DECISION

 

Target Brands, Inc. v. Nadiia Prepodobna / Private person

Claim Number: FA2404002092010

PARTIES

Complainant is Target Brands, Inc. ("Complainant"), represented by Jeanette Eriksson of FairWinds Partners LLC, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is Nadiia Prepodobna / Private person ("Respondent"), Ukraine.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <weeklyad-target.com>, registered with Regtime Ltd.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on April 5, 2024; Forum received payment on April 5, 2024.

 

On April 9, 2024, Regtime Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <weeklyad-target.com> domain name is registered with Regtime Ltd. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Regtime Ltd. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Regtime Ltd. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On April 9, 2024, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Russian and English Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of April 29, 2024 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@weeklyad-target.com. Also on April 9, 2024, the Russian and English Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default in Russian and English.

 

On April 30, 2024, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PRELIMINARY ISSUE: Language of The Proceeding

According to the Registrar, the registration agreement for the domain name is written in Russian. Rule 11(a) provides that the language of the proceedings is the language of the registration agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Complainant filed its Complaint in English and requests that these proceedings be conducted in English. Factors which previous panels have seen as important include evidence showing that the respondent can understand the language of the complaint, the language of the domain name, the content on any web pages resolving from the domain name, prior correspondence between the parties, and potential unfairness or unwarranted delay in ordering translation of the pleadings and the Decision. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.5.1, The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language), Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, "It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case.").

 

In this case, the domain name is written in English and targets a U.S.-based firm, and the website to which it resolves is written entirely in English, which demonstrates that Respondent is proficient in English. Complainant is not able to communicate effectively in Russian. Further, while Complainant filed its Complaint in English, the Written Notice of the Complaint, written in both Russian and English, was served upon Respondent in accordance with Rules 1 and 2. Respondent has not submitted a Response or any indication that it desires to participate in this proceeding, in Russian or otherwise. Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the additional time and expense of proceeding in Russian would be unwarranted inasmuch as the only party who might benefit from that has declined to participate.  For the reasons above set forth, this proceeding will be conducted in English.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant operates numerous department stores. It has rights in the TARGET mark based upon its international registration of that mark. The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark because it fully incorporates that mark, merely adding the descriptive phrase "weeklyad," a hyphen, and the ".com" generic top-level domain (gTLD).

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the domain name resolves to a website which appears to be a blog but instead impersonates Complainant, hosts monetized ads and harvests user information, and Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. 

 

Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith. It registered the domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark, it attempts for commercial gain to attract Internet users to its website by creating confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, and Respondent failed to respond to cease-and-desist demands from Complainant. 

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2)       the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true). Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) ("Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint"), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 ("In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent's default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.").

 

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding.

 

Identical or Confusingly Similar

The TARGET mark was registered internationally to Complainant (Reg. No. 2793901) on December 16, 2003 (WIPO printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit E-11). Complainant's international registration of its mark establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).    Bittrex, Inc. v. Domain Privacy Services, FA 1786849 (Forum June 15, 2018) (finding Complainant has trademark rights in the BITTREX mark through registration of the mark with the EUIPO and the USPTO.).

 

Respondent's <weeklyad-target.com> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark. It fully incorporates the mark, merely adding the phrase "weeklyad," a hyphen and a gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the domain name from Complainant's mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Maxim Integrated Products v. liao jian jia, FA2059513 (Forum September 22, 2023) ("[the] Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark.  It fully incorporates the mark, . . . , merely adding a hyphen, the letters "ic," . . ., and a gTLD"), Microsoft Corporation v. Thong Tran Thanh, FA 1653187 (Forum Jan. 21, 2016) (determining that confusing similarity exists where [a disputed domain name] contains Complainant's entire mark and differs only by the addition of a generic or descriptive phrase and top-level domain, the differences between the domain name and its contained trademark are insufficient to differentiate one from the other for the purposes of the Policy).  The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity "typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name."  Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant's mark is clearly recognizable within the domain name, and the domain name is likely to cause confusion.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the TARGET mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) ("Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests"). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.

 

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i)                      Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent's use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;

(ii)                      The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii)                      The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) it is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the domain name resolves to a website which appears to be a blog but instead hosts monetized ads, impersonates Complainant and harvests user information, and (ii) Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name.  These allegations are addressed as follows:

 

Complaint Exhibit F contains screenshots of numerous pages on the website to which the domain name points. At first glance it appears to be a Target advertisement site, displaying the TARGET word mark and Complainant's registered red bulls-eye logo (logo registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office on October 30, 1973, per WIPO printout included in Complaint Exhibit E). There appear to be hyperlinks on these pages directing the visitor to Complainant. The site also, however, displays hyperlinks to other entities, including travel services, medical services, churches, Dollar General, and restaurants. The latter pages appear to be part of a commercial pay-per-click program, offering click-through links to other vendors. Respondent is using the confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to its own website, where it operates a commercial pay-per-click program. This is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Bank of Am. Corp. v. Nw. Free Cmty. Access, FA 180704 (Forum Sept. 30, 2003) ("Respondent's demonstrated intent to divert Internet users seeking complainant's website to a website of Respondent and for Respondent's benefit is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)"), Vance Int'l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees).

 

As for the pages which appear to contain ads for Complainant, Complainant alleges that these are in the nature of a spam blog, or "splog," which it says is "deceitfully made to appear as a blog but is actually merely a vehicle for financial gain through monetized ads."  These allegations are not disputed, appear from the evidence to be plausible and are taken as true. Respondent's use of the domain name in this manner is for all intents and purposes the same as the pay-per-click links to third-party sites discussed above for the purposes of the Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) analysis. Further, these pages clearly impersonate and pass off as pages either sponsored or approved by Complainant, and using a confusingly similar domain name to pass off as a complainant does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) ("The usage of Complainant's NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material  is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name."), Ripple Labs Inc. v. NGYEN NGOC PHUONG THAO, FA 1741737 (Forum Aug. 21, 2017) ("Respondent uses the [disputed] domain name to divert Internet users to Respondent's website… confusing them into believing that some sort of affiliation exists between it and Complainant… [which] is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

Some of the pages impersonating Complainant invite the visitor to login to his or her TARGET account, furnishing a space for the visitor to type a login and password. This constitutes phishing, which is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Using a confusingly similar domain name to engage in phishing is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. I S / Internet Consulting Services Inc., FA 1785242 (Forum June 5, 2018) ("On its face, the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to the mark of another in order to facilitate a phishing scheme cannot be described as either a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)."), VectivBio AG v. John McLellan, FA2306002047090 (Forum June 30, 2023) ("Using a confusingly similar domain name to engage in phishing is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

The WHOIS printout included in Complaint Exhibit B and the information furnished to Forum by the registrar list the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. Neither of Respondent's names bears any resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent's use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that the Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name.

 

The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.

 

Registration or Use in Bad Faith

Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:

 

(i)                      circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)         by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent's web site or location.

 

The evidence of Respondent's conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, the website to which the domain name points hosts pay-per-click links. Respondent is using the confusingly similar domain name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent's web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). Respondent's use of the domain name is commercial also because the sponsors of the various web sites forwarded from Respondent's web site benefit from the subsequent interest and purchases of those who visit the sites. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO, 2000) (finding that "[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone" for a use to be commercial).

 

The evidence does not disclose the nature of the relationship between Respondent and Complainant itself with respect to the hyperlinks from Respondent's site to Complainant's. If Respondent receives some kind of remuneration or compensation as a result of customers forwarded from Respondent's site visiting or purchasing goods or services from Complainant, that would not necessarily take the case out of the Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) scenario because both parties obtain commercial gain. It does, however, imply that to some extent Complainant accepts or tacitly approves of Respondent's use of the domain name for this program insofar as it produces revenues for it. Conspicuously absent from the Complaint is an allegation, almost universally included in UDRP complaints, that this Complainant has not licensed or authorized this Respondent to use its mark.  If there is some sort of symbiotic relationship between the parties that would tend to render somewhat hollow or ingenuous Complaint's allegations of bad faith based upon this particular use of the domain name. At the same time, however, Respondent is still using the confusingly similar domain name for pay-per-click links to other entities, and the bad faith inherent in this conduct, as well as in the other uses discussed below is not necessarily eliminated by any questions about the relationship between Complainant and Respondent involving the links to Complainant.

 

Next, as discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to pass off as Complainant or as some kind of affiliate. This does not fit precisely within any of the scenarios listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955. The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum December 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.").

 

As also discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to engage in phishing. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), passing oneself off as a complainant to phish for sensitive private information from others has often been held to evidence bad faith registration and use. Klabzuba Oil & Gas, Inc. v. LAKHPAT SINGH BHANDARI, FA1506001625750 (Forum July 17, 2015) ("Respondent uses the <klabzuba-oilgas.com> domain to engage in phishing, which means Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)."), McKinsey & Company, Inc., and McKinsey Holdings, Inc. v. Privacy Protection, report abuse to / Registrar: DELTA-X Ltd., FA1409001580883 (Forum Oct. 25, 2014) (holding that the respondent had engaged in phishing, which is further evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), when the respondent used the disputed domain name in an attempt to obtain Internet users' personal information including their driver's license number and name).

 

Further, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name. In order to pass off as Complainant or an affiliate and advertise Complainant's goods and services on its website, Respondent had to have had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark.  There is no doubt that it knew of Complainant and its marks when it registered the domain name. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant's rights in its mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).

 

On March 4, 2024 Complainant's counsel sent a cease-and-desist demand to Respondent and followed up with reminders on March 6 and March 11, 2024 (copies of email correspondence submitted as Complaint Exhibit G). Respondent did not reply to any of these communications. This is further evidence of bad faith registration and use. Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Thomas Hampson / ClickTech Solutions Ltd., FA 1850421 (Forum Aug. 19, 2019) ("the Panel acknowledges that Respondent's failure to respond to Complainant's cease and desist letter supports a finding of bad faith, especially where, as in this case, the trademark in question has substantial goodwill and reputation.").

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <weeklyad-target.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

Dated: May 2, 2024