DECISION

 

Jeremy Manalis v. Konstantin Kovalevskyi

Claim Number: FA2608002239788

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Jeremy Manalis ("Complainant"), represented by Blake Mirolla of Lewis & Lin, LLC, New York, USA. Respondent is Konstantin Kovalevskyi ("Respondent"), Ukraine.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <jeremymanalis.com>, registered with Spaceship, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Gerald M. Levine as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on August 14, 2026; Forum received payment on August 14, 2026.

 

On August 18, 2026, Spaceship, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <jeremymanalis.com> domain name is registered with Spaceship, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Spaceship, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Spaceship, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On August 26, 2026, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of September 15, 2026 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@jeremymanalis.com. Also on August 26, 2026, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on August 28, 2026.

 

Pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, without objection by Respondent, Forum appointed Gerald M. Levine as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

In his signed and certified Response, Respondent included a list of eight annexes. The Panel found after downloading the file that it did not include these annexes and upon inquiry the Case Coordinator confirmed that she did not receive any annexes from Respondent. At the Panel's request the Case Coordinator emailed the Respondent. In his response to the email, he apologized, stating that the "list was not intended to state that all of those documents had already been attached. No separate Respondent Annexes were included with the filing."  He continued: "I am self-represented and would like to correct this mistake properly. Could you please advise what is now required from me?" He then itemized five questions. The UDRP is an adversary forum. The Panel takes notice only of the parties' submissions.

 

The Panel receives Respondent's responsive email only for the purpose of confirming that its response is complete as filed and served.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant acknowledges that he does not have a registered trademark. He rests his right to maintain this proceeding based on his assertion that he owns an unregistered, common law mark in his professional and personal name "JEREMY MANALIS." In support of this contention he proffers evidence in the form of licenses from the State of Oregon from 2003, payments to Google for displaying his name and services dating from 2016, web shots from the Wayback Machine also from 2016, and a testimonial of his use of the mark since 2004 as evidence of these rights.

 

Complainant comes to this UDRP proceeding because he inadvertently allowed <jeremymanalis.com> lapse. As both he and Respondent note, between the time of lapse and Respondent's acquisition of the disputed domain name at a lapsed domain name auction, <jeremymanalis.com> has been held by a succession of registrants.

 

Complainant shows, and Respondent does not deny that when first seen by  Complainant <jeremymanalis.com> resolved to a website imaging the contents of Complainant's website before his registration lapsed. The domain name presently resolves to nonreferential website which Respondent substituted as a result of pre-UDRP communications between Complainant and Respondent. 

 

B. Respondent

Respondent denies that his registration and holding of the disputed domain name is cybersquatting. In his own words he states that he "acquired a publicly available expired domain through the normal registration system for development as an advertising-supported web property. The domain had been outside Complainant's control since 2019 and had been used by unrelated registrants, including for unrelated Japanese-language content. Respondent did not acquire Complainant's business, client list, professional practice, or confidential information.

 

Respondent continues:

 

1.       "After registration, Respondent used an automated website-restoration service intended to retrieve and deploy archived material associated with an expired domain. Through that automated process, historical pages associated with jeremymanalis.com were deployed. Respondent did not manually copy or write Complainant's biography, professional credentials, photographs, contact information, or descriptions of services, and

2.       Respondent acknowledges that he is responsible for addressing content appearing on a domain under his control. The automated process is not offered to deny that the pages appeared."

 

Nevertheless, "It is relevant to Respondent's actual purpose and intent that … Respondent did not construct a false professional practice, did not hold himself out personally as Jeremy Manalis, and did not deploy the pages for the purpose of selling Complainant's services or forcing Complainant to purchase the domain.

 

Respondent concludes by arguing that

 

1.       [Notwithstanding that] Complainant presents evidence of professional licenses, business entities, advertising expenses, a historical domain, and references to his work [and that [t]hose materials show that Complainant is a professional who used his own name [t]hey do not necessarily establish that the public perceived JEREMY MANALIS as a trademark or source identifier rather than simply the personal name of the practitioner. 

2.       Moreover, the Respondent continues: "The asserted aggregate revenue is principally supported by Complainant's own declaration, and the record contains no consumer survey or substantial independent evidence quantifying recognition of the name as a mark. Respondent therefore submits that Complainant has not carried the burden under Policy Paragraph 4(a)(i).

3.       Lastly, Respondent states that he i) did not solicit Complainant or register the domain primarily to sell it to him. Complainant initiated acquisition discussions, and Respondent did not demand an inflated price. ii) did not operate a competing counseling, massage, coaching, or consulting business and did not accept professional appointments or payments; iii) the historical pages resulted from an automated archive-restoration process rather than Respondent's manual authorship of a false biography or professional practice — while this does not excuse the appearance of the pages, it is relevant to whether Respondent intended to impersonate Complainant; iv) the Complaint offers no identified client transaction, payment, appointment, or communication actually diverted to Respondent. Allegations of actual commercial harm and confusion are largely inferential; and v) Respondent took prompt corrective action to remove the archived content promptly after receiving actual notice and ceased the challenged presentation.

 

FINDINGS

The Panel does not disagree with Respondent that "[a] personal name is not protected under the UDRP merely because it identifies a professional or was formerly used as a domain." However, that is not the case here. While Complainant's evidence is not as fulsome as the Panel may wish, it is sufficient to establish his long time use of JEREMY MANALIS in the market he serves and his earlier registration and use of <jeremymanalis.com> since 2003 through 2019 when he inadvertently failed to renew his registration. Respondent's admission that he caused Complainant's domain name content to be rebuilt and displayed contradicts a defense under Paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy and as such Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. By extension, the display of Complainant's resuscitated contents supports Complainant's proof that Respondent's intent was precisely what he denies (Paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy). Accordingly, Complainant is entitled to his remedy.  

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)       the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)       Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)       the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. Paragraph 4(a)(i) requires the complainant have rights, and only if it does is it necessary to assess whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that mark.

In this case Complainant does not have a registered trademark in his professional name. Respondent argues that a "personal name is not protected under the UDRP merely because it identifies a professional or was formerly used as a domain." Respondent's argument would lead to dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Complainant lacks a right. While this may result in some instances, it misses the point when it comes to the jurisprudence of personal names.

If the question were whether a complainant can claim common law trademark rights for his personal name under any circumstances, the answer would be No. However, this does not account for those instances in which a complainant is able to demonstrate the use of its personal name in connection with a bona fide offer of goods or services. In other words, Complainant has shown he is actually operating a business under his personal name and for this reason JEREMY MANALIS is functioning as a mark.

There are many cases, some of which are cited by Complainant in its complaint that illustrate these circumstances. The distinguished 3-Member Panel in Arthur Golden v. Galileo Asesores S.L., WIPO Case No. D2006-1215 <arthurgolden.com> noted that "[w]hether a person's name has acquired secondary meaning (and hence may claim protection as a common law trademark) requires a factual determination. Factors that a panel might consider include (a) whether the name is common (which reduces the possibility of acquiring secondary meaning); (b) whether the name was used in connection with goods or services in a commercial context; and (c) the time period over which the name was so used."

 

Taking into account the factors noted by the Panel in Arthur Golden, the Panel concludes that Complainant has demonstrated that it has common law rights to his personal name primarily because "the name was used in connection with goods or services in a commercial context."

One other decision of note provides further insight into the jurisprudence of personal names. It illustrates why Complainant in this proceeding succeeds and the Complainant in Ramsey Mankarious v. Stanley Pace, WIPO Case No. D2015-1100 failed. The distinguished 3-Member Panel dismissed the complaint because the claim "falls squarely into the category of a businessperson (potentially) having a famous name but who does not actually use his/her name as an identifier for the business engaged in, which is insufficient to constitute unregistered trade mark rights."

 

Having established its right, WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.2.1, the next question concerns whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to its mark. Here, the entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. The standing (or threshold) test for this assessment involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant's trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.7. The disputed domain name is identical to the mark.

 

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name. Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of "proving a negative", requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent.

 

As a cure to this difficulty, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating its rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant).

 

The Panel concludes that Complainant has set forth a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks right or legitimate interests.

Respondent appeared and argued that "Complainant has not conclusively negated Respondent's claimed legitimate interest." It is not Complainant's job to "conclusively negate[ ] Respondent's claimed legitimate interest" but for the Respondent to produce evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests.

Of the three circumstances set forth in Paragraph 4(c) Respondent bases its right or legitimate interest on the argument that it "acquired a publicly available expired domain through the normal registration system for development as an advertising-supported web property." As it only invokes Paragraph 4(c)(i) it is unnecessary to address the other two circumstances.

 

Paragraph 4(c)(i) provides for a complete defense: "[if] before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name [was acquired] in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services." Respondent specifically invokes the defense that it has made "demonstrable preparations" to use the disputed domain name, and offers as evidence a substituted website to which <jeremymanalis.com> currently resolves. 

 

Leaving aside for the moment that before notice "Respondent used an automated website-restoration service intended to retrieve and deploy archived material associated with an expired domain [and that] [t]hrough that automated process, historical pages associated with jeremymanalis.com were deployed", it is possible that a website could be some evidence of demonstrable preparations. However, by itself a website is incomplete as evidence of a right or legitimate interest unless it demonstrates that the disputed domain name was acquired "in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services." 

 

This is particularly apparent in this case because the current website which Respondent invited the Panel to visit was created by Google Gemini and displays only content of general interest that AI may be prompted to retrieve. It does not purport to be a business. The website is merely a mockup offering a variety of nondescript "practical guides on home, productivity, cooking, everyday tech, money basics, and travel — simple advice you can actually use."

This does not satisfy the demands of the Policy for "demonstrable evidence" that Respondent is operating a bona fide business offering goods or services. See DigiPoll Ltd. v. Raj Kumar, WIPO Case No. D2004-0939 ("[A]n idea without any real preparations to put the idea into practice cannot be sufficient"); Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. v. Boris Postolov, WIPO Case No. D2023-0212 ("[P]reparations to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services cannot be merely self-serving statements but should be inherently credible and supported by relevant pre-complaint evidence."). 

As Respondent has failed to come forward with any relevant evidence, the Panel finds the second element of the Policy has been established.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Respondent denies any wrongful purpose or intention in acquiring and using the disputed domain name in bad faith while admitting he restored Complainant's website as it existed in 2019 before the domain name lapsed for failure to renew the registration. The Panel takes notice of this admission as it supports Complainant's proof of impersonation.

In protesting his good faith, Respondent asserts that he "did not approach Complainant to solicit a sale and did not register the domain primarily to sell it to Complainant [but that] Complainant initiated communications expressing an interest in acquiring the domain."  Respondent concludes this exchange with Complainant by urging the Panel to consider "[t]he complete correspondence … in context" but as noted in the PROCEDURAL ISSUE above Respondent has not submitted this evidence and this alleged exchange is not part of the record. 

 

Regardless, whether Respondent is liable for cybersquatting under Paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy is academic since the Panel concludes on the basis of the evidence of record, which specifically includes the recreation of Complainant's website before being substituted after notice of Complainant's claim that Respondent's registration and use of the disputed domain name violates Paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy by creating "a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location."

 

The Panel finds that Complainant's argument well taken that the text appearing at the <jeremymanalis.com> website prior to its removal  supports a reasonable inference of intentionality to impersonate Complainant for an unlawful purpose. In drawing this conclusion, the Panel does not discount that it is also probable that Respondent undertook this strategy of using Complainant's website content to lure Complainant to seek a return of the domain name.

For these reasons, the Panel finds the third element of the Policy has been established.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <jeremymanalis.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

Gerald M. Levine, Panelist

Dated: September 2, 2026