Mohawk Canoe Club v. Universal Computing
Services c/o George Fluck
Claim Number: FA0405000267477
PARTIES
Complainant
is Mohawk Canoe Club (“Complainant”),
represented by Thomas N. Kashickey of Fox and Fox LLP, 70
South Orange Avenue, Livingston, NJ 07039.
Respondent is Universal Computing
Services c/o George Fluck (“Respondent”), 229 Sharon Road, Robbinsville, NJ
08691.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <mohawkcc.com>,
registered with Network Solutions, Inc.
PANEL
The
undersigned certifies that she has acted independently and impartially and that
to the best of her knowledge she has no known conflict in serving as Panelist
in this proceeding. Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson sits as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”)
electronically April 30, 2004; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint May
3, 2004.
On
May 4, 2004, Network Solutions, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the
domain name <mohawkcc.com> is
registered with Network Solutions, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current
registrant of the name. Network
Solutions, Inc. verified that Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions,
Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name
disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On
May 6, 2004, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of May 26,
2004, by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@mohawkcc.com by e-mail.
The
Forum received a timely Response, determined to be complete, on May 26, 2004.
Complainant
filed an additional Response but, because it was deficient and did not comply
with Forum Rule 7, it was not considered.
On June 1, 2004, pursuant to Complainant’s request to
have the dispute decided by a single-member
Panel, the Forum appointed Hon. Carolyn
Marks Johnson as Panelist.
This
dispute involves a Governing member of a club who registered a domain name in
the name of the Complainant club but claims that the owner was his own
business, the Respondent here. The
Panel is persuaded that the presentation here by Complainant’s attorney represents
the remaining members of the Club, whose mark was expropriated by Respondent
for use in the disputed domain name. To
avoid a claim that this dispute is outside the scope of the UDRP, as has been
held in some cases, the Panel finds, after reviewing the parties submissions,
that no bar prevents a determination here because this is an “abusive
registration” that ICANN seeks to prevent as that term has been used in the
cases. See Thread.com, LLC v. Poploff, D2000-1470 (WIPO Jan. 5, 2001)
(refusing to transfer the domain name and stating that the ICANN Policy does
not apply because attempting “to shoehorn what is essentially a business
dispute between former partners into a proceeding to adjudicate cybersquatting
is, at its core, misguided, if not a misuse of the Policy”); see also Commercial
Publ’g Co. v. EarthComm., Inc.
FA 95013 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 20, 2000) (stating that the Policy’s
administrative procedure is “intended only for the relatively narrow class of
cases of ‘abusive registrations.’”
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant makes the following
allegations in this proceeding:
1.
The domain
name Respondent registered, <mohawkcc.com>, is identical to Complainant’s MOHAWK CANOE
CLUB and MOHAWK CC marks.
2. Respondent
registered the disputed name while its agent, George Fluck was a member of the
club, but he was authorized to do so only on behalf of the club and acquired no
rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name.
3. Respondent registered
and used the domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent makes the following points in
response:
1. Respondent’s agent George Fluck is a
shareholder in the Mohawk Canoe Club and Respondent’s agent Fluck owns
Universal Computing Services, Inc. with a partner, now deceased.
2. Respondent concedes that Universal
Computing Services developed “new logo items designed for the
Mohawk Canoe Club” (Emphasis added.) and sold the “logo items to the Mohawk
Canoe Club at cost.” Respondent
maintains that Mohawk Canoe Club did not pay for the website services and that
the domain name was owned by Universal Computing Services.
3. Respondent does not address its rights to
or legitimate interests that permitted it to use the club’s name for its own
purposes.
4. Respondent does not address the club’s
allegations of bad faith except to contend that permission at the time of
registration negates bad faith.
C. Complainant filed an additional
Submission that did not comply with the rules and was not considered.
FINDINGS
Complainant established that it has rights in marks
used in an identical and a confusingly similar domain name by Respondent; that
Respondent has no such rights; and that Respondent acted in bad faith.
Complainant is a non-profit corporation that
promotes the benefits of canoeing and other paddle sports. Founded in 1903, it has some 240 members in
three states, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York.
The Club owns proprietary information, property,
logos, designs, newsletters, schedules, and application forms.
The Respondent urged that its representative, George
Fluck, attended a meeting of the Club in October 1999 as an invited guest of
Complainant’s members. Fluck became a
Governing member and recommended a website to the Club. The Club says it paid costs of registering
the domain name and evidence shows the Club later offered to pay on-going
expenses. Fluck, acting as Respondent
Universal Computing Services, registered a domain name, www.go.to/Mohawk and then later changed it
to <mohawkcc.com>.
Complainant concedes that Club minutes note the
benefits the Club received from the website.
By July 2000, the club sold goods at the website.
The Club relates that Fluck separated from the Club
in 2001 when he failed to become Vice-Commodore, a Club post he ran for
unsuccessfully. The Club urges that
only after Fluck’s departure did the Club learn that Fluck had identified the
website as “Property of G. Fluck.”
Although the Club attempted to pay expenses for the website, Fluck urges
that he had paid them.
By letter, after formal vote April 22, 2003, the
Club relates that it requested Fluck to relinquish the website. The club sent a cease and desist letter to
Fluck October 31, 2003, directing Respondent to stop operating under the Club’s
name at the website, but Respondent openly continued to use the website as
though it had always been its private property.
Fluck, one assumes on behalf of Respondent, sets out
a lengthy history of himself and his wife and their activities in canoeing.
Fluck notes that he founded Respondent Universal Computing Services, Inc. with
a partner, now deceased; and he contends that the Club allowed him to develop a
website for the Club, using Universal Computing Services, Inc., which designed
and sold certain logo items to the Club at cost. Fluck enlarges upon his broad experience as a canoeing enthusiast
and the numerous memberships and organizations in which he is active; but Fluck
does not address the taking of the Club’s name under his own business
name. Fluck insists that the Club, via
its official corporate papers, has not requested that he hand over the domain
name, statements that are contrary to portions of the letters that attorneys
for the Club sent to Fluck.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three
elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or
transferred:
(1)
the domain
name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3)
the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant established with extrinsic proof in this
proceeding that it has common law rights in the MOHAWK CANOE CLUB and MOHAWK CC
marks. Complainant is a non-profit
corporation that promotes canoeing and other paddle sports among some 240
members. The Club was founded in 1903
and is active in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York. The Club has enjoyed long and continued use
of the marks and showed that others identify with the Club sufficiently to
extablish that Complainant has rights in the marks under the common law. See Fishtech v. Rossiter, FA 92976 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 10,
2000) (finding that Complainant has common law rights in the mark FISHTECH
which it has used since 1982); see
also Keppel TatLee Bank v.
Taylor, D2001-0168 (WIPO Mar. 28, 2001) (“[O]n account of long and
substantial use of the said name [<keppelbank.com>] in connection with
its banking business, it has acquired rights under the common law”); see generally McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition, § 25:74.2 (4th ed. 2002) (The ICANN dispute
resolution policy is “broad in scope” in that “the reference to a trademark or
service mark ‘in which the complainant has rights’ means that ownership of a
registered mark is not required–unregistered or common law trademark or service
mark rights will suffice” to support a domain name Complaint under the Policy).
The
domain name that Respondent registered, <mohawkcc.com>, is
confusingly similar to Complainant’s MOHAWK CANOE CLUB mark and is identical to
Complainant’s MOHAWK CC mark, because the domain name fully incorporates the
MOHAWK CC mark and deviates from the MOHAWK CANOE CLUB mark only by
abbreviating the terms “canoe club.” See
Microsoft Corp. v. Montrose Corp., D2000-1568 (WIPO Jan. 25, 2001) (finding
the domain name <ms-office-2000.com> to be confusingly similar even
though the mark MICROSOFT is abbreviated); see also Minn. State Lottery v. Mendes, FA 96701 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 2,
2001) (finding that the <mnlottery.com> domain name is confusingly similar
to Complainant’s MINNESOTA STATE LOTTERY registered mark).
The
addition of the generic top-level domain “.com” is irrelevant in determining
whether the <mohawkcc.com> domain name is confusingly similar to
Complainant’s mark. See Pomellato S.p.A v. Tonetti, D2000-0493
(WIPO July 7, 2000) (finding <pomellato.com> identical to Complainant’s
mark because the generic top-level domain (gTLD) “.com” after the name
POMELLATO is not relevant); see also Victoria's
Secret v. Hardin, FA 96694 (Nat Arb. Forum Mar. 31, 2001) (finding the
<bodybyvictoria.com> domain name is identical to Complainant’s BODY BY
VICTORIA mark).
The
Panel cannot determine the exact extent of fame associated with Complainant’s
mark; however, Respondent certainly knew about the Club and its expectation of
rights to exclusively use its marks before it registered a domain name using
Complainant’s marks. Complainant’s showing satisfies the Panel that Complainant
has done business using the name in question some 97 years before Respondent joined
the group as a member and that for 97 years a continuing membership has
attached secondary meaning to the marks that is identifiable to Complainant’s
goods or services. Molecular Nutrition, Inc. v. Network News & Publ’ns,
FA 156715 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 24, 2003) (approving of and applying the
principles outlined in prior decisions that recognized “common law” trademark
rights as appropriate for protection under the Policy “if the complainant can
establish that it has done business using the name in question in a sufficient
manner to cause a secondary meaning identifiable to Complainant's goods or
services”). Moreover, Respondent, Universal Computing Services c/o George
Fluck, has not, and probably cannot, make a showing that it is MOHAWK CANOE
CLUB or MOHAWK CC or that it is known in the industry as MOHAWK CANOE CLUB or
MOHAWK CC.
Complainant met the requirements of ICANN Policy ¶
4(a)(i), requiring a showing of identicalness to or confusing similarity.
Complainant
established with extrinsic proof that it has common law rights in its business
names and marks. Complainant alleged
that Respondent has no such rights. The
parties do not dispute that Respondent’s agent George Fluck was a member of the
Complainant Club when he registered a domain name using the Complainant’s
mark. The evidence shows that
Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Respondent has made no showing of rights to and legitimate
interests in the domain name that contains in its entirety the protected mark
of the Complainant, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Charles Jourdan Holding AG
v. AAIM,
D2000-0403 (WIPO June 27, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests
where (1) Respondent is not a licensee of Complainant; (2) Complainant’s prior
rights in the domain name precede Respondent’s registration; (3) Respondent is
not commonly known by the domain name in question); see also RMO,
Inc. v. Burbridge, FA 96949 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 16, 2001) (interpreting
Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) "to require a showing that one has been commonly known
by the domain name prior to registration of the domain name to prevail.").
Moreover, Respondent’s diversionary use
of the <mohawkcc.com> domain name does not constitute a bona fide
offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See Disney Enterss, Inc. v. Dot
Stop, FA 145227 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 17, 2003) (finding that Respondent’s
diversionary use of Complainant’s mark to attract Internet users to its own
website, which contained a series of hyperlinks to unrelated websites, was
neither a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain names); see also Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev, 188 F.Supp.2d 110, 114 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding
that, because Respondent's sole purpose in selecting the domain names was to
cause confusion with Complainant's website and marks, its use of the names was
not in connection with the offering of goods or services or any other fair
use).
Part of
Respondent’s claim of rights seems to suggest that it is privileged to use <mohawkcc.com>
because Fluck uses it as a forum for discussion of environmental issues. Respondent argues that its agent Fluck was
assisting Complainant at the inception of the <mohawkcc.com>
domain name and Respondent further asserts that as a partner in Universal
Computing Services, Fluck offered to include information about Complainant’s
club on a website about general paddling information. Even if Complainant acquiesced to having Respondent register a
domain name using the Club’s name, the facts permit an inference that the Club
expected Fluck to be acting on its behalf and Respondent’s submissions permit a
conclusive finding that Fluck knew he was acting for the
Club.
Respondent has
no evidence to justify registering a domain name using marks Complainant has
owned and used for nearly a century before Respondent’s agent came along. Further Respondent has provided no
justification to excuse its continued use of the disputed domain name after the
termination of the relationship with Complainant and such use is not protected
under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). Cf. Vinidex Pty. Ltd. v. Auinger, AF-0402 (eResolution Oct. 18,
2000)(finding that, as a former employee, Respondent knew or should have known
Complainant’s mark was in use as an integral part of the corporate name and as
a trademark and that Respondent understood the legitimate interests and rights
of Complainant and, by contrast, its own lack of interest or right. This is sufficient for Complainant to
establish that Respondent had no rights or interest in the domain name). Complainant showed rights to and legitimate
interests in the marks contained within the disputed domain name; Respondent
showed no such rights.
Complainant satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) requiring it to show rights or
legitimate interests.
Complainant
asserts that Respondent acted in bad faith.
Respondent did not address bad faith.
Because Respondent was a member of Complainant’s canoe club when the
domain name was registered, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s
rights in the MOHAWK CANOE CLUB and MOHAWK CC marks. The knowing conduct of Respondent’s agent GEORGE FLUCK in
registering a domain name containing Complainant’s protected mark but listing
his own company and himself as owner, demonstrates bad faith registration under
Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Digi Int’l
v. DDI Sys., FA 124506 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that “there
is a legal presumption of bad faith, when Respondent reasonably should have
been aware of Complainant’s trademarks, actually or constructively”); see
also Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135,
1148 (9th
Cir. Feb. 11, 2002) (finding that "[w]here an alleged infringer chooses a
mark he knows to be similar to another, one can infer an intent to
confuse").
Moreover,
Respondent continues to mislead the public.
Respondent is knowingly misleading Internet users by using Complainant’s
mark for Respondent’s own purposes.
Such use misleads the Internet user into thinking that opinions given
have the sponsorship of Complainant, an organization that has existed for more
than a century and not Respondent’s agent, a former member. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Bargman, D2000-0222 (WIPO May 29, 2000) (finding that Respondent’s
use of the title “Dodgeviper.com Official Home Page” gave consumers the
impression that Complainant endorsed and sponsored Respondent’s website); cf.
Fendi Adele S.r.l. v. O’Flynn,
D2000-1226 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2000) (transferring the domain name
<fendiboutique.com> where the likelihood of confusion with the trademark
FENDI is increased since Complainant’s fashion products are typically sold in
boutiques and where Respondent obviously tried (or threatened to try) to pass
himself off as a legitimate source for FENDI products).
Respondent’s bad faith here existed from
the outset. Respondent knew the Club
had rights to and legitimate interests in its name—and that it had so for
nearly a Century before Respondent came along—but nonetheless, Respondent
listed itself and its agent, Fluck, as owner of the domain name. Further, when Fluck left the Club,
Respondent continued to use the domain name to the advantage of Respondent
without right, license, or legal or ethical permission to do so. While the Policy lists four circumstances
demonstrating registration and use of a domain name in bad faith, this list
merely illustrates possible situations that demonstrate bad faith. The Panel
may look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the registration and
use of a domain name in determining whether bad faith is present. See Digi
Int’l v. DDI Sys., FA 124506 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 24, 2002) (determining
that Policy paragraph 4(b) sets forth certain circumstances, without
limitation, that shall be evidence of registration and use of a domain name in
bad faith); see also Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Risser, FA 93761 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 18, 2000)
(finding that in determining if a domain name has been registered in bad faith,
the Panel must look at the “totality of circumstances”). Looking to the totality of the
circumstances, the Panel finds that Respondent acted in bad faith.
Complainant satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) requiring a
showing of “bad faith registration and use.”
DECISION
Having
established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel
concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <mohawkcc.com>
domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Hon. Carolyn Marks
Johnson, Panelist
Dated: June 15, 2004
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