DECISION

 

Coller Capital Limited v. Jenny Swift

Claim Number: FA2404002091921

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Coller Capital Limited ("Complainant"), represented by Khaddyja M'balo of CSC Digital Brand Services AB, Sweden. Respondent is Jenny Swift ("Respondent"), Arizona, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <coller-capitals.com>, registered with Aceville Pte. Ltd.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on April 5, 2024; Forum received payment on April 5, 2024.

 

On April 8, 2024, Aceville Pte. Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <coller-capitals.com> domain name is registered with Aceville Pte. Ltd. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Aceville Pte. Ltd. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Aceville Pte. Ltd. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On April 10, 2024, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of April 30, 2024 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@coller-capitals.com. Also on April 10, 2024, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On May 1, 2024, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant is a leading investor in private equity's secondary market.  It has rights in the COLLER CAPITAL mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and other governmental trademark agencies. Respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark in that it fully incorporates the mark, albeit misspelled, merely adding a hyphen and a generic top-level domain.  Respondent is guilty of typosquatting.

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. It is not affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark, Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name, and Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead was previously using it to impersonate Complainant and phish for private sensitive information from consumers, and it is currently making no active use of the domain name.

 

Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith. It registered the domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark, it registered and was previously using the domain name to pass off as Complainant and phish for private sensitive information from consumers, and it is currently making no active use of the domain name.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2)       the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true). Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) ("Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint"), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 ("In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent's default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.").

 

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The COLLER CAPITAL mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 2,809,826) on February 3, 2004 (TESS printout included in Complaint Exhibit A). Complainant's ownership of this USPTO registration demonstrates its rights in the COLLER CAPITAL mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) ("Complainant's ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrates its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)."). 

 

Respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark. It fully incorporates the COLLER CAPITAL mark, merely substituting a hyphen for the space, adding an "s" at the end of the CAPITAL element of the mark and the ".com" generic top-level domain ("gTLD"). These changes do not distinguish the domain name from Complainant's mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Yahoo! Inc. v. HEIDI BUI, FA 1638878 (Forum Oct. 26, 2015) (finding that punctuation is not significant in determining the similarity of a domain name and mark), Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. GRUPO SA Ltd Co / Grupo S.A. Ltd. Co., FA 1985605 (Forum Mar. 30, 2022) ("Many panels have held that minor mis-spellings of complainants' marks constitute typosquatting and support a finding of confusing similarity"), Staples, Inc. v. Whois Privacy Shield Services, FA 1617690 (Forum June 5, 2015) ("Changing a single letter (especially when it is the final letter) is a minor enough change to support a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)"), MTD Products Inc v J Randall Shank, FA 1783050 (Forum June 27, 2018) ("The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant's mark as it wholly incorporates the CUB CADET mark before appending the generic terms 'genuine' and 'parts' as well as the '.com' gTLD."). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity "typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name."  Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant's mark is clearly recognizable within the domain name, and the domain name is likely to cause confusion.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the COLLER CAPITAL mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) ("Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests."). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.

 

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i)                      Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent's use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;

(ii)                      The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii)                      The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) it is not affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark, (ii) it is not commonly known by the domain name, and (iii) Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead was previously using it to impersonate Complainant and phish for private sensitive information from consumers, and it is currently making no active use of the domain name.  These allegations are addressed as follows:

 

Complainant states that Respondent is not affiliated with it and that it has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant's mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant's mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) ("Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant's trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.").

 

The information furnished to Forum by the registrar lists the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. That name bears no resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a name other than the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent's use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA 1574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that the Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name.

 

Next, by registering the domain name with a misspelling of Complainant's mark, i.e., adding the letter "s" at the end of the CAPITAL element of the mark in the domain name, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Registering a typosquatted domain name evidences a lack of rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA 1610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) ("Users might mistakenly reach Respondent's resolving website by misspelling Complainant's mark. Taking advantage of Internet users' typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent's lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).").  

 

Complaint Exhibit C contains screenshots of the website previously resolving from the domain name. The pages on it prominently displayed the COLLER CAPITAL name at the top of the page and advertised and purported to offer Complainant's services, duplicating many of the photos and textual components of Complainant's site, as shown on the screenshot of Complainant's website submitted as Complaint Exhibit E. While not an exact duplication of Complainant's website, Respondent's website clearly represented itself as that of Complainant.  Respondent was passing off as Complainant and to the extent that Respondent actually offered the services advertised it was in direct competition with Complainant.  Using a confusingly similar domain name to impersonate and pass off as and offer the same types of services as a complainant does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) ("The usage of Complainant's NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name."), Ripple Labs Inc. v. NGYEN NGOC PHUONG THAO, FA 1741737 (Forum Aug. 21, 2017) ("Respondent uses the [disputed] domain name to divert Internet users to Respondent's website… confusing them into believing that some sort of affiliation exists between it and Complainant… [which] is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

Among the pages on Respondent's previous website were a login page and a page inviting the visitor to set up an account—ostensibly with Complainant. The login page contained a box in which the visitor could type his or her Coller Capital password, and the account set-up page invited the visitor to use a code and set a password. This is clear evidence of phishing, which is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Respondent was using the domain name and its website to engage in fraudulent conduct, including phishing. Using a confusingly similar domain name to engage in phishing is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. I S / Internet Consulting Services Inc., FA 1785242 (Forum June 5, 2018) ("On its face, the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to the mark of another in order to facilitate a phishing scheme cannot be described as either a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶4(c)(iii)."), VectivBio AG v. John McLellan, FA 2047090 (Forum June 30, 2023) ("Using a confusingly similar domain name to engage in phishing is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

Complaint Exhibit C also contained a screenshot of the parking page to which the domain name currently points. Its only substantive content is a message reading "Sorry! This site has been dropped by the administrator."  Respondent is currently making no active use of the domain name but instead is passively holding it. This is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Morgan Stanley v. Francis Mccarthy / Baltec Marine Llc, FA 1785347 (Forum June 8, 2018) ("both Domain Names resolve to a web site that shows the words, 'Not Found, The requested URL / was not found on this server.' ' Inactive holding of a domain name does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence discussed above, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:

 

(i)                      circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)         by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent's web site or location.

 

The evidence of Respondent's conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent was clearly using the confusingly similar domain name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its previous website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). The evidence does not disclose whether Respondent was actually offering the services advertised on its website or luring unsuspecting consumers into bogus financial transactions. Regardless which scenario is present here, its conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA 1612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) ("The Panel agrees that Respondent's use of the website to display products similar to Complainant's, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).").

 

Next, as discussed above, Respondent was using the domain name to pass off as Complainant. This does not fit precisely within any of the scenarios listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955. The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum Dec. 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.").

 

As also discussed above, Respondent was using the domain name to engage in phishing. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), passing oneself off as a complainant to phish for sensitive private information from others is evidence bad faith registration and use. Klabzuba Oil & Gas, Inc. v. LAKHPAT SINGH BHANDARI, FA 1625750 (Forum July 17, 2015) ("Respondent uses the <klabzuba-oilgas.com> domain to engage in phishing, which means Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)."), McKinsey & Company, Inc., and McKinsey Holdings, Inc. v. Privacy Protection, report abuse to / Registrar: DELTA-X Ltd., FA 1580883 (Forum Oct. 25, 2014) (holding that the respondent had engaged in phishing, which is further evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), when the respondent used the disputed domain name in an attempt to obtain Internet users' personal information including their driver's license number and name).

 

As also discussed above, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), typosquatting has also, in and of itself, been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use. Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant's mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).

 

Next, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name in March 2024 (WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit B shows creation date). The COLLER CAPITAL mark is a unique, coined term that has no meaning apart from its association with Complainant. More tellingly, Respondent had to have had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark in order to pass off as Complainant on its previous website. There is no question that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name.  Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering and using a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant's rights in a mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).

 

Respondent is currently passively holding the domain name, making no active use of it, and this can, under certain circumstances, demonstrate bad faith registration and use. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), passively holding a confusingly similar domain name can be evidence of bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that [failure to make an active use] of a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith).

 

The concept of bad faith as illustrated in the four subparagraphs of Policy ¶ 4(b) necessarily involves a subjective intent on the part of a respondent knowingly to trade upon the goodwill of the complainant. Such subjective intent in turn requires that the respondent actually knew of the complainant and its rights in the relevant mark when it registered the domain name. As discussed above, it is clear that Respondent registered the domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark.

 

The Policy requires a complainant to prove both registration and a continuing use in bad faith. The Policy requirement, "is being used in bad faith," can include passive use. Telstra Corporation v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. 2000-0003 (".. . the concept of a domain name 'being used in bad faith' is not limited to positive action; inaction is within the concept."). In this case, there is no evidence that Respondent's passive holding of the domain name fits within any of the specific circumstances listed in Policy ¶ 4(b), so the question arises whether the facts present in this case support a finding of continuing bad faith use on some other basis.

 

The Panel has already concluded that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its rights in the COLLER CAPITAL mark when it registered the domain name, and that knowledge and resulting bad faith certainly continues. Also, Respondent is holding a domain name which is confusingly similar to Complainant's mark, without itself having any legitimate connection with Complainant or its products, which in and of itself has been held to be evidence of bad faith.  Google LLC v. Noboru Maruyama / Personal, FA 1879162 (Forum Mar. 3, 2020) ("the registration and use of domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark with which the respondent has no connection has frequently been held to be evidence of bad faith.").  Finally, it is not possible to conceive of a plausible legitimate use of the domain name that would not infringe on Complainant's rights. Respondent's passive holding of the domain name constitutes a continuing use in bad faith within the meaning and for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <coller-capitals.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

May 2, 2024