DECISION

 

Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Thomas Hastings, Manager / Techhatch.com, LLC

Claim Number: FA2506002159537

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. ("Complainant"), represented by Erin S. Hennessy of Haynes Boone, LLP, Florida, USA. Respondent is Thomas Hastings, Manager / Techhatch.com, LLC ("Respondent"), represented by Brett E. Lewis of Lewis & Lin LLC, New York, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <dirtyharry.com> ("Domain Name"), registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that they have acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge have no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Gerald M. Levine and Richard Hill as Panelists and Nicholas J.T. Smith as Chair.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on June 6, 2025; Forum received payment on June 6, 2025.

 

On June 6, 2025, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <dirtyharry.com> domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On June 9, 2025, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of June 30, 2025 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@dirtyharry.com. Also on June 9, 2025, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on June 30, 2025.

 

On August 1, 2025, pursuant to Respondent's request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, Forum appointed Gerald M. Levine and Richard Hill as Panelists and Nicholas J.T. Smith as Chair.

 

On July 31, 2025, Complainant filed an unsolicited Additional Submission responding to certain matters raised in the Response.  As there were matters in the Response, including matters relating to the Respondent's business model, that could not have been reasonably anticipated or dealt with in the Complaint, the Panel has exercised its discretion to have regard to the Additional Submission.  On August 5, 2025 the Panel issued a Panel Order under Rules 10 and 12 of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") providing Respondent with the opportunity (by August 19, 2025) to respond to Complainant's additional submission.  On August 19, 2025, Respondent provided a response to Complainant's additional submission. 

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant is a fully integrated, broad-based entertainment company and a global leader in the creation, production, distribution, licensing and marketing of all forms of entertainment and their related businesses. The company's vast library, one of the most prestigious and valuable in the world, includes the well-known action thriller DIRTY HARRY film franchise starring world-renowned Academy Award® winning actor and director Clint Eastwood. The DIRTY HARRY film franchise includes five films beginning with the eponymous DIRTY HARRY film which was first released in 1971.

 

Complainant has rights in the DIRTY HARRY mark based on registration of the mark in various national jurisdictions including with the European Union Intellectual Property Office ("EUIPO") (e.g., Reg. No. 000836874 registered November 18, 1999).  

 

Respondent's <dirtyharry.com> domain name is identical to Complainant's DIRTY HARRY mark as it simply adds the ".com" generic top-level domain ("gTLD") to the wholly incorporated mark.

 

Complainant contends that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the <dirtyharry.com> domain name. It does not use the Domain Name for any bona fide offering of goods, is not commonly known by the Domain Name and is not using the Domain Name for any legitimate noncommercial or fair use.

 

Complainant further contends that Respondent registered and uses the <dirtyharry.com> domain name in bad faith. Respondent acquired the Domain Name well after Complainant had acquired a significant global reputation for DIRTY HARRY and has since offered to sell the Domain Name (including to the star of the film series Clint Eastwood) for various sums including most recently USD 100,000, a sum vastly in excess in any out-of-pocket costs incurred in respect of the registration of the Domain Name.  Furthermore, Respondent has engaged in other bad faith conduct, including engaging in a pattern of conduct in registering domain names corresponding to well-known marks and offering them for sale such as <jimihendrixmovie.com> and <zoomtrader.com>.

 

B. Respondent

The Respondent is a real estate property developer and domain name trader who has registered and sold thousands of domain names. On or around September 22, 2020, Respondent acquired the Domain Name through auction. Respondent contends that it did not acquire the Domain Name to profit from the Complainant or its reputation, rather it acquired the Domain Name because the term DIRTY HARRY has now become a generic term, separate from that of the Dirty Harry action film franchise. Indeed (it further contends) the term is now defined in the dictionary as "A police officer who is reckless, disregards practices and policies, or who practices vigilantism, or has a questionable use of force and officer involved shooting incidents."

 

The Respondent contends that it acquired the Domain Name as a possible name for a home flipping business "to purchase dirty and distressed homes that other developers weren't tough enough to take on and rehabilitate and resell them for profit[,] analogous to how Harry Callahan cleaned up the streets of San Francisco."  Respondent has also offered the Domain Name for sale to a wide variety of entities that have an interest in the Dirty Harry name such as Clint Eastwood, but also third parties that trade under the name.

 

The Respondent finally contends that Complainant has failed to establish that the Domain Name has registered the Domain Name to capitalise on the Complainant's goodwill. The Respondent has never used the Domain Name to target the Complainant or its intellectual property, rather the Respondent had a clear plan to use the Domain Name for its home flipping business and its decision to offer the Domain Name for sale to third parties including Clint Eastwood's attorney does not illustrate bad faith. Rather Respondent has registered a domain name that consists of a now generic set of words for a legitimate purpose and then has sought to sell it to third parties. This does not amount to registration and use of the Domain Name in bad faith.  

 

C. Complainant's Additional Submissions

In its additional submission, Complainant contends that Respondent's submission that DIRTY HARRY is a dictionary term is patently absurd and must be rejected by the Panel. The term DIRTY HARRY cannot be found in any reputable dictionary, and the only examples of use identified by the Respondent are directly credited to or refer to the Complainant's use of the term in the film series. In particular the third party use as the name of a song or for certain businesses are entirely referential to Complainant's DIRTY HARRY film franchise and character.

 

Complainant contends further that Respondent's suggested use as a real estate flipping business as analogous with how Harry Callaghan cleaned up San Francisco, makes it clear that Respondent acquired the Domain Name in full awareness of Complainant's trademark and with the intention of associating the Respondent with Complainant's IP. Furthermore, Respondent's claimed intention to use the Domain Name for a real estate flipping business is unsupported by any evidence of demonstrable preparations to operate such a business. Indeed, Respondent admits that it "never created a formal business plan." Respondent's "Intended use" is nothing more than a post facto rationalization that cannot support a finding of legitimate interests.

 

Furthermore, even if the term DIRTY HARRY was a dictionary term, in order to find a legitimate interest a domain name should be used or demonstrably intended to be used in connection with the relied-on dictionary meaning. This is not the case; there is no evidence of use or demonstrable preparations to use the Domain Name for any particular meaning, including the Respondent's intended use. Rather, Respondent owns a business that resells domain names, including domain names that comprise or contain well-known marks (or misspellings of marks) such as <blimpys.com>, <cragslit.com>, <marscompany.com>, <uberfree.com> and multiple variants on the WAHLBURGERS mark. Respondent fully knew and understood the value of the DIRTY HARRY mark and the domain name and has offered it for sale for amounts far in excess of the amount the Respondent paid to acquire the Domain Name.

 

The Respondent's only demonstrable use of the Domain Name is to offer the Domain Name for sale (including a direct offer made to Clint Eastwood's lawyer on May 11, 2025). The Respondent's claims that the Domain Name was offered to other third parties took place on June 7, 2025, the day after the Domain Name was locked in anticipation of the present proceeding. The Respondent is a domain name trader with a history of registering domain names that correspond to well-known marks and offering them for sale. It acquired the Domain Name in full awareness of Complainant and its rights and reputation in the DIRTY HARRY mark and with the full intention of taking advantage of the identity between the Domain Name and the DIRTY HARRY mark by selling it to the highest bidder. Respondent has never used, and provides no evidence of attempts to use, the Domain Name for any other purpose. It acquired and uses the Domain Name in bad faith.

 

D. Respondent's Additional Submissions

The Respondent rejects Complainant's assertions.  It contends that Complainant does not own exclusive rights in the term "dirty harry". Rather the term "dirty harry" has a colloquial or slang meaning that is commonly used by a variety of third parties in various contexts across industries. Respondent notes that the only currently active trademark registered for the DIRTY HARRY mark in the United States is registered by a third party and provides reference to the use of the term "dirty harry" in various third party journals referring to situations or perceived situations where the police are unable to do justice except through unconstitutional means.

 

Further, Complainant's characterization of Respondent as a cybersquatter is incorrect. Respondent has never been accused of being a cybersquatter outside the present proceeding and owns over 1,000 domain names, fewer than 3% corresponding with registered marks; indeed a number of the cited domain names led themselves to various good faith and fair use purposes. Respondent did not register the Domain Name for sale to profit off the trademark holder, noting that Complainant released its last dirty harry movie in 1998.

 

Respondent goes on to state that it did not offer to sell the Domain Name to Mr. Eastwood (who in any event is not the trademark holder) for $100,000; the e-mail offer did not mention a price, and furthermore the additional e-mail solicitations referred to in the reply took place before Respondent received notice of the register lock on June 9, 2025.

 

FINDINGS

The Respondent's argument that it registered the Domain Name in good faith rests on the proposition that DIRTY HARRY, the trademark, has become genericized. If that were the case this dispute would be better suited to resolution by a court of competent jurisdiction, a position set forth in the Dissent by Mr. Hill.

 

The Majority recognizes that there has been cultural penetration of the term "Dirty Harry" and that in a figurative sense it has "entered the lexicon as slang for a 'ruthless police officer,'" However, the Majority has concluded that while the expression "Dirty Harry" has become a cultural shorthand for a certain type of policeman DIRTY HARRY has not lost its distinctiveness as a brand identifier.

 

Accordingly, the Majority finds 1) Complainant holds trademark rights for the DIRTY HARRY mark in a number of national jurisdictions for a variety of goods and services; 2) The domain name <dirtyharry.com> is identical to Complainant's DIRTY HARRY mark; 3) Complainant has established that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the use of the Domain Name; and 4) Respondent registered and has used the Domain Name in bad faith.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)       Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant has rights in the DIRTY HARRY mark based on multiple registrations including the EUIPO (e.g. Reg. No. 000836874 registered November 18, 1999). Registration of a mark with any of these jurisdictions sufficiently confers a complainant's rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Sanlam Life Insurance Limited v. Syed Hussain / Domain Management MIC, FA 1787219 (Forum June 15, 2018) ("Registration of a mark with the EUIPO, a government agency, sufficiently confers a complainant's rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)."). 

 

Respondent's argument that Complainant does not have a registration for DIRTY HARRY in the United States and that another party has registered a mark in that jurisdiction for the term ORIGINAL DIRTY HARRY is not a relevant consideration in deciding the issue under Sec. 4(a)(i) of the Policy. 

 

The Majority finds that the <dirtyharry.com> domain name is identical to Complainant's DIRTY HARRY mark as it wholly incorporates the DIRTY HARRY mark and adds the ".com" gTLD.  Adding a gTLD to a wholly incorporated trademark does not negate confusing similarity between a domain name and a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Dell Inc. v. Protection of Private Person / Privacy Protection, FA 1681432 (Forum Aug. 1, 2016) ("A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs."); see also Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (finding top-level domains are irrelevant for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis).

 

The Majority finds Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Complainant alleges that Respondent holds no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. In order for Complainant to succeed under this element, it must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm't Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum Aug. 18, 2006) and AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Forum Sept. 25, 2006) ("Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names."). 

  

The Majority notes that Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, nor has Complainant authorized Respondent to use the DIRTY HARRY mark.  Rather, Respondent argues, in essence, that it has a legitimate interest in the Domain Name because it is comprised of a generic term, and it is a legitimate business buying and selling names and because it registered the Domain Name with an interest in setting up a home flipping business. 

 

With regard to Respondent's argument that it has demonstrated demonstrable preparations to use the Domain Name, the Majority notes that Respondent provides no evidence in support of the stated use as a home flipping business, such as a business plan or any demonstrable preparations to use the Domain Name. The Majority rejects Respondent's declaration that the Panel should accept its intent on the grounds that its "history as a developer of both real property and online property, and registration of numerous home flipping domain names, supports my intent." The "intent" demanded of the Policy is proof of "demonstrable preparations." The term "demonstrable preparations" is only satisfied by offering proof that it has made those preparations. For these reasons, the Majority finds that this explanation does not provide Respondent with rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Furthermore, the Majority notes that this alleged intent was quickly abandoned for as early as May 9, 2021, approximately 8 months after the Domain Name was acquired by the Respondent, the Domain Name was being offered for sale for $50,000 on its own website. See On AG, On Clouds GmbH v. Nguyen Luu, Withheld for Privacy Purposes, Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf, Vuong Hoang, AN NGUYEN, NEO CORP., and Ngoc Tam Nguyen, D2021-1714 (WIPO July 28, 2021) "a use cannot be deemed bona fide if the disputed domain names constitute trademark infringement," citing earlier authority. "[B]ona fide use is predicated on honest adoption of the name," Sai Machine Tools Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Sudhir Jaiswal, Shree Sai Extrusion Technik Pvt. Ltd, D2018-2560 (WIPO January 19, 2019).

 

The Majority then must consider the second use of the Domain Name by the Respondent, namely offering the Domain Name for sale to a variety of third parties. Prior UDRP panels have accepted that a party may have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name when registered for resale provided the domain name was not registered to profit from and exploit a complainant's trademark. See Limble Soltions, Inc. v. Domain Admin, Alter.com, Inc., D2022-4900 (WIPO March 8, 2023) 

 

The Majority accepts that the fame of "Dirty Harry" the movie has resulted in third parties using the expression figuratively to denote a particular kind of policeman or police activity. However, Respondent's illustrations of the expression do not affect the distinctiveness of the mark or support the proposition that the DIRTY HARRY mark has become genericized even as the term "dirty harry" has indisputably become part of the (in the Respondent's words, "lexicon" in describing a "ruthless police officer."

 

While Respondent contends that it has sought to sell the Domain Name to other potential purchasers, Complainant, in its Reply, notes that all of the other "targeted offers" were made on June 7, 2025, the day after the Registrar locked the Domain Name in anticipation of the present proceeding, which suggests that these offers were not legitimate, rather they were deliberate attempts to present evidence of actions other than seeking to profit from the Domain Name's identity with the DIRTY HARRY Mark.

 

Respondent, in its response to Complainant's reply, annexes at Exhibit 2 an e-mail sent from the Registrar dated June 9, 2025 and seeks to argue that its awareness of the dispute dates from this date. The record before the Panel is that the Domain Name was locked by the Registrar on June 6, 2025. The content of the e-mail annexed to the response to the Complainant's reply is an e-mail from the Registrar that begins with "thank you for contacting us", indicating that it was sent in response from an e-mail from Respondent. Respondent has chosen to omit information of the contact that prompted the Registrar's correspondence and presents this e-mail as its first notification of the dispute; which clearly cannot be the case since it is in response to a contact from Respondent.  In the absence of full and complete disclosure the Majority cannot accept the position that the "targeted offers" were made unaware of the pending proceeding.

 

Accordingly, the Majority finds Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

The Respondent does not deny that it had actual knowledge of Complainant's DIRTY HARRY mark when it acquired the disputed domain name on September 22, 2020.

 

As outlined under the "Rights or Legitimate Interests Heading", the Majority does not accept the Respondent's explanation that it sought to register the Domain Name for a home flipping business and finds that Respondent acquired the Domain Name for the clear purpose of selling (or otherwise leveraging) the Domain Name to the Complainant or a competitor for valuable consideration in excess of any out-of-pocket costs.  

 

The Respondent has never used the Domain Name for any active purpose, other than to redirect to a GoDaddy page offering the Domain Name for sale which on the Respondent's website is listed for $100,000, a sum far in excess of any possible out-of-pocket costs incurred by Respondent. Furthermore, the Respondent directly sought to sell the Domain Name to Clint Eastwood. An offer to sell a disputed domain name may be evidence of bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). See loanDepot.com, LLC v. sm goo, FA 1786848 (Forum June 12, 2018) (finding that where a respondent's only employment of a substantially identical domain name is to attempt to sell the name, there exist sufficient grounds to find the respondent registered and used the name in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(i)).  

 

The principles surrounding whether an offer for sale is evidence of bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(i) are set out in 3.1.1 of the WIPO Overview 3.0, with the key question being whether the Respondent registered and sought to sell the Domain Name to take advantage of any generic meaning; or did the Respondent register and seek to sell the Domain Name to take advantage of its similarity with the DIRTY HARRY mark. For the reasons set out "Rights or Legitimate Interests", being the lack compelling evidence that the DIRTY HARRY mark has become genericized and the targeted offer to sell to Clint Eastwood the Majority finds on the balance of probabilities, that the Domain Name was registered and used for the bad-faith purpose of selling it to the trademark owner or a related party. 

 

The Majority finds Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Majority (Mr. Nicholas J.T. Smith and Mr. Levine) concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <dirtyharry.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

__________________________________________________________________

 

DISSENT BY MR. HILL

Respondent admits that it registered the disputed domain name deliberately, with full knowledge of its fame and of Complainant's mark. Its defense is that the term has become generic. That is, it alleges – and provides some evidence in support – that the DIRTY HARRY trademark has ceased to identify in the public's mind the particular film character, but rather identifies a type of behavior, namely recklessness, or disregarding practices and policies, or practicing vigilantism, or questionable use of force.

 

It appears to me that the key element is how the public perceives the term DIRTY HARRY. That is a complex factual issue that cannot properly be determined in a UDRP proceeding. Indeed, the question of whether or not the term DIRTY HARRY has become generic is a trademark law issue, which the Policy is not well suited to resolving. See Happy State Bank d/b/a GoldStar Trust Company v. Ronny Yakov / CrowdPay.us, Inc. FA 1802648 (Forum Sept. 27, 2018); see also Abbott Labs. v. Patel, FA 740337 (Forum Aug. 15, 2006) (holding that assertions of trademark infringement are "entirely misplaced and totally inappropriate for resolution" in a domain name dispute proceeding because the UDRP Policy applies only to abusive cybersquatting and nothing else); see also Stevenson Indus., Inc. v. CPAP-PRO Online, FA 105778 (Forum Apr. 25, 2002) ("If the existence of [rights or legitimate interests] turns on resolution of a legitimate trademark dispute, then Respondent must prevail, because such disputes are beyond the scope of this proceeding."). Consequently, I find that the instant case is outside the scope of the UDRP, and thus there should be no findings of fact, nor any findings regarding the three elements of the Policy (even if the disputed domain name is obviously identical to Complainant's mark).

 

Obiter dictum, I will add that, in my view, no account should be taken of the fact that Respondent's portfolio contains a number of domain names corresponding to well-known trademarks. The owners of those trademarks are not party to the instant proceedings, and may not consider that Respondent's registration of those domain names is abusive in the sense of the Policy. The registration and use of those domain names is outside the scope of the instant proceedings.

 

Further, also obiter dictum, Complainant has not alleged – much less provided evidence to show – that Respondent has lost prior UDRP cases. In my view, a pattern can be found only if Respondent has been found, in previous UDRP cases, to have registered and used domain names in bad faith.

 

Finally, again obiter dictum, I agree that the real estate justification is not convincing. However, if the term has become generic, then, under the Policy, it is legitimate to register it merely in order to resell it for a high price. Some people think that that should not be allowed, but we are not here to change the Policy, and consistent case law holds that it is allowed under the Policy. So, again, the crux of the matter is whether or not the term has become generic, and, as stated above, I believe that determining that issue is outside the scope of the Policy.

 

Thus I respectfully dissent from the Majority view and would dismiss the Complaint.

 

 

 

Richard Hill and Gerald M. Levine as Panelists and Nicholas J.T. Smith as Chair Panelist

Dated:  August 25, 2025