
DECISION
Valeris, Inc. v. Mayra Guerra
Claim Number: FA2602002205224
PARTIES
Complainant is Valeris, Inc. ("Complainant"), represented by David E. Bennett of Coats & Bennett, PLLC, North Carolina, USA. Respondent is Mayra Guerra ("Respondent"), Minnesota, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <valerishires.com>, registered with NameSilo, LLC.
PANEL
The undersigned certify that they have acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge have no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
David E. Sorkin and Nicholas J. T. Smith as Panelists and Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Chair.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on February 13, 2026; Forum received payment on February 16, 2026.
On February 13, 2026, NameSilo, LLC confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <valerishires.com> domain name is registered with NameSilo, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameSilo, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameSilo, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").
On February 17, 2026, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of March 9, 2026 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@valerishires.com. Also on February 17, 2026, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On March 17, 2026, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, Forum appointed David E. Sorkin and Nicholas J. T. Smith as Panelists and Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Chair.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response or any other submittal from Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Complainant provides patient support, data analytics and market access services for the biopharmaceutical industry. It has common law rights in the VALERIS mark through its use of that mark since May of 2025. Respondent's <valerishires.com> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark as it incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely adding the descriptive term "hires," which heightens the confusion, and the ".com" generic top-level domain (gTLD).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its VALERIS mark, Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to impersonate Complainant and engage in an email phishing scheme, and it is not commonly known by the domain name.
Respondent registered the domain name in bad faith. It had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name, it is using the domain name to impersonate Complainant and engage in a phishing scheme, and it attempts to take advantage of Complainant's reputation by creating a liklihood of confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorchip, affilation or endorsement of the domain name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not file a Response in this matter.
FINDINGS
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory allegations unsupported by competent evidence.
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this case:
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
Complainant has not registered the VALERIS mark with the United States Patent and Trademark office (USPTO) or any other governmental trademark agency. It has applied for the registration of that mark with the USPTO (Serial No. 99195259) (TSDR printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit 4) but as of this date the USPTO has not registered it. The great weight of UDRP jurisprudence developed over the years is very clear that a pending application for registration of a trademark with the USPTO is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.1), at ¶ 1.1.4. "A pending trademark application would not by itself establish trademark rights within the meaning of UDRP paragraph 4(a)(i)." The WIPO Overview is not a definitive statement of applicable law which governs any particular issue, but it does express a consensus among a significant number of UDRP panelists as to how particular issues typically are and should be resolved. This Panel accepts that consensus on this and other issues addressed later in this Decision.
A complainant need not show registration of its mark in order to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). If proven, common law rights are sufficient to establish rights for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Oculus VR, LLC v. Ivan Smirnov, FA 1625898 (Forum July 27, 2015) ("A complainant does not need to hold registered trademark rights in order to have rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) and it is well established that a Complainant may rely on common law or unregistered trademarks that it can make out.").
Common law rights in a trademark can be established by evidence of secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) ("Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition."). The WIPO Overview 3.1 at ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including "(i) the duration and nature of the use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark and during which time period, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark—including evidence of expenditures over a relevant time period, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry such as trade and professional associations, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys. The fact that a respondent is shown to have been targeting the complainant's mark (e.g., based on the manner in which the mark is used on the related website or impersonating documents or other instruments) may also support the complainant's assertion and evidence that the mark has achieved significance as a source identifier."
The evidence of secondary meaning submitted by Complainant is thin at best. A press release in 2020 described one of Complainant's predecessors, then named TrialCard, as having been founded in 2000 and having connected over 33 million patients with nearly $15 billion in branded drug savings (Complaint Exhibit 1). A second press release in 2023 announced that TrialCard was changing its name to Mercalis and stated that the company has approximately 1,800 employees and supports some 500 clients (Complaint Exhibit 2). A third press release in May 2025 announces the merger of Mercalis with another firm to form Complainant (Complaint Exhibit 3). This is the first time the name VALERIS appears in any of these Exhibits, all of which were issued by Complainant or its predecessor. Complaint Exhibits 5 and 6 contain screenshots of Complainant's website at <valeris.com> which feature the VALERIS mark and describe Complainant's services but are undated and contain no information about sales volume or size of customer base. Complaint Exhibit 7 is a series of screenshots of Complainant's social media presence that while undated contain references to July 4th, Veterans' Day and Labor Day, and show that Complainant was using the VALERIS mark over the summer and fall of 2025. These show some 5,797 followers. Missing from all of these exhibits is any evidence of the amount of sales or recognition of the mark within the relevant public as a source indicator for Complainant and its services. According to the first two press releases, it appears that Complainant's predecessors had a significant presence in their industry and it follows that any mergers or name changes, e.g., to VALERIS, would be noted and recognized by others in that industry. As Complainant's clients are pharmaceutical companies, a client base of 500 would be significant. It would have been helpful for the Panel to have direct evidence of that third-party recognition, or other forms of third-party awareness of the mark as associated with Complainant. One thing is certain, however: The VALERIS mark was sufficiently known that Respondent was able to gain awareness of it at or before November 28, 2025, when it registered the domain name (WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit 8 shows creation date). Further, Complainant's application to the USPTO for registration of the mark, while insufficient on its own to demonstrate rights in that mark, corroborates and supports the other evidence before the Panel. The evidence presented persuades the Panel, by the narrowest of margins, that Complainant has sufficient common law rights in the VALERIS mark to satisfy the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Respondent's <valerishires.com> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's VALERIS mark. It incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely adding the descriptive term "hires" and the gTLD. Complainant's mark is clearly recognizable within the domain name. The changes described above do not distinguish the domain name from Complainant's mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Further, the addition of descriptive terms that relate to a complainant can actually enhance confusion. That is the case with the domain name involved here. Complainant alleges that Respondent registered the domain name shortly after Complainant had publicly posted job listings under the VALERIS mark. The Panel found no evidence of the alleged job posting this but in any event the descriptive term "hires" describes the normal business practice of recruiting employees and could easily lead an Internet user to believe that a resolving website, or emails from an account based on the domain name, would be associated with Complainant's recruiting efforts. Adding it to Complainant's mark in the domain name enhances the confusing similarity.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the VALERIS mark, in which Complainant has rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent's use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its VALERIS mark, (ii) Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to impersonate Complainant and engage in an email phishing scheme, and (iii) it is not commonly known by the domain name. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant states that it has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel and is taken as true. Evidence that a respondent is not authorized to use a complainant's mark in a domain name supports a finding that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.
Complaint Exhibits 9 through 12 contain copies of emails directed to various individuals from "Robert Keenan," using the robert@valerishires.com email address and claiming the title of Complainant's HR/Talent Manager.1 This "Robert Keenan" tells the recipients that they are being considered for a Remote Implementation Manager position with Complainant and invite them seriatim to schedule an interview, then furnish a screening questionnaire, then submit a valid government-issued photo ID. This demonstrates that Respondent is impersonating Complainant, engaging with the addressee for a discussion about employment purportedly with Complainant. Respondent is thus impersonating and passing off as Complainant. Using a confusingly similar domain name to impersonate a complainant and send fraudulent emails is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv). Microsoft Corporation v. Terrence Green / Whois Agent / Whois Privacy Protection Service, Inc., FA 1661030 (Forum Apr. 4, 2016) (finding the respondent's use of the disputed domain names to send fraudulent emails purportedly from agents of complainant to be neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).
By requesting a copy of the recipient's government-issued photo ID, Respondent is soliciting the type of information associated with phishing, which is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Respondent is using the domain name for an email account from which it engages in phishing. Using a confusingly similar domain name to engage in phishing is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. I S / Internet Consulting Services Inc., FA 1785242 (Forum June 5, 2018) ("On its face, the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to the mark of another in order to facilitate a phishing scheme cannot be described as either a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).").
The WHOIS information furnished to Forum by the registrar lists the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. This name bears no resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. The Panel finds that Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.
Registration or Use in Bad Faith
Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) requires Complainant to prove that the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent 's web site or location.
The concept of bad faith as illustrated in the above four subparagraphs necessarily involves a subjective intent on the part of a respondent knowingly to trade upon the goodwill of the complainant. The respondent must intentionally have targeted the complainant's mark. Such subjective intent would in turn require that the respondent actually knew of the complainant or its rights in the relevant mark when it registered the domain name.
In attempting to discern actual knowledge and a subjective bad faith intent, panels have looked at many different types of evidence, including but not limited to use of a domain name in direct competition with a trademark owner, impersonation, the parties operating in the same market segment, the parties being physically located in the same general geographic area, a pattern of bad faith conduct, actual prior association between or among the parties, the distinctive nature of the trademark, and the extent to which the trademark has been publicized and is known as a source indicator for the complainant. Unsupported allegations about a respondent's subjective intention are not evidence in this regard.
In this case it is abundantly clear that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name in November 2025 (WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit 8 shows creation date). VALERIS is not a generic or descriptive mark. It is unique, a coined term that has no meaning except for its association with Complainant. It would not normally be selected for inclusion in a domain name by anyone other than Complainant or an authorized affiliate except for the purpose of targeting this Complainant. Finally, Respondent had to have had actual knowledge of Complainant or its mark in order to impersonate it. Respondent's registration of the domain name was no happenstance. It had actual knowledge of Complainant's rights in the incorporated mark when it registered the domain name and intended to target this Complainant and its mark in doing so.
Next, as discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to pass off as Complainant. This does not fit within any of the circumstances listed above, but Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum December 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.").
As discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to engage in phishing. This also is evidence of bad faith registration and use. McKinsey & Company, Inc., and McKinsey Holdings, Inc. v. Privacy Protection, report abuse to / Registrar: DELTA-X Ltd., FA 1580883 (Forum Oct. 25, 2014) (holding that the respondent had engaged in phishing, which is further evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), when the respondent used the disputed domain name in an attempt to obtain Internet users' personal information including their driver's license number and name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered or is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
DECISION
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <valerishirescom> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Chair
March 20, 2026
David E. Sorkin, Panelist
Nicholas J. T. Smith, Panelist
[1] The unsupported but undisputed allegations in the Complaint state that Robert Keenan was an actual employee of Complainant.
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page