National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

EMCO Enterprises, Inc. v. Domain's Administration

Claim Number: FA0601000624378

 

PARTIES

Complainant is EMCO Enterprises, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Randel S. Springer, of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, One West Fourth Street, Winston-Salem, NC 27101.  Respondent is Domain's Administration (“Respondent”), GPO Box 221, Central, HK.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME 

The disputed Domain Name is <emco.com>, registered with Enom, Inc. (“Enom”).

 

PANEL

The undersigned, David H Tatham, certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (“the NAF”) electronically on January 10, 2006; the NAF received a hard copy of the Complaint on January 13, 2006.

 

On January 10, 2006, Enom confirmed by e-mail to the NAF that the disputed Domain Name was registered with them and that the Respondent was the current registrant of the name.  Enom has verified that Respondent is bound by the Enom registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve Domain Name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On January 13, 2006, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of February 2, 2006 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@emco.com by e-mail.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on January 31, 2006.

 

On February 6, 2006 an Additional Submission was received from Complainant and was deemed to have been timely filed in compliance with the NAF’s Supplemental Rule 7.

 

On February 6, 2006, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the NAF appointed David H. Tatham as Panelist.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Complainant

Complainant is the owner of two U.S. trademark registrations, copies of which were annexed to the Complaint –

No. 2,421,429 EMCO for “metal doors and non-metal doors” registered as from January 16, 2001 but claiming use since February 1977, and

No. 2,707,441 FOREVER for “metal door screens, hardware for doors and windows, namely metal locks; metal entry doors” registered as from April 15, 2003 but claiming use since February 1977.

 

Complainant is a manufacturer of storm doors and it has been in that business for nearly 30 years.  Complainant has used its EMCO and FOREVER trademarks in connection with metal and non-metal doors continuously since at least as early as 1977. 

In addition, Complainant owns and uses the Domain Name <www.emcodoors.com> to promote its products, as was evidenced by an Annex to the Complaint consisting of two pages from Complainant’s website.

            Respondent

            Respondent has not provided any information about itself.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Complainant

Complainant provided a copy of the WHOIS records to show that the disputed Domain Name is currently registered to Respondent, Domain’s Administration with a Post Office Box address in Hong Kong.  Before the Complaint was filed, as can be seen from an Annex to the Complaint, a visitor to the disputed Domain Name was taken to a website which was a portal to a variety of links to websites offering storm doors.  These links also included links to third party retailers such as Lowe’s and Home Depot which offer products in competition with those of the Complainant.  Complainant points out that its EMCO trademark appears in multiple places on the website, and that the site also contains references to its FOREVER trademark.

 

Complainant further contends as follows –

A.        The Domain Name Is Confusingly Similar to Complainant’s Trademark.

The disputed Domain Name is legally equivalent and confusingly similar to Complainant’s EMCO mark.  The fact that the disputed Domain Name adds the “.com” top level domain to Complainant’s trademark does not keep the Domain Name from being confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark.  A number of panels applying the Policy have held that the addition of a top level domain, such as “.us,” “.com,” “.net,” or “.org,” to a trademark does not sufficiently differentiate the resulting Domain Name from the trademark, and that such a Domain Name is still confusingly similar to the incorporated trademark and Complainant referred to the Decision in VAT Holding AG v. vat.com, D2000-0607 (WIPO Sept. 11, 2000).

 

Because the disputed Domain Name consists of Complainant’s entire EMCO trademark, the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark. 

 

B.        Respondent Has No Rights or Legitimate Interests in the Domain Name.

Respondent has no connection or affiliation with Complainant, and Complainant has not consented to Respondent’s use of the disputed Domain Name.  Further, neither Respondent nor its business are known by the EMCO mark.  Decisions applying the Policy have found that the fact that a Respondent is not known by a mark indicates that the Respondent has no rights in the mark and Complainant referred to the Decision in Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., D2000-0020 (WIPO Mar. 17, 2000).

 

Moreover, Respondent’s use of the Domain Name to advertise competing products is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate use under the Policy, and Complainant referred to the Decision in The American Heart Ass’n v. Whois Privacy Prot. Serv., FA 463122 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 31, 2005), which found that use of <americanheartassociation.com> to operate a search engine featuring health-related websites was not a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate use.

 

Consequently, Complainant asserts that Respondent has no legitimate rights or interest in the disputed Domain Name. 

 

C.        Respondent Has Registered and Is Using the Domain Name in Bad Faith.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors for determining bad faith.  These factors include whether the Domain Name has been used to attract users to the Respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark for the respondent’s commercial gain. 

 

Clearly, Respondent registered the Domain Name with the intent to divert users seeking information about Complainant’s goods to Respondent’s website.  Respondent has registered a Domain Name consisting solely of the Complainant’s entire mark. Respondent has registered the Domain Name with the expectation that users seeking information about the Complainant from Complainant’s website will not type the additional word “doors.”  Furthermore, the repeated use of Complainant’s EMCO and FOREVER trademarks throughout the site is a blatant attempt to mislead viewers to believe that the website is associated with Complainant.  It can also be inferred that Respondent is using the Domain Name to profit by advertising various competing door retailers on its websites and Complainant referred to the Decision in Wilson v. Whois Privacy Prot. Serv., FA 417186 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 29, 2005), which found that, “the Panel infers that Respondent receives click-through fees for diverting Internet users to various music related websites.”  Complainant also referred to Yahoo! Inc. v. Whois Privacy Prot. Serv., FA 412705 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 17, 2005), which found that, “the Panel infers that Respondent receives click-through fees in conjunction with its Internet search engine.” 

 

Finally, Respondent’s constructive knowledge of Complainant’s EMCO mark prior to registration of the Domain Name further supports an inference of bad faith on the part of the Respondent.  Complainant’s federal registration serves as constructive notice of its rights in the EMCO mark and Complainant referred to the Decisions in Pfizer, Inc. v. United Pharmacy, Ltd., D2001-0446 (WIPO June 25, 2001) and Expedia, Inc. v. European Travel Network, D2000-0137 (WIPO April 18, 2000). 

 

Consequently, Complainant asserts that the Respondent has registered the Domain Name in bad faith.

 

Respondent

Respondent’s Response was short and is reproduced below in full:

A.  Respondent's registration of the Domain Name predates the very creation of the Complainant's trademark.
1)  Complainant's word trademark (EMCO) registration date is January 16, 2001 and filing date is February 22, 2000.
2)  The Domain Name <emco.com> creation date was November 23, 1998.  See ODE-Optimum Digital Enters. v. Intership Ltd., D2001-0074 (WIPO May 1, 2001) ("We are of the unanimous view that the trademark must predate the Domain Name.").

B.  Trademark owner in Country A is unable to produce evidence that a Domain Name registrant in Country B would or should have known of the fame of the mark.
1)  Complainant and trademark owner is in USA and trademark mainly being used in USA.
2)  Respondent is in Hong Kong and has never heard of the trademark name EMCO before this case.  See Univ. of Md. Univ. Coll. v. NUCOM Domain Name Brokers, D2002-0081 (WIPO Apr. 29, 2002) ("The case is no different from the many WIPO cases where a trademark owner in Country A is unable to produce evidence from which a Panel can infer that a Domain Name registrant in Country B would or should have known of the fame of the mark.").

Based on the above two reasons, the Complainant cannot claim or prove that Respondent registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith.  Therefore the Respondent should have the right to retain registration and use of the disputed Domain Name, <emco.com>.

Additional Submission

In its Additional Submission, Complainant points out that neither of the two claims in Respondent’s response is accurate.

 

A.     Complainant’s Trademark Rights Substantially Predate the “Creation” of the Domain Name.

Complainant has used its EMCO and FOREVER trademarks in commerce within the United States in connection with storm doors since at least as early as 1977.  Complainant has therefore, under US law, established substantial common law rights in these trademarks long before the disputed Domain Name was registered in 1998.  Moreover the Policy does not require that the trademark be registered prior to the registration of a disputed Domain Name – and Complainant referred to a number of UDRP Decisions to this effect.

 

The ODE case relied upon by Respondent involved circumstances that were completely distinct from this case.  In that case the Domain Name was registered in 1997, while Complainant did not even begin to use its trademarks until 2000.  Other Panels have transferred Domain Names in cases where the Complainants trademark registrations were issued after the disputed Domain Name was registered, provided the Complainant had established rights in those marks that predated registration of the Domain Name, and Complainant cited AB Svenska Spel v. Zacharov, D2003-0527 (WIPO Oct. 2, 2003).  Thus, the fact that Complainant’s trademark registrations issued after the disputed Domain Name was registered has no bearing on whether Complainant “has rights” to the trademarks.  Complainant’s trademarks were in use in the USA for more than 20 years prior to the registration of the disputed Domain Name and, as a consequence, Complainant has acquired substantial enforceable rights in those marks long before Respondent registered the disputed Domain Name.

 

B.     Respondent’s Conduct Indicates That It had Knowledge of Complainant and Its

      Trademarks.

Respondent’s second claim is that no evidence was produced that it had knowledge of Complainant’s trademark, and it could not have such knowledge because it is located in Hong Kong.

 

In reply, Complainant contends, firstly, that the WHOIS record for the disputed domain name apparently contains an inaccurate address so “it is far from clear that Respondent is in fact located in Hong Kong.”

 

Secondly, prior to the filing of the Complaint, the website at the disputed Domain Name included numerous references to Complainant’s trademarks EMCO and FOREVER in connection with storm doors.  In an effort to conceal its bad faith, Respondent has directed the disputed Domain Name to the <google.com> site.  Furthermore, because the trademarks EMCO and FOREVER are distinctive of doors, it cannot be a coincidence that Respondent chose to display prominently these two trademarks along with content relating to storm doors and with links to retailers selling both Complainant’s products as well as those of its competitors.  Thus, this demonstrates that Respondent is familiar with Complainant’s trademarks and that its statement to the contrary is clearly false.

 

Thirdly, by registering a Domain Name which is identical to Complainant’s trademark EMCO, and by linking it to a website containing numerous references to that mark in connection with storm doors, (i.e. the very same products which Complainant sells under its marks EMCO and FOREVER), Respondent has acted in bad faith.

 

Fourthly, Respondent does not dispute that this name is identical to Complainant’s trademark EMCO.

 

In conclusion, Complainant asserts that Respondent has not set forth one legitimate reason for its registration and use of the disputed Domain Name.

 

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a Domain Name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(i)      the Domain Name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(ii)    the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and

(iii)   the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant has produced evidence of a registration in the United States for the trademark EMCO.  In the Complaint, Complainant only alleges confusing similarity between this mark and the disputed Domain Name, but this charge is upgraded to identicality in its Additional Submission.  In the opinion of the Panel, there is no doubt that Complainant’s mark is identical to the disputed Domain Name because, when making a comparison between a trademark and a domain name, it is customary in UDRP disputes to disregard a suffix such as “.com.”

 

Respondent has alleged that its rights predate those of Complainant’s and implies that therefore the Complaint must fail.  On the face of it this claim is correct as the disputed Domain Name was registered on November 23, 1998, and registration of the trademark EMCO occurred just over 2 years later, on January 16, 2001.  However the US trademark system, unlike those in almost the whole of the rest of the world, is based on use and no trademark can be registered in the United States unless it has been used.  As can be seen from the copy of the registration certificate filed by Complainant, the EMCO trademark claimed use since 1977 so, if the mark has been in continuous use since then, then Complainant could have acquired substantial common law rights in the EMCO name.  Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy only requires that a Complainant should have “rights” in a trademark or service mark and it is by now well established that these can be common law rights.

 

The “WIPO Overview of Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions” published in 2005 (“the WIPO Overview”) states that the consensus view among Panelists is that in order to rely on common-law or unregistered trademark rights a Complainant “must show that the name has become a distinctive identifier associated with the complainant or its goods and services.”  In this case, Complainant has only filed copies of extracts from its website and no specific evidence showing actual use of the name and trademark EMCO.  However the Panel has visited Complainant’s website and confirmed therefrom that Complainant has clearly been in business for many years using the EMCO name to sell its storm doors.  Also, the trademark registrations of these names both claim use since 1977 and, as the US Patent & Trademark Office insists on seeing proof before accepting a claim for prior use, Complainant must have filed such proof dating back to 1977.[1]  Consequently, the Panel is prepared to accept that Complainant has long-established rights in the EMCO name that substantially pre-date the registration of the disputed Domain Name.

 

Thus, the Panel concludes that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) is proved.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

It is well established that once a Complainant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to a Respondent to establish that he does have rights or legitimate interests in a disputed Domain Name.

 

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy sets out 3 circumstances which could demonstrate that a Respondent has rights or a legitimate interest in a disputed Domain Name, although these are not exclusive.

 

In this case, Complainant has made out a strong prima facie case, and in reply Respondent alleges only that he had never heard of Complainant’s trademark before registering his Domain Name, pointing out that he is located in Hong Kong while Complainant is in the United States.  Complainant contends that there is some doubt about Respondent’s claim to reside in Hong Kong, but adduces no evidence for this assertion.  The Panel can find no fault with Respondent’s address on the WHOIS record, which is the same as in the Complaint.  Furthermore the NAF has not supplied the Panel with any evidence that any of its communications to Respondent were returned marked “not known.”  Also, a Response was filed so clearly Respondent did receive all the papers which Complainant claims to have sent in accordance with ICANN Rule # 2(b).  The Panel concludes therefore that the Respondent’s claim to be in Hong Kong is correct.

 

Respondent’s claim that geography prevented it from knowing of Complainant’s name and trademark conflicts with Complainant’s contention that Respondent had constructive knowledge of its EMCO trademark simply because it was registered.  On this latter point, the WIPO Overview states: “Most panels have declined to introduce the concept of constructive notice into the UDRP” unless (in a few cases) the parties were located in the same country.  The Panel in this case is firmly on the side of the majority in this and so rejects Complainant’s argument on this point.  Nevertheless there is much more to be said for Complainant’s other contention regarding the remarkable “coincidence” that even though Complainant is based in Iowa and Respondent in Hong Kong, and so are separated by a distance of some 12,300 Kilometers, Respondent is using a name which is identical to Complainant’s and which links to a website that contains frequent references to Complainant’s products.  It is inconceivable therefore that he hit upon the name EMCO by chance, and in the view of the Panel there is absolutely no justification for his claim to have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name.  As evidenced by one of the attachments to the Complaint, the website at the disputed Domain Name at the time of the Complaint contained five references to Complainant’s trademark EMCO and four references to its trademark FOREVER.  Also, the website is wholly devoted to doors, especially storm doors.  These are, if not Complainant’s only product, certainly their principle product.  There is no indication that these references were placed there as part of some automatic computer programme and not deliberately by Respondent, so Respondent’s claim never to have heard of Complainant has no basis in fact.  As the Panel can confirm, the disputed Domain Name now diverts all visitors to the <google.com> website.

 

Respondent’s use of the disputed Domain Name to redirect Internet users interested in Complainant’s products and services to Respondent’s website is not a use in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.   See Disney Enters., Inc. v. Dot Stop, FA 145227 (Nat. Arb. Forum March 17, 2003)  (finding that the respondent’s diversionary use of the complainant’s mark to attract Internet users to its own website, which contained a series of hyperlinks to unrelated websites, was neither a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed Domain Names); see also Computer Doctor Franchise Sys., Inc. v. The Computer Doctor, FA 95396 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 8, 2000) (which found that the respondent’s website, which was blank but for links to other websites, was not a legitimate use of the Domain Names).

 

Therefore the Panel concludes that the Domain Name was registered, and is used, by Respondent with the purpose of misdirecting Internet users seeking information either about storm doors or about Complainant and so earning revenue from click-through fees.   See Yahoo Inc. v. Whois Privacy Prot. Serv., Inc., FA 412705 (Nat. Arb. Forum March 17, 2005) (which found that use was not legitimate where Respondent received click-through fees to advertise services that competed with those of Complainant).

 

It is clear to the Panel that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name and he finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) is proved.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out 4 circumstances which could demonstrate that a Respondent has registered a disputed Domain Name in bad faith.

 

In the opinion of the Panel, at least 2 of them are obviously present in this case, namely:

 

1.      The disputed Domain Name was registered with the prime intention of disrupting Complainant’s business.

How else can one view a situation in which, as mentioned above, Respondent has registered and is using a name which is identical to Complainant’s mark and which links to a website that contains frequent references to Complainant’s products.  This is in clear breach of the Policy.  For example, the Decision in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Celebrex Drugstore, FA 123933 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 21, 2002), found that the respondent registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith because the respondent was using the confusingly similar Domain Name to attract Internet users to its commercial website.  See Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA 95312 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 29, 2002) (which found bad faith where the Domain Name in question was obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks, thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain); see also eBay, Inc v. Progressive Life Awareness Network, D2001-0068 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 16, 2001) (which found bad faith where the respondent was taking advantage of the recognition that eBay has created for its mark and therefore profiting by diverting users seeking the eBay website to the respondent’s site).

 

2.      The disputed Domain Name has been used intentionally to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the website at it by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark.

The Panel entirely agrees with Complainant when it said that Respondent has registered the Domain Name with the expectation that some users seeking information about the Complainant from Complainant’s website might fail to type the additional word “doors,” and that the repeated use of Complainant’s EMCO and FOREVER trademarks throughout the site is a blatant attempt to mislead viewers into believing that the website is associated with Complainant.  See Southern Exposure v. Southern Exposure, Inc., FA 94864 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2000) (which found that the respondent acted in bad faith by attracting Internet users to a website that competed with the complainant’s business); see also Puckett v. Miller, D2000-0297 (WIPO June 13, 2000) (which found that the respondent diverted business from the complainant to a competitor’s website in violation of paragraph 4(b)(iii) of the Policy).

 

            Consequently, the Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) is also proved.         

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <emco.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

 

David H Tatham, Panelist
Dated: February 20, 2006

 

 

 

 

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[1] In fact, the history of Complainant on its website states that the name EMCO was adopted as early as “the 1950s”.