DECISION

 

United States Steel Corporation v. mehmet celik

Claim Number: FA2506002161939

 

PARTIES

Complainant is United States Steel Corporation ("Complainant"), represented by Michael D. Lazzara of Leech Tishman Fuscaldo & Lampl LLC, Pennsylvania, USA. Respondent is mehmet celik ("Respondent"), Turkey.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <ussteelmarket.com>, registered with Tucows Domains Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on June 22, 2025; Forum received payment on June 22, 2025.

 

On June 23, 2025, Tucows Domains Inc. confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <ussteelmarket.com> domain name is registered with Tucows Domains Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Tucows Domains Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Tucows Domains Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On June 23, 2025, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of July 14, 2025 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@ussteelmarket.com. Also on June 23, 2025, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no formal Response from Respondent,¹ Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On July 15, 2025, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant has for many years used its U.S. STEEL mark to market its products. It has rights in the U.S. STEEL mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and by common law based upon its use of the mark in commerce over many years.  Respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark because it fully incorporates Complainant's mark, merely adding the descriptive term "market" and a generic top-level domain (gTLD).

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark, Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name, and Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to pass off as Complainant.

 

Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith. It is using the domain name to redirect users to a dummy website which includes content related to the steel and metal industry, likely for the purpose of increasing the commercial value of the domain name to Complainant, a competitor of Complainant, or a third party, and it registered the domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2)       the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true). Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) ("Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint"), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 ("In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent's default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.").  The WIPO Overview 3.0 is not a definitive statement of applicable law or practice standards which governs any particular issue, but it does express a consensus among a significant number of UDRP panelists as to how particular issues typically are and should be resolved. This Panel accepts that consensus on this and other issues addressed later in this Decision.

 

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The U.S. STEEL mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 4,714,744) on April 7, 2015 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit B). Complainant's USPTO registration of its mark establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) ("Complainant's ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrates its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)."). 

 

Respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark. It fully incorporates Complainant's mark, merely omitting the periods and space and adding the descriptive term "market" and a gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the domain name from Complainant's mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Health Republic Insurance Company v. Gustavo Winchester, FA 1622089 (Forum July 7, 2015) ("Domain name syntax requires TLDs. Domain name syntax prohibits spaces. Therefore, omitted spacing and adding a TLD must be ignored when performing a Policy ¶4(a)(i) analysis."), Yahoo! Inc. v. HEIDI BUI, FA 1638878 (Forum Oct. 26, 2015) (finding that punctuation is not significant in determining the similarity of a domain name and mark), MTD Products Inc v J Randall Shank, FA 1783050 (Forum June 27, 2018) ("The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant's mark as it wholly incorporates the CUB CADET mark before appending the generic terms 'genuine' and 'parts' as well as the '.com' gTLD.").  The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity "typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name."  Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant's mark is clearly recognizable within the domain name.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the U.S. STEEL mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) ("Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests"). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.

 

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i)                      Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent's use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;

(ii)                      The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii)                      The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark, (ii) Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name, and (iii) Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to pass off as Complainant.  These allegations are addressed as follows:

 

Complainant states that it has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, it is not controverted by any evidence in the record, and it is taken as true. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant's mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant's mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) ("Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant's trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.").

 

The information furnished to Forum by the registrar lists the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. This name bears no resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent's use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that the Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name.

 

Complaint Exhibits E, F, G and H contain screenshots of pages of the website resolving from the domain name. While the site does not copy or attempt to mimic Complainant's site (screenshot of home page submitted as Complaint Exhibit C) and in fact is quite different from Complainant's site in general appearance, three of the four pages prominently display the name US STEEL as the sponsor of the site, and two of them feature photos of steel and metal products. The Exhibit F "About Us" page is a dummy page using the nonsensical Lorem ipsum dummy text. The Exhibit G page is a "Contact Us" page giving patently false information, e.g., two different telephone numbers, one of which is simply 12 345 67 89, and an address of "Street Name, New York 54785."  As noted by Complainant, the site does not appear to offer any specific or particular goods or services for sale, or explain how a visitor to the site might purchase any such service or product. These factors raise questions about Respondent's specific intent or objective in hosting the website. Complainant speculates that Respondent may be attempting to create or increase commercial value the domain name might have for Complainant, but there is no evidence of any offer or even willingness to sell evident from the exhibits.  Nevertheless, none of these unusual characteristics of the website lessens or mitigates the fact that the site represents itself as that of Complainant, and the domain name at a minimum generates initial interest confusion. Thus, while there is no evidence of Respondent actually competing with Complainant or actively seeking some kind of advantage from this use of the domain name, there is a strong likelihood that internet users would reasonably believe that the domain name is related to Complainant or its products. Respondent is passing off as Complainant. Other panels have accepted this argument. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. Chloe Day, Case No. D2023-2453 (finding that the respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain where a respondent used a domain name containing the complainant's mark in full, and finding that a web user seeing the disputed domain name could reasonably believe that it is related to Complainant or its products – particularly as it currently redirects to Complainant's website. As such, the disputed domain name, in the absence of any credible explanation, essentially impersonates Complainant and cannot constitute a fair use or legitimate interest). Using a confusingly similar domain name to impersonate and pass off as a complainant does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. Chloe Day, (Ibid), Ripple Labs Inc. v. NGYEN NGOC PHUONG THAO, FA 1741737 (Forum Aug. 21, 2017) ("Respondent uses the [disputed] domain name to divert Internet users to Respondent's website… confusing them into believing that some sort of affiliation exists between it and Complainant… [which] is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").

 

Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence discussed above, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.

 

Registration or Use in Bad Faith

Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) requires Complainant to prove that the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:

 

(i)                      circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)         by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent 's web site or location.

 

The concept of bad faith as illustrated in the above four subparagraphs necessarily involves a subjective intent on the part of a respondent knowingly to trade upon the goodwill of the complainant. The respondent must intentionally have targeted the complainant's mark. Such subjective intent would in turn require that the respondent actually knew of the complainant and its rights in the relevant mark when it registered the domain name. Renu Medispa, LLC v Angela Sattler/Aesthetics, FA2503002143814 (Forum April 28, 2025) ("A foundational question under ¶ 4(a)(iii) is whether or not Respondent had knowledge of Complainant or its claimed trademark at the time it registered the disputed domain name.").

 

In attempting to discern actual knowledge and a subjective bad faith intent, panels have looked at many different types of evidence, including but not limited to use of a domain name in direct competition with a trademark owner, impersonation, the parties operating in the same market segment, the parties being physically located in the same general geographic area, a pattern of bad faith conduct, actual prior association between or among the parties, and the distinctive or famous nature of the trademark, suggesting that any similarity is not happenstance. Importantly, allegations about a respondent's subjective intention are not evidence in this regard.

 

In cases where no Response has been filed, it can be difficult to determine whether a respondent registered a domain name with actual knowledge of the complainant and its rights in the mark. In this case, however, Complainant's mark is famous, having been used since 1901 as a source indicator for Complainant, whose steel and other metal products have been used in countless iconic structures throughout the United States (Information about Complainant submitted as Complaint Exhibit D). Complainant had been in business under the U.S. STEEL mark for over one hundred twenty years when the domain name was registered in April 2025 (WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit A shows creation date).  More importantly, Respondent must have had actual knowledge of Complainant in order to impersonate it on its website. Respondent's registration of the domain name was no happenstance. It had actual knowledge of Complainant's rights in the incorporated mark when it registered the domain name. This is clear evidence of an intent to target this Complainant and its mark.

 

As discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis, Respondent is using the domain name to pass off as Complainant. This does not fit precisely within any of the scenarios listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955. The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum December 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.").

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <ussteelmarket.com> domain name BE TRANSFERRED TO COMPLAINANT.

 

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

July 16, 2025