pet shipping business at least as early as 2008 (USPTO registration certificate for that mark included in Complaint Exhibit 3 shows a first use January of that year). Further, the STARWOOD mark is unique, a coined term. It has no meaning apart from its association with Complainant and would not likely be selected for a domain name except to target Complainant and its mark.  The fact that Respondent typosquatted Complainant's mark is further evidence of prior knowledge.  More importantly, Respondent passes off as Complainant and purports to offer Complainant's services using Complainant's brand. There is no question that Respondent knew of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant's rights in its mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <starwoodpettravels.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant

 

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

Dated: October 13, 2023