DECISION

 

Liana Georgoulis, d/b/a Coast Psychological Services v. Yohanes Feliks Budiman

Claim Number: FA2606002226784

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Liana Georgoulis, d/b/a/ Coast Psychological Services ("Complainant"), represented by Sarah S. Brooks of Venable LLP, California, USA. Respondent is Yohanes Feliks Budiman ("Respondent"), Singapore.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <coastpsychologicalservices.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on June 11, 2026; Forum received payment on June 11, 2026.

 

On June 14, 2026, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <coastpsychologicalservices.com> domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On June 18, 2026, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of July 8, 2026 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@coastpsychologicalservices.com. Also on June 18, 2026, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On July 9, 2026, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response or any other submittal from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant is a licensed clinical psychologist. She has common law rights in the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES mark based upon her continuous and extensive use of the mark in commerce since 2012. Respondent's <coastpsychologicalservices.com> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES mark as it fully incorporates the mark, merely omitting spaces and adding the ".com" generic top-level domain (gTLD).

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use her mark, Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is currently using it to pass off as Complainant, it has not been commonly known by the domain name, and it may be using the domain name to violate state law prohibiting the unlicensed practice of psychology. 

 

Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith. It attempts for financial gain to attract Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, it is passing off as Complainant, it registered the domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant and her mark, it opportunistically registered the website after Complainant had inadvertently allowed it to expire, and it refused to engage with Complainant when she attempted to purchase the domain name.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2)       the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory allegations unsupported by competent evidence.

 

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant has not registered COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES with any governmental trademark agency. Nevertheless, a complainant need not show registration of its mark in order to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). If proven, common law rights are sufficient to establish rights for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Oculus VR, LLC v. Ivan Smirnov, FA 1625898 (Forum July 27, 2015) ("A complainant does not need to hold registered trademark rights in order to have rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) and it is well established that a Complainant may rely on common law or unregistered trademarks that it can make out."); Artistic Pursuit LLC v. calcuttawebdevelopers.com, FA 894477 (Forum Mar. 8, 2007) (finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) does not require a trademark registration if a complainant can establish common law rights in its mark).

 

Common law rights in a trademark can be established by evidence of secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since "[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant's rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will . . . . Complainant has published under the KAREN KOEHLER name extensively, and Complainant's legal skills have been recognized by various organizations and groups with extensive positive media coverage. Complainant also operates an online blog associated with the KAREN KOEHLER mark."); Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) ("Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition."). The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions (WIPO Overview 3.1), at ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including "(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys."  

 

The evidence of secondary meaning submitted by Complainant consists of her statement in a written Declaration subject to penalty of perjury that she has "pervasively and continuously used the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES trademark in connection with my licensed clinical psychologist practice since as early as May 2013. Particularly, I have used the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES mark on my previous website at the <coastpsychologicalservices.com> domain name where I promoted various clinical and educational services related to my practice between approximately May 2013 to August 2025. As a result of my practice's widespread use and subsequent public recognition of the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES mark, . . . the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES mark has become the distinctive identifier associated with my practice" (Complaint Appendix B).  Also submitted is an archived image of Complainant's former website at the <coastpsychologicalservices.com> domain name showing that she was using the mark in the domain name and the resolving website promoting her practice in May of 2013 (Complaint Appendix C), and a screenshot of the website she is currently using for that purpose located at <coastpsychologicalservices.net> (Complaint Appendix D).  Both websites prominently display the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES brand, identify Dr. Liana Georgoulis, a licensed clinical psychologist, as the site sponsor, describe the services offered by her, and display a street address and telephone number for her office.  There is no other documentary evidence, such as copies of brochures or printed educational materials she may have used in her practice, copies of invoices, business leases, advertising materials, correspondence, state license renewals, business tax returns, professional liability insurance policies, third-party media recognition, etc., that might corroborate her statement that she has been using the mark continuously and that it has become associated in the minds of the relevant public with her practice. Nevertheless, the uncontroverted evidence before the Panel demonstrates that she was using the mark on a website promoting her practice in 2013 and is doing so currently, and she states unequivocally, under penalty of perjury, that she has been using COAST PSYCHOLOGOICAL SERVICES as the brand for her practice the entire time from 2013 to the present. While the evidence is not as robust as it might have been, the Panel finds that the evidence demonstrates a secondary meaning for the claimed mark.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the COAST PSYCHOLOGOICAL SERVICES mark, in which Complainant has rights. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to the respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. If the respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant's prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant.

 

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i)                      The respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or

(ii)                      the respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii)                      the respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use her mark, (ii) Respondent is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is currently using it to pass off as Complainant, (iii) it has not been commonly known by the domain name, and (iv) it may be using the domain name to violate state law prohibiting the unlicensed practice of psychology.  These allegations are addressed as follows: 

 

Complainant states that she has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use her mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel and is taken as true. While evidence that a respondent is not authorized to use a complainant's mark is not dispositive, it is relevant to the circumstances listed in Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii) and supports a finding that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.

 

Complaint Appendix E is a screenshot of the website resolving from the domain name as of May 14, 2026. It is an exact duplicate of Complainant's current website at <coastpsyshologicalservices.net>, displaying exactly the same photo images and text as Complainant's site, even the same street address and telephone number. Respondent is using the domain name to impersonate and pass off as Complainant. This is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services nor as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of a domain name within the meaning of Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). General Motors LLC v. MIKE LEE, FA 1659965 (Forum Mar. 10, 2016) (finding that "use of a domain to sell products and/or services that compete directly with a complainant's business does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)."); Yahoo Assets LLC v. Zanybh Solutions, FA 2022077 (Forum Dec. 12, 2022) ("As the Panel agrees that Respondent appears to be passing off as Complainant to draw Internet traffic, the Panel finds that Respondent lacks any bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).").

 

The information furnished to Forum by the registrar lists the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. This name bears no resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name.  Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name.

 

Complainant alleges that the Contact Us page on Respondent's website solicits personal information from visitors, which could suggest phishing, but there is no evidence as to the type of personal information sought or even that that is being done. Complainant also alleges that if Respondent is offering psychological services it is likely violating state laws prohibiting the unlicensed practice of psychology. That would likely be correct if Respondent is offering such services but, again, there is no evidence that that is happening. The fact the Complainant's address and telephone number are the only contact information shown on Respondent's website would suggest that it is not actually offering psychological services.

 

Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence discussed above, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.

 

Registration or Use in Bad Faith

Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) requires Complainant to prove that the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:

 

(i)                      circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or

(iii)                      the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)         by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent's web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent 's web site or location.

 

The concept of bad faith as illustrated in the above four subparagraphs necessarily involves a subjective intent on the part of a respondent knowingly to trade upon the goodwill of the complainant. The respondent must intentionally have targeted the complainant's mark. Such subjective intent would in turn require that the respondent actually knew of the complainant or its rights in the relevant mark when it registered the domain name.  Constructive notice does not suffice.

 

In attempting to discern actual knowledge and a subjective bad faith intent, panels have looked at many different types of evidence, including but not limited to use of a domain name in direct competition with a trademark owner, impersonation, the parties operating in the same market segment, the parties being physically located in the same general geographic area, a pattern of bad faith conduct, actual prior association between or among the parties, the distinctive nature of the trademark, and the extent to which the trademark has been publicized and is known as a source indicator for the complainant. Unsupported allegations about a respondent's subjective intent are not evidence in this regard.

 

According to Complainant's Appendix B Declaration, she registered the domain name in 2012 and used it to promote her practice until she inadvertently allowed it to expire in August 2025. According to the Declaration, at some unspecified time after that the Respondent acquired the domain name, causing it to point to a blank page with no substantive content for several months and then, early in 2026, posting the current infringing website. The domain name is not generic in nature, it is not a domain that could be used in any number of contexts. It has no value as an ordinary, short, generally descriptive domain. Instead, it is obviously the name of a specific business, and Respondent was undoubtedly aware of that when it acquired the domain name. Respondent says she attempted to contact Respondent to purchase it but was unable to obtain a response. The WHOIS information furnished to Forum by the registrar shows the Respondent's domicile in two different and mutually exclusive places, Jakarta, Indonesia and Singapore, so it is likely false, which if true could explain Respondent's failure to respond to Complainant's offer to purchase.  While Respondent's motives in acquiring the domain name are somewhat unclear, the fact that the domain name is so obviously the name of Complainant's business, coupled with Respondent's later posting an exact duplicate of Complainant's website suggests that impersonation, passing off, was its intent in acquiring the domain name.  John Hutton International v. Whois Privacy Protection Service by Value Domain / Axelight co. Ltd., Yasutaka Sakatani, WIPO Case No. D2015-0318 (April 27, 2015) (Respondent acquisition of expired domain name coupled with subsequent use in bad faith held to be evidence of bad faith registration). The WIPO Overview 3.1, at ¶ 3.2.1 states, "Particular circumstances panels may take into account in assessing whether the respondent's registration of a domain name is in bad faith include: . . . (iv) the timing and circumstances of the registration (particularly following a product launch, or the complainant's failure to renew its domain name registration) . . . . Application of UDRP paragraph 4(b)(iv): in some cases, e.g., where it is unclear why a domain name was initially registered and the domain name is subsequently used to attract Internet users by creating a likelihood of confusion with a complainant's mark, panels have found that UDRP paragraph 4(b)(iv), read in light of paragraph 4(a)(ii), can support an inference of bad faith registration for the respondent to rebut."  The evidence in this case is at least sufficient to make a prima facie case of targeting, and there is no evidence to refute that. The Panel finds that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it acquired the domain name and selected it with the intent to target this Complainant. Respondent registered the domain name in bad faith.

 

The evidence of Respondent's conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis supports a finding of bad faith registration and use based upon the grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, it has used the confusingly similar domain name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of that website. Commercial gain is possible from the sale of services from the website. Respondent's conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA 1612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) ("The Panel agrees that Respondent's use of the website to display products similar to Complainant's, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).").

 

Next, as discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to pass off as Complainant. This does not fit precisely within any of the scenarios listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum Dec. 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where "Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant's own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.").

 

Finally, Respondent registered and is using the domain name, which incorporates and is confusingly similar to the COAST PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES mark, but Respondent has no legitimate connection with that mark or its owner, the Complainant.  Given the nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), the registration and use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark with which the respondent has no connection has frequently been held to be evidence of opportunistic bad faith. JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Nics Telekomunikasyon A.S., FA 1890140 (Forum Apr. 24, 2020) ("[W]here a disputed domain name is so obviously connected with such a well-known name, product or service, its use by someone with no connection to the name, product or service indicates opportunistic bad faith.").

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered or is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.  

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <coastpsychologicalservices.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant. 

 

 

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

July 14, 2026