National Alliance for the Mentally Ill Contra Costa v. Mary Rae Fouts

Claim Number: FA0310000204074



Complainant is National Alliance for the Mentally Ill Contra Costa (“Complainant”) represented by Robert B. Hodil of Morrison & Foerster LLP, 101 Ygnacio Valley Road, Suite 450, Walnut Creek, CA, 94596-8130. Respondent is Mary Rae Fouts, 1547 Palos Verdes Mall #407, Walnut Creek, CA 94597 (“Respondent”).



The domain name at issue is <> registered with



The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.


Richard Hill as Panelist.



Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”) electronically on October 21, 2003; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on October 22, 2003.


On October 22, 2003, confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <> is registered with and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. has verified that Respondent is bound by the registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).


On October 29, 2003, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of November 18, 2003 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to by e-mail.


A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on November 12, 2003.


Complainant submitted a timely and complete Additional Submission on November 17, 2003.


On November 21, 2003, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Richard Hill as Panelist.



Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.



A. Complainant

Complainant contends that it has been using the “NAMI Contra Costa” name to identify itself in the community since at least as early as January 1997, and that it therefore has rights under the Policy.


Complainant maintains a website at <>.


It alleges that Respondent registered and used the contested domain name in bad faith in order to publish false and misleading information about a mental health facility (the Crestwood Facility) in an effort to defeat the facility’s attempts to open a site in Pleasant Hill.  Complainant supports the opening of the Pleasant Hill site (including through its website <>) and thus, it says, Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name were undertaken in order to mislead Internet users into the belief that Complainant was affiliated with or endorsed the opinions expressed on Respondent’s <> website, to which the disputed domain name was redirected.


Complainant alleges that Respondent has no legitimate rights in the contested domain name.


B. Respondent

Respondent contends that Complainant does not have a trademark for the string “namicontracosta”. 


She further alleges that all the information that she published on her website <> (the site to which the disputed domain name was redirected for a certain period) was accurate.


Respondent alleges that she registered the contested domain name so that she could provide social commentary, related information, and public awareness of what “n-a-m-i” meant to her.  There are many meanings, she says, for “n-a-m-i”.  For example she states, <> is a Japanese lifestyle and travel website.  She adds that “n-a-m-i” also refers to Russian automobiles, and her site at the disputed domain name currently includes references to SUVs and auto-packed roadways in order, she says, to encourage people to think about our reliance on the auto in traffic-jammed Contra Costa County.


Regarding previous use of the contested domain name, which was redirected to Respondent’s <> site, Respondent alleges that when she purchased the contested domain name, she did not immediately implement her plans for the site concerning the use of “n-a-m-i”, because of other commitments on her time. 


During this period, she says, she preferred that the disputed domain name not lie fallow.  Until she had time to implement the planned website for “n-a-m-i”, she could use the disputed domain name as a community service tool to promote increased public awareness regarding a very public and political community issue, by redirecting the disputed domain name to Respondent’s <> site, the site containing criticism of the planned opening of the Crestwood mental health facility.


Respondent contends that she had no intent to misleadingly divert persons seeking not-for-profit services and denies that her use of the contested domain name was potentially confusing.  Furthermore, she states, Complainant does not provide any evidence of actual confusion.


Furthermore, Respondent states:


“Complaint provides no evidence to support its erroneous allegation that my activities were undertaken in bad faith to mislead Internet users into believing Complainant was affiliated with or endorsed the opinions on  As stated in Complaint’s Exhibit E (see Contact Information for, the website clearly and succinctly provided ownership information to all Internet users:  ‘This site is owned and maintained by…Mary Rae Fouts [Respondent]… Unless attributed to someone else, opinions expressed on this website are those of…’  Placing a disclaimer on that the views were not those of the Complainant was not only unnecessary, it was never requested by Complainant.”


Respondent takes issue with various communications sent by Complainant’s counsel, in particular Complainant’s counsel’s letter of July 9, 2003, about which she states:


“In MoFo’s [Morrison & Foerster, Complainant’s counsel] July 9, 2003 letter, Exhibit 20, Complainant reached a new level of absurdity.  Complainant now wished to ‘avoid’ transfer of, and demanded that I provide my user name and password or face legal action and attempted legal cost recovery.  My compliance was literally impossible, as it would give Complainant access to my personal and business e-mail, websites, and credit cards.  Furthermore, as the continued owner of, I would have remained liable for Complainant’s actions.”


Respondent requests that the Panel find that Complainant has engaged in Reverse Domain Name Highjacking (UDRP Rule 1).


C. Additional Submissions

Complainsnt contends that it has a registered trademark for NAMI and common law trademark right for “NAMI Contra Costa”.  It contends that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its registered and common law marks.


It contends that Respondent’s stated reason for registering the disputed domain name (namely, to provide generic information on “n-a-m-i”) is not supported by the evidence.


It states:

“… Respondent’s right to voice opinions contrary to those of NAMI Contra Costa did not create a legitimate ‘fair use’ for her to misleadingly use the domain name, which is confusingly similar to NAMI Contra Costa’s domain name, as a platform for those opinions.”



Complainant has a registered trademark “NAMI” and, at least since 1997, a common law trademark “NAMI Contra Costa”.


The parties are engaged since early 2003 in a bitter public dispute concerning the planned opening of a mental health facility (the Crestwood facility).


In the context of this dispute, Respondent created in February 2003 a site <> containing criticism of the planned opening of the Crestwood facility.  This site was operational and regularly updated through August 2003.


The <> site is clearly identified as Respondent’s personal site and a disclaimer clearly states that the opinions published on the site are those of Respondent.  It is also clearly identified as a site criticizing the planned Crestwood facility and users could not consider that the site is associated with Complainant.


Respondent registered the disputed domain name on April 1, 2003.


From April to June 2003, the disputed domain name was redirected to the <> site.


On June 11, 2003, counsel for Complainant wrote to Respondent to request that Respondent immediately abandon any and all use of the disputed domain name and any other misleading use of the NAMI or NAMI Contra Costa names or marks.  Counsel also requested that Respondent assign all rights in the disputed domain name to Complainant.  As counsel’s letter made clear, however, Complainant did not wish to interfere with Respondent’s right to voice her opinions regarding the proposed Crestwood facility.  Rather, Complainant wanted only to be sure that Internet visitors were not confused by Respondent’s misleading use of the <> domain name. 


From June 2003 on, the website at the disputed domain name has contained content regarding a Soviet-made automobile, the NAMI-1.



Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”


Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:


(1)    the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2)    the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)    the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.


Identical and/or Confusingly Similar


Complainant has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proving that it has at least common law trademark rights in a name that is confusingly similar to the disputed domain name.


Accordingly, this Panel holds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to a mark in which Complainant has rights.


Rights or Legitimate Interests


The question of whether or not Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name is inextricably linked to the question of whether she registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.


As Respondent correctly points out, the registration and redirection of a domain name to an information site is clearly a bona fide business activity in the sense of paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy, absent an intent to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.


An intent to mislead or to tarnish would be, in the opinion of this Panel, an act of bad faith under the Policy.


Complainant alleges that the information provided by Respondent is false and misleading, which might indicate an intent to tarnish.  But Respondent alleges that the information is correct.  These proceedings, conducted under the UDRP, are not the appropriate forum in which to argue complex question of fact, which facts might or might not constitute violations of national laws.  National courts are the appropriate forums in which to argue such violations.  Therefore, this Panel will make no attempt to evaluate the accuracy, or not, of the information posted on the web by Respondent.


Thus the only question that this Panel must address is whether there are circumstances that indicate that, in this particular case, Respondent registered and used the domain name with an intent to misleadingly divert Internet users, in which case Respondent’s use could not be considered bona fide or legitimate under the Policy.


There can be no doubt that Respondent has the right to create a website containing criticism of Complainant.  Indeed, Complainant recognizes this.  However, according to Complainant, Respondent does not have the right to use Complainant’s mark for the domain name of the criticism site, because, says Complainant, that misleads Internet users and could result in confusion.


The question of whether or not criticism sites violate the Policy is a controversial issue, with Panels taking opposite views on the matter.


Decisions transferring the domain names of criticism sites include Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires v. Greenpeace Int’l, <> D2001-0376 (WIPO May 14, 2001) (Respondent’s showing that it “has a right to free speech and a legitimate interest in criticizing the activities of organizations like the Complainant ... is a very different thing from having a right or legitimate interest in respect of [a domain name that is identical to Complainant’s mark]”, especially given that the mark was famous); and Monty & Pat Roberts, Inc. v. Keith, <> D2000-0299 (WIPO June 9, 2000) (“[T]he Panel does not dispute Respondent’s right to establish and maintain a website critical of (the Complainant) . . . . However, the panel does not consider that this gives Respondent the right to identify itself as Complainant”, especially given that the mark was famous); and Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., <> D2000-0020 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding bad faith where Respondent knowingly chose a domain name, identical to Complainant’s mark, to voice its concerns, opinions, and criticism about Complainant).


Decisions denying the transfer of the domain names of criticism sites include Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, <> D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000) (finding that Respondent has free speech rights in the domain name <> where Respondent linked the domain name to a “complaint” website about Complainant’s products and stating that as a general proposition: “the same facts establishing fair use and the exercise of free speech negate a finding of bad faith intent” (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v., 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535-536 (E.D. Va. 2000)); Legal & Gen. Group Plc v. Image Plus, D2002-1019 <> (WIPO Dec. 30, 2002) (finding that initial interest confusion is displaced by the criticism content at Respondent's website, that such a "low level of confusion is a price worth paying to preserve the free exchange of ideas via the Internet, and that “the goals of the Policy are limited and do not extend to insulating trademark holders from contrary and critical views when such views are legitimately expressed without an intention for commercial gain”); and Britannia Building Society v. Britannia Fraud Prevention, <> D2001-0504 (WIPO July 6, 2001).


This Panel takes the view that the goals of the Policy are limited.  Domain name registrations are basically first-come-first-served, and the purpose of the Policy is limited to rectifying cases of obvious cyber-squatting.


The closest equivalent to a legislative history for the Policy can be found in the 30 April 1999 Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, which formed the basis for the ICANN Policy (available online at: ).  This report states at paragraph 135:


In view of the weight of opinion against mandatory submission to an administrative procedure in respect of any intellectual property dispute arising out of a domain name registration, the final recommendations of the WIPO Process contain two major changes in respect of the suggested administrative dispute‑resolution procedure:


(i)            First, the scope of the procedure is limited so that it is available only in respect of deliberate, bad faith, abusive, domain name registrations or “cybersquatting” and is not applicable to disputes between parties with competing rights acting in good faith.


(ii)            Secondly, the notion of an abusive domain name registration is defined solely by reference to violations of trademark rights and not by reference to violations of other intellectual property rights, such as personality rights.


And the WIPO Report states at 153:


… The scope of the procedure would be limited to cases of abusive registrations (or cybersquatting), as defined below, and would not be available for disputes between parties with competing rights acting in good faith.


And at 166:


The first limitation would confine the availability of the procedure to cases of deliberate, bad faith abusive registrations. 


And at 172:


… Domain name registrations that are justified by legitimate free speech rights or by legitimate non‑commercial considerations would likewise not be considered to be abusive.


This Panel agrees with the case law cited by the Panel in Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, <> D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000), but mutatis mutanda, in the sense that Complainant in the present case would not be expected to have a domain name under “.com” (see discussion on that point at the end of this section):


The "fair use doctrine applies in cyberspace as it does in the real world." See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999). In Brookfield, a trademark infringement case, the court found that the domain name in question, which was used for a commercial website, infringed on the plaintiff’s trademark, after an extensive factual analysis of several factors on the issue of likelihood of confusion, including in particular the relatedness of the products and services offered. The Brookfield court cited a number of cases for the proposition that fair use could include the use of a trademark to identify the trademark holder’s products in certain circumstances, but rejected the defendant’s fair use defense, noting that the trademark was being used in the domain name to describe the domain name holder’s products and not simply to identify the trademarked products. The court also noted that the domain name utilized the <.com> top level domain, "signifying the commercial nature of the site", and pointed out that "web users often assume, as a rule of thumb, that the domain name of a particular company will be the company name followed by ‘.com’". Id. at 1044-1045.


In this case, the Respondent is not using the website for commercial purposes and has not appropriated the <.com> domain, which the Complainants have themselves registered and are using for a commercial website. This case is more closely analogous to the facts in Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998), one of the cases cited approvingly by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brookfield on the fair use issue. In Bally, the court held that the defendant’s use of a trademark in an Internet site for purposes of consumer commentary and criticism did not infringe or dilute the plaintiff’s mark. The court held that the defendant was "exercising his right to publish critical commentary about Bally" and that he could not do so without making reference to Bally:


Faber is using Bally’s mark in the context of a consumer commentary to say that Bally engages in business practices, which Faber finds distasteful or unsatisfactory. This is speech protected by the First Amendment...As such; [sic] Faber can use Bally’s mark to identify the source of the goods or services of which he is complaining. This use is necessary to maintain broad opportunities for expression. Id. at 1165, 1167.


The court in Bally thus recognized both fair use and free speech as defenses to trademark infringement and dilution in the Internet context. In Bally, the defendant was not using the trademark in the domain name itself, however, but on the website, which prominently stated, inter alia, "Bally sucks." The Bally court distinguished cybersquatting cases like Panavision International v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) on the grounds that the use of the trademark in domain names in those cases created a high likelihood of consumer confusion, i.e., that reasonably prudent consumers would believe that the site using the appropriated name was the trademark owner’s site. However, the court pointed out that "no reasonably prudent Internet user would believe that "" is the official Bally site or is sponsored by Bally." Bally at 1163-1164.


The Panel sees no reason to require domain name registrants to utilize circumlocutions like <> to designate a website for criticism or consumer commentary. "We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach." Brookfield, supra, 174 F.3d at 1054. In the cybersquatting cases, the domain names in question generally were <> domain names, which prevented the trademark holder from utilizing the customary commercial domain name for its "official" site. See, e.g., Panavision International v. Toeppen, supra. Here, however, the domain name registrant has not usurped the <.com> domain but has utilized only the <.net> domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage, and has included criticism and commentary on the site so that a reasonably prudent Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark holder’s "official" site. See Western Hay Company v. Carl Forester, ICANN Case No. FA0001000093466 (Internet user who arrived at respondent’s "discussion forum" website would not be confused).


The Panel is aware of the line of trademark infringement cases holding that <> domain names may be protected as free speech because of their "communicative content" while <> domain names serve merely as "source identifiers" and are thus unprotected. See, e.g., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), cited by Complainants. The Panel declines, however, to adopt that distinction for purposes of analysis of the Policy’s requirements and notes that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recently expressly rejected this distinction because "the nature of the domain names is not susceptible to such a uniform, monolithic characterization," in view of the "lightning speed development" and "extraordinary plasticity" of both the Internet and the domain name system. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions Inc. 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir. 2000). With respect to free speech, the Second Circuit held in Name.Space that "Domain names ... per se are neither automatically entitled to nor excluded from the protections of the First Amendment, and the appropriate inquiry is one that fully addresses particular circumstances presented with respect to each domain name." Id. In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999), a trademark dilution case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the use of a <> domain name rather than a <> domain name raised genuine issues of material fact on virtually every element of the dilution claim, including whether such use constituted "commercial use". 189 F.3d at 879-880. The Court noted that "<.net> applies to networks and <.com> applies to commercial entities," and that "a fact-finder could infer that dilution does not occur with a <> registration." Id. at 880-881. Such fact-intensive analyses on issues of trademark infringement and dilution are beyond the scope of this administrative proceeding and are better carried out by arbitrators or courts.


As noted above, the disputed domain name was redirected to a criticism site, but the site was clearly identified as criticizing the planned Crestwood facility and users would not be confused into believing that the site was associated with Complainant.


This Panel also agrees with Britannia Building Society v. Britannia Fraud Prevention, <> D2001-0504 (WIPO July 6, 2001):


Complainant has failed to prove that Respondent lacks a legitimate interest in the Domain Name. In particular, it has failed to prove that Respondent is not entitled to the protections of paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy, which provides that a Respondent has a legitimate interest if it is


"making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue".


The Panel concludes that Respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial use of the domain name because Respondent maintains its website as a site critical of the policies of the management of Britannia Building Society. See Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc., and Bridgestone Corporation v. Jack Myers, Case No. D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000); Compusa Management Co. v. Customized Computer Training, Case No. FA0006000095082 (NAF Aug. 17, 2000). Although Complainant does allege that Respondent has registered and used the Domain Name misleadingly to divert customers to its highly critical site, with the probable intent of tarnishing the mark at issue, such allegations fail to undermine the legitimacy of Respondent’s use.


The Respondent’s actions cannot be characterized as consistent with an "intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers." That phrase refers to the kind of confusion that arises in a trademark infringement context, when a competitor diverts consumers to its site and, potentially, diverts sales. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. G.A.B. Enterprises, Case No. D2000-0416 (WIPO June 29, 2000); Houghton Mifflin Company v. The Weathermen, Inc., Case No. D2001-0211 (WIPO Apr. 17, 2001). Here, there is no diversion "for commercial gain" and thus no loss of legitimacy. That some internet users might initially be confused into thinking that, because of the use of the mark in the Domain Name, <> is Complainant’s official web site is of no moment. First, any such confusion would immediately be dispelled by Respondent’s prominent disclaimer and the link that is displayed to Complainant’s official site. Second, and in any event, such a low level of confusion is a price worth paying to preserve the free exchange of ideas via the internet. A user who misleadingly stumbles upon Respondent’s site while looking for Complainant’s official site need only click the "back" button to return to her search, or the link helpfully provided by Respondent.


In the present case, Respondent’s criticism site clearly states that the views are Respondent’s own personal views, so a user would not be confused into thinking that he or she had accessed information provided by Complainant.  Complainant is promoting the Crestwood facility and its name is associated with information regarding the facility.  Thus, Respondent has, prima facie, a legitimate interest in using a variation of Complainant’s name in order to publicize her own views concerning the Crestwood facility.


However, Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name would not be legitimate (and would be in bad faith) if, as Complainant alleges, she registered and used the site deliberately to mislead or to confuse Internet users.


Complainant has not presented any evidence to show that users were indeed mislead or confused.  Nor has Complainant presented convincing evidence that Respondent acted with an intent to mislead or to confuse.


Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that Internet users would tend to look for information on Complainant within the top level domain “.com”.  Complainant is a non-profit organization.  The types of organizations that should be registered in the several top-level domain names are defined in IETF RFC 1591, clause 2 of which states:


“COM - This domain is intended for commercial entities, that is companies. … ”


Thus, Complainant could be expected to have registered a domain name in a domain other than “.com”, which is in fact the case, since Complainant’s website is in the top level domain “.org”.


The Panel finds that Complainant has failed to satisfy its burden of proving that Respondent registered and used the site deliberately to mislead or to confuse Internet users.


Complainant has not alleged, much less provided evidence to prove, that Respondent committed some other act of bad faith when she registered and used the contested domain name.


As noted above, the provision of information regarding a matter in which Complainant is active is a legitimate use of the contested domain name, absent other factors that would make the use illegitimate.


As a consequence, this Panel holds that Respondent does have legitimate interests in the contested domain name.


Registration and Use in Bad Faith


For the reasons stated above, this Panel finds that Complainant has not satisfied its burden of proving that Respondent acted in bad faith.


Furthermore, the condition of 4(a)(iii) of the Policy is “that the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”  Respondent’s current use of the disputed domain name is clearly permissible, since the disputed domain name now merely points to a website containing information on the Russian automobile called NAMI.  Such use is clearly not in bad faith.  On this count also, the Complaint fails.


Reverse Domain Name Highjacking


Paragraph 1 of the Rules defines Reverse Domain Name Hijacking:


Reverse Domain Name Hijacking means using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a domain name.


Respondent invokes this provision when it requests the Panel to find that Complainant is using the Policy in a bad faith attempt to deprive a registered domain name holder of a domain name.


The general conditions for a finding of bad faith on the part of Complainant are well stated in Smart Design LLC v. Carolyn Hughes, <> D2000-0993 (WIPO, Oct. 18, 2000):


Clearly, the launching of an unjustifiable Complaint with malice aforethought qualifies, as would the pursuit of a Complaint after the Complainant knew it to be insupportable.


These conditions are confirmed in Goldline International, Inc. v. Gold Line, <> D2000-1151 (WIPO, Jan. 4, 2001) and Sydney Opera House Trust v. Trilynx Pty. Limited, <> D2000-1224 (WIPO, Oct. 31, 2000) (where the condition is stated as “the respondent must show knowledge on the part of the complainant of the respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name and evidence of harassment or similar conduct by the complainant in the face of such knowledge”), which in turn cites Plan Express Inc. v. Plan Express, <> D2000-0565 (WIPO, July 17, 2000).


There is nothing in the record to indicate malice on the part of Complainant and nothing to indicate that Complainant knew that its case was insupportable.


Respondent’s request is ill founded.  As noted above, Panels have consistently been split on the question of whether or not criticism sites violate the Policy.  Respondent’s response shows great familiarity with the Policy and the case law under the Policy.  Indeed, Respondent goes so far as to cite the travaux preparatoires, which is not commonly done by the parties.


Given her deep knowledge of the UDRP, Respondent should have known that many Panels take a view on criticism sites that is the opposite of the view taken by this Panel in the present case and that, therefore, the Complaint could well have succeed if it had been evaluated by a different Panel.


Thus, Respondent should have known that her claim of Reverse Domain Name Highjacking is unfounded to the point of being frivolous.



Having considered all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.  The Complaint is DISMISSED.


Respondent’s request for a finding of Reverse Domain Name Highjacking is DENIED.




Richard Hill, Panelist
Dated: December 6, 2003







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